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1 - Introduction 
 
The Netherlands has often been depicted as one of the strongholds of a multiculturalist approach. 
Specific measures that have been adopted to further the integration of ‘ethnic minorities’ have been 
discussed extensively, both in national and international (academic as well as non-academic) political 
discourses. Indeed, especially in the 1980s, the Netherlands established various policy practices that 
involved strongly targeted group-specific measures, which would also have a strong influence on 
policies adopted in other European countries. Take for instance the consultation structures with 
migrant organizations that were mimicked in many other countries, preferential treatment programs 
for minority members on the labour market, preferential funding schemes for migrant children at 
schools, or a variety of very ‘visible’ measures to promote the integration of minorities such as 
broadcasting agencies for different (religious) communities.  
 
At the same time, the Netherlands has also been one of the first countries that discarded the 
multicultural model in the 2000s, and adopted a more assimilationist approach. Rather than 
integration, adaptation became a key policy objective, and rather than focusing primarily on socio-
economic participation, the socio-cultural sphere now became much more central to policies.  Take 
for instance the focus on Dutch values and norms in civic integration programs. Again, the 
Netherlands was not the only country to go through an assimilationist turn in the 2000s, but perhaps 
one of the countries where the discourse around assimilationism emerged the earliest and was the 
sharpest.  
 
More recently, a new ‘trend’ or ‘phase’ seems to have gained ground in the Dutch setting, marking 
possibly a new turn in the development of migrant integration policies; ‘mainstreaming.’ Especially 
since the end of the 2000s, and more specifically since the new government coalition led by the 
Liberals came to power in 2010, mainstreaming seems to play an important role in the Dutch policy 
discourse. However, already in the early 2000s the Dutch government was one of the architects of 
the European Common Basic Principles of Integration, which first featured the idea of 
‘mainstreaming’ as one of the basic principles for integration policymaking (Penninx & Scholten, 
forthcoming). As mentioned in the EU case study (Petrovic and Collett, 2014), this was one of the 
first times that mainstreaming emerged on the policy agenda. Furthermore, in 2013-2014 the Dutch 
government commissioned an international study on how best to ‘mainstream’ integration policies 
(Collett & Petrovic, 2014) and organized a high-level policy conference on mainstreaming. Likewise 
several research institutes and scholars have looked into the matter of mainstreaming, or related 
questions of super-diversity and targeting in the field of immigrant integration (see Engbersen, 2014; 
Dagevos & Grundel, 2013; Boutellier et.al., 2012; Ham & van der Meer, 2012; Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken, 2012; Peeters, 2012; RMO, 2012; Van der Zee et.al., 2012). As such, the Dutch 
case is of broader relevance to understanding the mainstreaming trend on a European scale as well.  
 
However, what is meant by ‘mainstreaming’ remains rather indistinct in national as well as local 
policy discourses in the Netherlands. In particular, mainstreaming seems to be used in the Dutch 
context to refer to a retreat from group-specific measures and the embedding of policy measures 
into generic policy frameworks like education, social affairs and housing. Research shows that this 
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trend has indeed been very distinct in national as well as local policies (Scholten, 2013). However, in 
actual (national and local) policies, the term mainstreaming is rarely used explicitly. Also, it is very 
unclear whether the Dutch approach also features other elements of mainstreaming that we defined 
in the literature review of this study (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014), such as poly-centric 
governance and a ‘whole society’ approach that actively approaches diversity as a generic topic to 
various (if not all) policy areas. Criticasters of Dutch mainstreaming argue that it has been driven 
rather by politics of retrenchment than a desire to set a ‘whole society’ approach towards diversity. 
This makes the Dutch case not only a very central case from an international perspective, but also a 
very crucial case for understanding the meaning and implications of mainstreaming in terms of 
actual migrant integration policies. 
 
This report analyses the politics of mainstreaming in the Dutch case, based on the definition of 
mainstreaming that was defined in the literature review conducted in the previous work package of 
this research project (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). We understand mainstreaming as a shift 
toward generic policies oriented at a pluralist society and involving poly-centric forms of 
governance. This means that we do not follow how mainstreaming may be conceptualized in Dutch 
policy discourses nor that we refer only to cases where the concept of mainstreaming is used 
explicitly; rather our study applies to all situations that fit the definition and characteristics of 
mainstreaming as sketched in the previous work package of this research project. The focus of this 
study is on the rationale of mainstreaming, rather than the implementation and impact of 
mainstreaming that will be the subject of subsequent work packages.  Key questions in this study 
are: 
1. What forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration 
policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred?  
2. How have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors contributed or 
obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance? 
3. Why has or has not integration governance been mainstreamed? What explanations can be 
found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between cases 
be explained? 
When analyzing the Dutch case, we will address a set of expectations that have been formulated for 
this work package, regarding how and why mainstreaming will take place under specific 
circumstances. This includes expectations on how the problem setting (migration history, diversity, 
perceived integration issues), policy context (policy history, spin-offs from other areas, crisis or 
retrenchment) and political setting (politicization, populism, and individualization) account for 
different mainstreaming strategies in the Dutch case. In particular, we expect mainstreaming (as in 
our definition) to be more likely in cases with a long migration history, very sizeable migrant groups, 
absence of perceived group specific problems, a history of mainstreaming and spin-offs from 
mainstreaming from other areas, absence of retrenchment, low politicization of integration, weak 
presence of populism, and a relatively high degree of individualization of society. Subsequently, 
addressing the ‘how’ question, we will address the hypotheses formulated in the previous work 
package: if mainstreaming takes place, does that indeed take the form of a ‘whole society approach’ 
oriented at interculturalisation and a polycentric mode of policy coordination? 
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Precisely as mainstreaming speaks to the embedding of immigrant integration into generic policies it 
is required in methodological terms to not focus not only on integration policy as an institutional 
policy domain per se. Therefore, we will focus on two policy areas in which immigrant integration 
policies usually play a key role (that have been selected in the context of the UPSTREAM project at 
large): education and social cohesion. Furthermore, in order to account for the ‘polycentric’ 
dimension of mainstreaming, we will not only look at national policies, but at local policies as well. 
Therefore, besides a national policy analysis, this study also involves an analysis of two cities that are 
known for their decidedly different integration approaches: Rotterdam and Amsterdam (Scholten, 
2013). The analysis is based on qualitative (content) analysis of national as well as local policy 
documents, records of parliamentary and council meetings, research and advisory reports and 
relevant secondary literature. Furthermore, 16 semi-structured interviews were held (6 at the 
national level, 10 at the local level), which includes policymakers as well as politicians, NGO 
representatives and experts (see appendix I for overview of respondents).  
In the following chapter an overview will be given of immigrant integration policies in the 
Netherlands, and the traces of mainstreaming in particular. Subsequently chapter 3 and 4 provide an 
analysis of mainstreaming in the fields of education and social cohesion, at the national as well as 
the local level. The report is concluded in chapter five, highlighting the main trends of (non-
)mainstreaming in the Netherlands.  
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2 - Immigrant integration in the 
Netherlands 
In order to understand when, how and why immigrant integration policies are mainstreamed, it is 
important to first understand the social context and policy setting in which this would take place. In 
the theoretical overview that was produced in the previous work package (Van Breugel, Maan & 
Scholten, 2014), various factors were defined that could be relevant to mainstreaming, such as 
migration history, degree of diversity, and policy history. These factors will be discussed in some 
detail in this chapter, focusing both on the national as on the local level. This also includes an 
analysis of the history of national policies, which provide an important context to the analysis of 
education and social cohesion policies in subsequent chapters. 
2.1  Brief sketch of migration history 
Although the Netherlands is not a traditional immigration country such as the United States or 
Australia, it does have a relatively long history of immigration when compared with other European 
countries. Modern immigration to the Netherlands can be characterized in different phases with 
immigrants coming from the former colonies, including Indonesia and Suriname since respectively 
the 1940’s and 1970’s; the so called ‘guest-workers’ recruited from Southern-Europe, Turkey and 
Morocco in the 1960’s; subsequently asylum migration from the 1980’s as well as considerable 
family migration also since the 1980s in particular, and more recently a new flow of labour migration 
in the form of  ‘mobile-EU-citizens’ working and living in the Netherlands since roughly 2004. Of the 
3,6 million immigrants (on a total population of almost 17 million) the Netherlands currently counts, 
2 million are of non-western descent (see table below). 
 







      
 
Source: adapted from CBS1 
The terminology used in the Dutch immigrant-integration debate has always been contested. The 
terminology used with reference to migrants is also of key importance to this project, as 
mainstreaming is all about how to focus policies while the targets of policies are particularly difficult 
to define. While the current debates speak alternately of ‘migrants’, ‘ethnic minorities’, ‘newcomers’ 
or ‘young men of Moroccan- and Antillean-Dutch descent’2, the Dutch migration debate was long 
                                                          
1Retrieved August 12, 2014, from 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=a&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=0,2-
4&D6=2,6,10,14,l&HD=140812-1158&HDR=T,G2,G3,G5&STB=G1,G4, accessed on the 12th of August 2014 
2 Different terms used in the national ‘Integration Agenda 2013’, retrieved September 8, 2014, from 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/notas/2013/02/19/agenda-integratie.html  
 




population 15 654 192 16 105 285 16 334 210 16 574 989 16 829 289 
 
Allochthons 13 033 792 13 140 336 13 186 595 13 215 386 13 234 545 
Non-western 
allochthon 1 278 453 1 558 353 1 720 050 1 858 294 1 997 584 
Western 
allochthon 1 341 947 1 406 596 1 427 565 1 501 309 1 597 160 
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characterized by the group-based notion of ‘ethnic minorities’ and later the distinction between 
‘allochtoon’ and ‘autochtoon’ citizens. The term ethnic minorities provided the basis for the group-
oriented Minorities Policies of the 1980s, focused on specific groups such as ‘Turks’ and ‘Moluccans’. 
Later the term ‘allochtoon’ was introduced, based on the Greek words allos ('other') and chtoon 
('country')3, the term ‘allochtoon’ refers to someone who is born abroad or of whom at least one 
parent was born abroad4. While intended to introduce a more neutral term with a focus on 
integration (WRR, 1989), the ‘allochthon-autochthon’ division have become hotly debated terms 
themselves. In official discourse the ‘allochtoon’-‘autochtoon’ terminology was abolished, replacing 
it with a variety of alternatives, such as newcomers, new-Dutch, Dutch-Turks and Surinamese Dutch. 
Since so-called second- and even third generation immigrants are often targeted too (so those born 
in the Netherlands), descent rather than migratory status an sich plays an important role in these 
terms. In this report we will primarily speak of respectively immigrant- and native-citizens, unless 
specifically referring to the terminology as employed by Statistics Netherlands such as in the tables 
below. 
 
Currently the ‘allochtoon’-‘autochtoon’ distinction is still applied in official statistics, as kept by 
Statistics Netherlands. The Netherlands has an advanced statistical database keeping track on all 
sorts of social-economic information of its citizens, including data on immigrant background. In their 
data Statistics Netherlands distinguishes between an ‘allochtoon’ of a Western, or non-Western 
background as to distinguish between the foreign-born with socio-economic difficulties and those 
that fared better in society, curiously marking for example Indonesians and Japanese as Western 
‘allochthones’ (Guiraudon, Phalet & Ter Wal, 2005, p.78). Annually, respectively Statistics 
Netherlands (CBS) or the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) publishes a report on the 
social economic position of immigrants and the status of integration in the Netherlands in different 
social fields. While immigrant integration policies are increasingly moving towards generically 
targeted policies, the monitoring of ethnicity still plays an important role. While not as explicit as 
before, this is has to do with the Dutch aim of “‘evenredigheid’, i.e. proportional participation for 
comparable groups with or without a migrant background” (Verbeek, Entzinger & Scholten, 
forthcoming) as monitored in these yearly studies. In the 2011 Memorandum on Integration the 
Coalition explicitly addressed the importance of ethnic monitoring under generic policies “to hold a 
good overview on the process of integration and effects of generic policies” claiming that amidst the 
cuts in integration-budgets the resources for monitoring should be maintained (Ministerie van 
Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties [BZK], 2011, p.12)5.  
 
Statistical monitoring is well developed and institutionalized at the local level as well. Our case 
studies, the cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam, have their own research and statistics departments 
and advisory bodies6. Both cities annually publish generic monitors on the demographics and social- 
economic- and political developments in the city, as well as specific monitors on the status of 
‘diversity and integration’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004; 2010; 2012) or later ‘citizenship and 
integration’ (2013) in Amsterdam and ‘participation and citizenship’ in Rotterdam (2009; 2010; 
                                                          
3 Retrieved September 8, 2014, from http://onzetaal.nl/taaladvies/advies/allochtonen  
4 Retrieved September 8, 2014, from http://www.cbs.nl/en-GB/menu/themas/dossiers/allochtonen/ 
methoden/begrippen/default.htm?Languageswitch=on&ConceptID=37  
5 All translations to English by the authors of this report. 
6 Respectively the ‘Bureau Onderzoek en Statistiek’ and the ‘Adviesraad Diversiteit en Integratie’[ADI] in Amsterdam and 
the ‘Onderzoek en Business Intelligence’ in Rotterdam. 
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2011X). As part of a special Antilleans-program the municipality of Rotterdam also published specific 
monitors on ‘Antillean Rotterdammers’ (2009b; 2011Xb). Equally Rotterdam publishes a monitor on 
the EU-foreign workers program. Additionally some specific publications have been very influential 
on Rotterdam policy making, such as a prognoses on future city-demographics as published by 
Statistics Netherlands in 2003 which eventually caused a debate on (forced) spreading of 
disadvantaged citizens through the city (see chapter four). While more recently the joint publication 
on the ‘The Status of Integration’ (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012) in the cities of Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam was one the causes that put integration back on the map.  
A diversification of the immigrant population 
A complicating factor regarding the use of target group labels in the Dutch immigrant integration 
debate is the diversification of migration-related diversity in the Netherlands. Not only have the 
absolute numbers and relative percentages of people with an immigration background increased 
significantly (in some cities around 50% of the total population), the diversity of involved immigrant 
groups has increased significantly as well. Furthermore, some of these migrant groups have been in 
the Netherlands for so long, that there is a very sizeable second (for some groups now even larger 
than the first generation) and even third generation as well. As such, the label ‘super-diversity’ 
applies rather well to the Dutch situation.  
To understand this diversification, a brief account of Dutch migration history is required. The 
independence of Indonesia in 1949 and that of Suriname in 1975 led to the main migratory 
movements from the former colonies in the second half of the 20th century, a large part of these 
migrants held Dutch state-citizenship. The guest workers that were recruited in the 1960’s and later 
arriving ‘spontaneously’ came to the Netherlands for economic reasons. While their presence was 
believed to be temporary, the so-called guest workers eventually did settle down in the Netherlands, 
later having their families coming over to build up their lives in the Netherlands. After labour 
migration of this category ended in the 1970s, family migration in the form of first family 
reunification and later family formation continues until the present day.  
The four biggest groups of non-Western immigrants in the Netherlands are the Turks, Moroccans, 
Surinamese and Antilleans, originating from these first two waves of immigration. Their number is 
still increasing, primarily by the birth of second generations rather than by immigration. This makes 
the group of non-western immigrants relatively young (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek [CBS], 
2012, p.30). Since a few years the majority of the Turkish and Moroccan population is of the second 
generation (Huijnk, Gijsberts & Dagevos, 2014, p.32). While not officially counted as immigrant or 
‘allochtoon’ the so-called ‘third generation’ immigrants form a new group in immigrant integration 
policies. Officially the definition of ‘allochtoon’ limits itself to first and second generation immigrants 
(by registering country of birth up to once parents), and ‘third generation’ therefore should be 
considered ‘Dutch.’ However in 2010 the Ministry of Wellbeing, Health and Sport had a study 
conducted on the so-called third generation immigrants, in order to gain insight in the processes of 
integration and to examine the effectiveness of immigrant integration policies on the ‘third-
generation’7. In the study they stress the difference between first, second and third generation 
immigrants as well as the diversity within these generation with regard to their diverse background 
and different levels of social economic integration (CBS, 2010). The growing group of ‘third 
                                                          
7 While not registered as such information on the third generations can be drawn from the municipal registers based on 
country of origin of child, parents and grandparents as far as these are available (CBS, 2010).   
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generation’ immigrants increasingly forms an important portion of the perceived immigrant-groups 
and targets of policies and monitoring (Gijsberts, Huijnk and Dagevos, 2012).  
Another category of immigrants that can be distinguished are refugees, consisting of various groups 
of very different origin. The last twenty years immigrants from mainly Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran and 
Somalia have come to the Netherlands for political and humanitarian reasons. The influx of these 
groups consists mainly of family-members of settled refugees rather than asylum-seekers 
themselves (CBS, 2012, p.11), although recent figures over the years 2012-2014 show a gradual 
increase of asylum migration again. Thirdly there is the group of mobile workers from Poland, 
Bulgaria and Romania. Next to the strong increase of immigration of these groups between 2004 and 
2007, emigration has also risen (CBS, 2012, p.12).  In general, there are strong patterns recognizable 
between immigration and emigration. The migration ‘balance’ (immigration minus emigration) 
varied from 50 thousand in 2000 till minus 30 thousand between 2005 and 2006, since 2008 the 
migration balance has been stable, reaching approximately 30 thousand per year (CBS, 2012, p.42). 
The economic crisis in the Netherlands has not yet led to a decrease in immigration (CBS, 2012, 
p.41). 
The diversification of migration groups, in terms of descent, generation and more in general in their 
levels of social-economic integration and participation raises questions in terms of targeting 
immigrant integration policies. In 2004 for example standard group-based minority-policies were no 
longer considered appropriate, one of the reasons mentioned is the fact that “within and between 
minority groups there are big differences in terms of degree of integration and in terms of 
disadvantages” (Tweede Kamer, 2004b). This indicates a first cautious step towards generic policies. 
The unofficial category of third generation migrants also raises questions as to when integration is 
achieved; when does the third generation become ‘integrated’? Or will there also be a need to 
define a fourth and fifth generation? What does this say about the Dutch case, in contrast to for 
example the French case where newcomers after five years are considered ‘French’ (Bozec & Simon, 
2014). To get a better understanding of the Dutch particularities in the field of immigrant integration 
and its patterns of mainstreaming some of the main developments in immigration policy are 
addressed below. 
2.2 City cases: Amsterdam and Rotterdam demographics 
The diversification of diversity applies perhaps most to the two major cities of the Netherlands 
Amsterdam (811.185 inhabitants8) and Rotterdam (619.826 inhabitants9) that have received most 
immigration over the past decades. Known as respectively the capital- and a harbour city, 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam show distinctive patterns in demographics and politics.  However, both 
can clearly be defined as ‘super-diverse’ cities, although in somewhat different ways.  
 
The four major immigrant groups are present in both cities, though Rotterdam has a bigger Antillean 
population (3,6% in 2010, against 1,5% in Amsterdam) while Amsterdam hosts a bigger population of 
Moroccan descent (9,0% in 2010 against 6,6% in Rotterdam)10.  The development of these groups 
                                                          
8 Retrieved august 13, 2014, from http://www.iamsterdam.com/nl-NL/experience/over-amsterdam/feiten-en-cijfers 
9 Gemeente Rotterdam (2014). Feitenkaart Bevolkingsmonitor juli 2014. Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam. 
10 All data based on (Scheffer and Entzinger, 2012). More recent, comparable data are not available thus based on the data 
from 2010. 
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are rather stable through time, with the rise of ‘other non-western groups’ as its most remarkable 
exception in Rotterdam (rising from 7,5% to over 10% between 2000-2010). The Surinamese 
population forms the biggest ethnic group in both cities making up respectively 9,0% in Amsterdam 
and 8,9% in Rotterdam.   
 
Table 2 -  2010 demographics by descent  
 Rotterdam Amsterdam 
 number percentage number percentage 
Surinamese 52.632 8,9 68.881 9,0 
Antilleans 21.066 3,6 11.689 1,5 
Turks 46.868 7,9 40.370 5,3 
Moroccans 38.982 6,6 69.439 9,0 
Other non-western 
immigrants 
59.379 10,0 77.832 10,1 
Western  immigrants 63.849 10,8 114.553 14,9 
Native population 310.163 52,3 385.009 50,1 
Total 592.939 100 767.773 100 
Source: adapted from Scheffer and Entzinger (2012) 
 
Since the EU-expansion in 2004 and 2007 the number of migrants from Central- and East-Europe to 
the Netherlands has grown. Particularly Rotterdam, amongst other areas, hosts a large number of 
these so-called ‘EU-mobile citizens’ with 9.088 official registrations at the Municipal Populations 
Register in 2012. Because many of these immigrants are not registered some believe this number 
should be multiplied by two or three to equal the number actually present in the city (Engbersen, 
2014, p.7). 
 
Both cities are highly diverse, with a large cohort of young, second generation, immigrants. The 
segment of second generation immigrants has risen quickly since 2000, with second generation 
immigrants (western and non-western) making up 20,8% and 21,4% percent of the total population 
in Rotterdam and Amsterdam (against respectively 26,9% and 28,4% first generation immigrants)  
(Entzinger & Scheffer 2012, p.68). In the age category of 0-14 years old immigrants make up 61,1% 
(52,5% non-western; 8,6% western immigrants) and 62,7% of the total population in Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam.  
Rotterdam 
Rotterdam is a working-class city that has, up to 2002, almost permanently been led by the social 
democrats, the Partij van de Arbeid. The city is often characterized as a social laboratory, 
experimenting with new policies exploring the boundaries of what is legally permitted, such as the 
‘Wet Bijzondere Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek’, also known as the Rotterdam Act, 
aiming at residential desegregation of low-income groups (as a proxy for ethnicity) throughout the 
city. On the other hand, social cohesion and well-being policies in Rotterdam for a long time had a 
rather informal character, aimed at the support of minorities or immigrants through specific projects 
by an emphasis on cultural expressions and role models (e.g. the action-program ‘Veelkleurige Stad 
1998). “Migration policies had an atmosphere of ‘let a thousand flowers bloom’. The sudden rise of 
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Liveable Rotterdam [at the 2002 elections] was a conceivable response of part of the Rotterdam 
population to this attitude” (Rensen, 2013, p.218). This newly launched local party, launched by Pim 
Fortuyn, received almost 35 per cent of the votes in the 2002 and gained 17 seats (Uitermark & 
Duyvendak, 2008). Liveable Rotterdam can be considered the local expression of the backlash 
against multiculturalism.  
After its spectacular electoral victory Leefbaar Rotterdam formed a coalition with CDA and VVD 
(2002-2006), putting immigrant integration high on the agenda. This marked a transition to 
restrictive and more normative integration policies after years of labour led coalitions. Instead of the 
dialogue and connection that were central to immigrant integration before, the policies from then 
on centered around the immigrants own responsibility in 'their' (integration) disadvantages. Despite 
partly settling the casualty around these policy practices, the cooperation with many migrant self-
organizations continued for a long time, only breaking down under financial pressure (and larger 
administrative reforms) years later. So despite being framed in strong terms, categorical policies and 
financial support continued for a long time, illustrating that the political pressure is perhaps only the 
first step in putting these reforms on the agenda. Between 2006-2014 it was citizenship rather than 
integration that was on the agenda, focusing strongly on social cohesion, participation or bonding. 
Integration and migration are completely absent in this period, or “reformulated in terms of safety 
issues” (Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). One exception here is the special program ‘Antillean 
approach’ (see a.o. De Boom, Van San, Weltevrede & Hermus, 2009; Burgemeester en Wethouders 
[B&W] Rotterdam, 2009c).  
After losing power in the 2010 elections, Livable Rotterdam recently retained control over the 
Rotterdam City Hall in 2014, by winning the local elections with a tiny margin from the Social 
Democrats. A recently installed Coalition of Leefbaar Rotterdam, D66 and CDA once again explicitly 
addresses immigrant integration as an independent policy field. Over the past years it has also 
addressed new issues, such as the settling and integration of immigrants, or mobile citizens, from 
Central- and Eastern Europe. 
Amsterdam 
Amsterdam too has a significant immigrant population, counting for roughly 50 percent of the city 
population. The city has a fairly stable political climate, with a long tradition of Social-democrat 
(Partij van de Arbeid) rule in the City Hall. In this setting immigrant integration policies have become 
less contested than in Rotterdam, being characterized by its multicultural policies with a strong 
emphasis on emancipation. However the city was befallen by the sudden murder on filmmaker and 
columnist Theo van Gogh by a radicalized second generation Dutch-Moroccan in 2004. This put 
segregation, polarization and radicalization on the map changing the outlook of integration in 
Amsterdam. These developments will be addressed in more detail in chapter four on social cohesion 
policies. 
 
When compared to the national level and to Rotterdam, the actual move away from integration 
polices to citizenship and diversity policies came rather late in Amsterdam, around the year of 2010 
(B&W Amsterdam, 2003). Although self-organizations are not supported as such, financial support is 
available on the basis of projects (Ham & Van der Meer, 2012). The citizenship and diversity 
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department takes on an active role in bringing the projects and organizations together11.  Despite 
the generic approach Amsterdam also took part in the Antilleans and the Moroccans-approach. 
Although the latter is framed in generic-youth terms and social-economic background (2012). While 
coordinated at the city level, many of the immigrant integration policies are executed from the 
district-level.  
 
Both cities do no longer speak of immigrant integration policies but instead work on citizenship and 
diversity, which can be understood as a development of mainstreaming. How exactly this developed 
will be addressed in the specific fields of education and social cohesion in the subsequent chapters. 
 
2.3 Background of national migrant integration policies 
Although the use of the term mainstreaming is relatively new in the Dutch case study, the process of 
mainstreaming (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014) has been of relevance for a much longer time. 
Especially the issue of whether to conduct generic or specific policies has a long tradition in Dutch 
policies. To some extent this applies as well for the dimension of policy-centric governance, 
especially in the context of policy decentralization. Therefore, this paragraph will give a brief 
historical account of ‘mainstreaming’ in Dutch immigrant integration policies.  
From Ethnic Minorities to Integration Policies 
In the first two decennia after the Second World War the Netherlands was primarily characterized as 
an emigration country. Consequently, early immigrant integration policies up to the late seventies 
consisted solely of separate ad-hoc policy measures relating to foreign workers (Wetenschappelijke 
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid [WRR], 2001, p.168) and a few policies targeting Surinamese, 
Antilleans, Moluccans, travelers and gypsies- scattered between different departments. In this 
period it was believed that a coordinated integration policy was not required as “the Netherlands 
was not and should not be an immigrant-country” (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.28). The aim of 
‘integration while maintaining one’s own culture’ was strongly informed by the idea of temporary 
residence (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.19-23). In the seventies a number of incidents (e.g. hijacking of 
trains by Moluccan youths, riots and attacks on Turkish dwellings in the Afrikaanderwijk in 
Rotterdam) put interethnic-tensions and the socio-economic deprivation of several immigrant 
groups on the agenda.  
Faced with the growing tension between the norm of not being a country of immigration and the 
reality of rising numbers of immigrants and clearly signals permanent residence, the Dutch 
government drafted its first ‘minority’ policy in 1983. This involved the launch of an Ethnic Minorities 
Policy, with a focus on the social-economic disadvantage of immigrants and an improvement of their 
legal position. This policy marks a shift towards emancipation of specific minority-groups. Immigrant 
integration policies in this era focus on social skills and the Dutch language, as well as education in 
the own language and culture, and, additionally intercultural education. Minority self-organizations 
that stimulated emancipation were supported financially (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.37). Primarily 
specific in focus, immigrant integration policies were oriented towards a plural vision of society with 
“a sustainable multicultural character” (Tweede Kamer, 1983).  
                                                          
11 Interview with head of the department citizenship and diversity, Amsterdam, 20th of June 2014. 
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The nineties saw a move from Ethnic Minorities policies to integration-policies, with a focus on 
citizenship and integration in Dutch society (Tweede Kamer, 1994). The shift indicates a transition 
from specific approach on the emancipation of minorities to an intensification of generic integration 
policies (Scholten, 2011, p.138). This can be understood as a first move towards mainstreaming. On 
the one hand this meant a move from specifically targeted minority policies to more generic 
integration policies in terms of policy-targeting. However it should be remarked that, strongly 
informed by the idea of proportionality, this decade was still characterized by a high degree of 
specifically targeted policies to increase levels of participation in the fields of education, housing and 
the labour-market such as the 'Wet Bevordering Evenredige Arbeidsdeelname Allochtonen' (Wet 
BEAA), an act intended to encourage the equal labour participation of immigrants.  
The move towards more generic integration policies was closely associated to a shift from Ethnic 
Minorities policies as a stand-alone field to stronger deconcentration of policy responsibilities to 
colleague-departments and decentralization the local level. This also reflected a clear trend of 
mainstreaming in this period already. The Memorandum of 1994 addressed the role of 
municipalities in “shaping and implementing immigrant integration policies”, whilst the national 
government kept a “regulating and controlling task” (Tweede Kamer, 1994: p.23). Parallel, the so-
called ‘Big Cities Policy’-programs (Grotestedenbeleid: GSB) were drafted between 1995-1999 and 
later between 1999-2003. The programs focused on the fields work, education, safety, livability and 
care and the physical, economic and social infrastructure in urbanized-areas. Combined in one 
Ministry of Big City- and Integration Policies in 199812, immigrant integration policies in this period 
were likewise phrased in broad terms, focusing on ‘active citizenship’ and the role of the native 
population in integration policies as well as the high diversities amongst immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 
2004, p.48). These developments involved a move toward horizontal and vertical policy governance, 
which can be considered the first case of mainstreaming in terms of polycentric governance (Van 
Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, p.25-26). Non-governmental organizations such as a selected group 
of migrant self-organizations have been formally integrated in consultation structures (e.g. LOM). 
Based on gender policies mainstreaming is associated with a de-concentration of policy governance, 
sharing policy responsibilities between different (non)-governmental actors, as can be recognized in 




                                                          
12 While initially coordinated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Big City- and Integration Policies in 1998 
was the first Ministry focusing on immigrant integration affairs as a separate field. However as a Ministry without portfolio 
the Ministry formed part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  
In the subsequent coalitions this was continued in different forms under the Ministry of Justice (2002-2007), Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (2007-2010); the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2010-
2012). Since 2012 Immigrant Integration no longer holds a separate Ministry but is now again hosted generically, this time 
under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
For an overview of the Ministries see appendix II 
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Institutionalized consultation structures 
In 1985, along with drafting the first Immigrant Integration policies a national advisory committee on 
the same topic was established (LAO). Based on "the Dutch tradition of consultation and consensus 
based conflict management" (Musch, 2010, p.112) and a pillarized model of integration.. ".. the 
political elites of different groups of ethnic minorities were integrated in a national advisory and 
consultation structure, asking them to establish representative organizations who could be consulted 
for policy proposals." (Musch, 2010, p.104-105). In 1997 this structure was reformed to the new 
'Consultation Committee on Minority Policy' (LOM) 13 . The Committee served as an official 
consultation-structure in which the government regularly consulted a selected group of ethnic 
minority-organizations on relevant political and societal developments. While previously entitled as 
official advisers to the government (Musch, 2010, p. 105), this power was restricted however a 
regular consultation structure was maintained. Throughout the years the Committee represented 
immigrant-groups from Southern Europe, Turkey, Morocco, the Moluccans, Suriname, the 
Caribbean, China and an organization representing refugees.  
Under Verdonk (2003-2006) the representativeness of the organizations was under discussion, with 
a revision of the financial support for these organizations as these were considered too strongly 
dominated by first generation migrants.14 While throughout the years LOM's mandate broadened 
from consolatory advise to 'signaling' and 'canalizing' sentiments in the migrant communities and 
the Dutch society and additional councils and advisory platforms were initiated in the turbulent early 
2000's15  overall the functioning of the structure and its representative bodies has remained 
relatively stable, until it was withdrawn all together  in 2013 as part of a broader move away from 
specifically targeted policies.  In line with the latest Agenda on Integration (2013) it is acclaimed that 
people should be addressed "on their talents and behavior individually instead of their descent or the 
ethnic group they account themselves too, or are accounted to by others" (Eerste Kamer, 2013). 
Instead, the government believes a flexible dialogue without a legal basis or fixed representative 
groups is more suitable (Eerste Kamer, 2013). Beyond this official discourse however the move 
should also be understood in a shift away from specific and 'beneficial' policies marked by the 
backlash against the multi-cultural inheritance of its preceding years. The austerity-measures 
announced in the Integration Memorandum of 2011 marked the demolition of other players too, 
such as Forum, a knowledge institute for 'Multicultural Affairs’.  
Based on policy developments since the seventies we can conclude that immigrant integration in 
these twenty years has developed from temporarily to accommodative policies geared towards 
emancipation of specifically targeted 'minorities', based on a multicultural model. In the nineties 
some first steps towards generic policies were set with the move from ethnic minorities to 
integration policies. However at the same time immigrant integration policies remained informed by 
the idea of proportionality, continuing all sorts of specifically targeted programs. The introduction of 
                                                          
13 Anchored in the Act on Consulting Minority-policy (WOM) 
14 Interview with program coordinator migrant organization, Utrecht 30th of June 2014. 
15 In response to the murder on filmmaker Theo van Gogh an additional Integration Council was established in 2005, 
involved in the implementation of policy measures. Between 2004 and 2006 a special Islamic platform was established in 
the context of integration issues. Eventually in the structure of the Inter-Islamic Platform of governmental issues (IPO) e.g. 
the 'Contact-body Muslims and Government' (CMO) and 'Contactgroup Islam' (CGI) were regularly consulted. By now these 
structures have been abolished, although CMO is still consulted on a flexible basis.  
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a separate Ministry responsible for integration meant an institutionalization of specific and separate 
immigrant integration policies.  
The Dutch Assimilationist turn 
The focus on local governments and the accessibility of generic facilities and instruments remained 
central to immigrant integration policies throughout the early 2000’s (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.52). 
However, like many European countries, the Netherlands experienced ‘an assimilationist turn’ in this 
decade (Scholten, 2011, p.138). With the visibility of ongoing immigration, particularly consisting of 
family- and asylum migration, and high fertility rates among ‘old migrants’ (Scholten, 2011, p.185) 
integration was placed in the context of restricting immigration (see: Minister voor Grote Steden- en 
Integratiebeleid, 2002) and furthering civic integration as a condition for the successful integration 
of immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.56).   
 
The early 2000's mark a turbulent political period in immigrant integration. In an influential opinion 
piece published in one of the national newspapers, social-scientist Paul Scheffer (2000) declared the 
renowned Dutch multicultural model ‘a tragedy’ and ‘a failure’. The opinion piece led to a 
Parliamentary debate and marked a shift in thinking on immigrant integration and issues of 
identification. The presumed ‘Dutch tolerance’ is under pressure, hardening the tone of the debate. 
The strong language of the ‘new realist’ approach translates into the spectacular rise of Pim Fortuyn 
and his party LPF in the 2002 elections (Scholten, 2011, p.197). Fortuyn phrased immigrant 
integration in assimilationist terms, defining migrants in terms of socio-cultural, and religious 
differences: “[i]n order to preserve Dutch culture and identity and to compensate for the social-
cultural deprivation of migrants, Fortuyn argued for a more obligatory approach to integration that 
also involved adaptation to Dutch norms and values” (Scholten, 2011, p.196). After their successful 
election the LPF formed part of the Coalition of the Balkenende I Cabinet, which listed immigrant 
integration high on the political agenda. Resulting in a sharp and obligatory tone in the 
Memorandum on Integration, with a strong focus on combatting segregation in a physical, social and 
mental sense (Tweede Kamer, 2004, p.60; Scholten, 2011, p.196).  
 
On the whole all these development led to public unrest on the effects of immigrant integration 
policies, eventually leading to a parliamentary Investigative committee, also known as the Blok 
Committee, that was meant to evaluate the ‘causes for failure’ of Dutch immigrant integration 
policies16. In the midst of this commotion the ‘Integration policy - New Style’ was published in 
September 2003. The Memorandum stresses the importance of unity and sharing, "Shared 
citizenship’ for both immigrant as well as native citizens is the aim of the immigrant integration 
policies" (Minister voor Vreemdelingezaken en Integratie [VI], 2003), explicitly challenging "the 
previous acceptation of differences as a value in itself". In terms of mainstreaming the policies 
strongly move away from accommodative and specifically targeted policies. Another notable 
development is the emphasis on social cohesion and the social cultural dimension of integration. 
Moving away from the old slogan 'integration whilst maintaining one’s own culture' integration is 
addressed in terms of 'shared citizenship'. While this partly opens the integration debate to a more 
                                                          
16 After an extensive study of immigrant integration policies of the last thirty years the Committee concluded that the 
process of integration for many immigrants had been “a total or partial success” (Scholten 2011: p. 194). The whole 
process of the research, and particularly its moderate outcome led to strong response in- and outside the Parliament, as 
the Commission's conclusions strongly diverged from the public and political sentiments on immigrant integration.  
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generic and dual process, most policy measures seem to be directed at the cultural adaptation of 
immigrant to the Dutch norms and values.   
 
So, while policies in the early 2000's moved away from the multicultural, specifically targeted 
policies of the previous decade the influence of the assimilationist turn seems contraire to 
mainstreaming. Whilst placing the more inclusive message of social cohesion and a more generic 
approach of integration on the agenda, policies still mainly separately target immigrants, now in 
terms of social cultural adaptation. This 'dilemma of recognition' is typical of the policy model of 
assimilation: by emphasizing the costs of accommodation, e.g. stigmatization and reinforcing 
cultural boundaries, the tradition promotes denial (De Zwart, 2005, p.139). In terms of policy 
governance, immigrant integration remained a separate policy field under the coordination of its 
own Minister (though still without portfolio)17. The polarization and mediatization of the integration 
debate that mark this period put the policy field at the center of attention.  
Recent developments 
While the early years of 2000 were characterized by a strong focus on commonality and a shared 
sense of citizenship, emphasizing the necessity to speak Dutch and to have a shared set of values 
and norms, the debate on immigrant integration shifted once again between about 2007 and 2014. 
In this period the emphasis was increasingly put on neighborhood policies, connecting immigrant 
integration to issues of urban affairs. It was under the fourth Balkenende government (2007-2010), 
that the programme for urban neighborhood priorities was launched (‘Krachtwijken’), very similar to 
those that had been developed in France. Furthermore, possibly as a reflection of the strong 
presence of Christen Democrats and the Christian Union in this government, more emphasis was put 
on intercultural and interreligious dialogue programs, taking plurality, openness and an 
understanding of diversity as basic principles to overcome segregation and discrimination. On the 
other hand a stronger emphasis on the integration obligations of immigrants is visible in the 
development of civic integration courses in these same years. The Civic Integration Act in 2007, 
obliging non-EU immigrants to take a civic-integration exam before obtaining a residence permit, 
formalizes the link between immigration and integration further. The preparation of this law had, 
however, begun during earlier government coalitions, as of 2003.  
The citizenship frame; from social inclusion to civic integration courses 
 
The assimilationist turn in the early 2000's, which led to the awareness that social and cultural 
integration did not automatically follow from social and economic mobility and emancipation within 
the own group, led to the introduction of obligatory civic-integration courses and a naturalization-
exam. These were aimed at promoting citizenship and social cohesion. Whilst already introduced in 
1994, the term 'citizenship' served as a 'guiding principle for a new vision on the presence of people 
from diverse cultures in the Netherlands' (Pierik, 2012, p.31; Tweede Kamer, 1994). The government 
thereby explicitly targeted newly arrived migrants, as well as immigrants residing in the Netherlands 
for a longer time and native Dutch citizens. Whilst the citizenship terminology on the hand opens the 
integration debate to a generic message addressing both immigrant and native Dutch citizens, on 
the other hand this terminology initiated the debate on social and cultural integration, eventually 
leading to the Act on Civic Integration of Newcomers (WIN) in 1998. The Act was replaced by the act 
                                                          
17 For an overview of the Ministries see appendix II. 
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on Civic Integration (WI) in 2007, which introduced an obligatory civic-integration exam. In 2012 the 
Act was again adjusted, withdrawing the financial support previously offered to participating 
immigrants. While the citizenship-discourse on the hand links integration to a broader generic 
message, the increasing restrictions on the civic integration courses- and exams link the topic to 
immigration in a narrow sense and should be understood in terms of restricting regulation and the 
assimilationist backlash against redistributive policies (De Zwart, 2005, p.139).  
 
 At the same time this period saw the rise of the new Party for Freedom (PVV) who gained nine seats 
in the national elections of 2006, and has been represented in parliament ever since. With 
immigration high on the agenda the PVV has dominated many discussions on and the framing of 
immigrant integration issues, from double nationalities18 to a proposal for tax on headscarves19, and 
parliamentary debates on the ‘costs’ of immigration20 and the so-called ‘Moroccans-debate’21.  
While the first steps in mainstreaming were set in the nineties, with a move to more generic 
integration policies, decentralizing part of the policy responsibilities to colleague-departments, the 
field was further deconcentrated during the 2000’s. The Cabinet explicitly distanced itself from the 
“relativism enclosed in the concept of the multicultural society” in 2011 (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.15). 
In the memorandum the Cabinet states that increased pluriformity and diversity do not 
automatically lead to shared norms, but that this instead requires effort of those who come to settle 
here. The government expresses in more linear and assimilationist terms now that: "Our society has 
indeed been partly shaped by the migrants that settled here too, but is not interchangeable for any 
other society what so ever...integration therefor is about integration in Dutch society.. .. Dutch 
society in all its diversity is the society in which those who come to settle in the Netherlands, have to 
learn to live, to which they will have to adapt and have to fit in” (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.5). The 
Integration Agenda (Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid [SZW], 2013) of the current 
government continues the focus on "Dutch society and its values" (Minister SZW, 2013b) and strives 
for equal treatment of all its citizens, working towards a society where people can develop 
themselves unhindered and independently to contribute to Dutch society. So while the move to 
generic policies was initiated in the 90's already, it was primarily the rephrasing in assimilationist 
terms that indicates a second step in this direction in the 2000's. With a strong focus on individual 
responsibility and a monist adaptation to Dutch society the question rises in how far this links to the 
concept of mainstreaming.  
In terms of policy targeting the increased diversity amongst immigrant groups in 2004 led to the 
consideration that group-policies in general are not useful, focusing on generic policies in ‘most 
areas’ instead (Tweede Kamer, 2004c). Reaffirmed in the more intercultural years of 2007, where 
specific policies are only applied under ‘extra-ordinary’ circumstances. In 2011, this is taken a step 
further under the motto ‘future over descent’ policies are centered around individuals rather than 
                                                          
18 Retrieved from, http://nos.nl/artikel/60652-beroering-over-dubbele-nationaliteit.html 
19 Retrieved from, http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1166140/2009/09/16/Wilders-wil-
kopvoddentaks.dhtml 
20 In 2009 the PVV requested a cost-benefit analysis of the Parliament on the presence of immigrants in the Netherlands, 
this led to a parliamentary debate on the 8th of September 2009. Retrieved from, 
http://www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4324/Nieuws/article/detail/1169390/2009/07/22/PVV-Wat-kost-ons-de-allochtoon.dhtml  
21The debate was requested by the PVV following the death of a soccer-referee who got molested by a group of youngsters 
of immigrant descent. The PVV framed the incident a ‘Moroccan-problem’ and an example of ‘Moroccan-violence’. 
Retrieved from, http://www.spitsnieuws.nl/archives/binnenland/2012/12/dood-grensrechter-marokkanenprobleem  
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groups, therefor specific problems are from then on “addressed through generic policies only” 
(Ministerie BZK, 2011). Overall we see a shift in emphasis here from emancipatory specifically 
targeted policies in the 80’s to the accessibility of generic policies in this period. This development is 
characterized by a move from a multicultural approach to a recognition of increased diversity and 
individualization of targeting on the one hand, and general decentralizations in the social sector on 
the other. As summarized by one of our respondents: "sometimes it is said that it [mainstreaming] is 
a new development, however, de facto this development has been going on much longer already".22  
Roughly speaking, throughout the years immigrant integration policy has been limited to civic 
integration courses and re-migration policies. In fact, in 2011 it was announced that the budget for 
immigrant integration will be reduced to zero by the year of 2015. The Integration Memorandum of 
2011 stated that by 2015 all subsidies from the national government for integration will be cut 
(Ministerie BZK, 2011. p.11); "knowledge, based on research and networks, will then be the most 
important service of our department"23.  
While throughout the 2000's the respective Ministers took an active coordination role (see a.o. 
Minister VI, 2003; Tweede Kamer, 2005) references to colleague departments are very scarce in the 
2011 Memorandum. Though slightly extended again in 2013, in general the past years are 
characterized by strong decentralizations in the social sector and move towards the so-called 
‘participatory-society’. While the policies fields of integration and education partly overlap, and 
occasionally coordinate, education policies fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education, 
Culture and Science and are thus ruled from a different department than immigrant integration 
policies.  Except from the period between 2007-2010 and the current government since 2012, the 
ministerial position on integration has been held by CDA (Christen Democrats) candidates, 
noteworthy with regard to religion-related questions such as faith schools and the freedom to 
choose a school24. How these two policy-fields relate and how mainstreaming has affected this, will 
be addressed in chapter three on education policies.   
 
In terms of vertical governance, the cooperation between the state and local governments is central. 
Throughout the last ten years, social cohesion, as a prime objective of immigrant integration 
policies, is increasingly phrased in local and neighborhood terms, placing the work- and living-
environment of people central in the policy design (Tweede Kamer, 2006).  The national government 
works together with local governments through programs such as 'Big Cities Policy' (since 1994), 
more recently the GIA-program or specific programs such as the decentralized ‘Antilleans Policy’25. 
The aim of GIA, 'Collective Integration Agenda' in 2008, was to adjust local and national integration 
policies, creating dual, though unified policies (Huinder, 2013, p.197). This can be considered a 
preamble to big decentralizations that followed in 2011. Consequently GIA II (renamed 'Collective 
Integrated Approach') in 2012 focused around questions of mainstreaming, dealing with immigrant 
integration issues through generic policies26. 
                                                          
22 Interview with policy advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
The Hague 26th of June 2014 
23 Interview with Head of the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, The 
Hague 28th of May 2014 
24 Between 2007-2010 and since 2012 there is a Minister from the PvdA 
25 Initiated from the national level by financial support for seven municpalities with the largest Antillean-community. 
26 Interview with policy officer Forum (knowledge-center for multicultural affairs), Utrecht, 27th of June 2014 
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2. 4  Conclusion: the context of mainstreaming in the Netherlands 
This chapter has made clear that mainstreaming has been an incremental development in the 
Netherlands over the past two to three decades, rather than a sudden policy punctuation over the 
past years. Although it is true that the term mainstreaming has not been used until very recently 
(and even now tends not to be mentioned explicitly in policy documents), a shift from target group 
specific to generic policies has been taking shape already since the 1970s. Ever since the 1970s when 
policies were primarily target group specific and ad-hoc, the balance between specific and generic 
policies has been shifting towards the latter. Already in the 1980s in the context of the Ethnic 
Minorities Policy, the aim was to have generic policies wherever possible, and specific policies 
wherever required. This was reflected in particular in target group specific policies in the socio-
cultural domain, but generic policies in the socio-economic domain (where the budget was 
concentrated). The Integration Policy of the 1990s made the generic focus of policies even more 
distinct, abandoning the focus on minority groups for a focus on individual migrants that were to 
become citizens in the Dutch context. Although the assimilationist turn of the early 2000s partly 
continued this civic turn in Dutch integration policies, it also reintroduced a group-orientation, 
especially by problematizing the socio-cultural background of specific groups.  
The most recent policy episode, which starts around 2007-2010, can be considered a closing piece to 
this trend from target-group specific to generic policies. Integration policy has now been largely 
deconstructed as a separate institutional policy domain, at the national as well as the local level. 
Especially at the national level, this is also clearly reflected in budgetary terms, with a zero-budget 
foreseen after 2015. However, recent developments around EU labour migrants but also around the 
radicalization of Muslim youth in the Netherlands do seem to put immigrant integration back on the 
agenda.  
This shift toward generic policies, as one of the key dimensions of mainstreaming, should be seen as 
a reflection of shifting beliefs about the role of immigration and diversity in Dutch society. Just as 
much as the group specific ad-hoc measures in the 1970s were a reflection of the belief that 
migrants were not stay permanently and that the Netherlands should not be a country of 
immigration, should the current generic-policy approach be seen as a full realization that the 
presence of immigrant groups as well as the phenomenon of immigration as such should be 
considered permanent traits of contemporary Dutch society. It is in this respect that mainstreaming 
in the area of migration-related diversity shows similarities with for instance gender mainstreaming 
and disability mainstreaming.  
As we have seen in this chapter, such generic policies also adequately reflect the deepening of 
diversity in Dutch society, or what we have described as the ‘diversification of diversity.’ The growing 
number of people with a migration background, the growing number of different migrant groups 
being present in Dutch society, but also with increasing fragmentation within groups over different 
migrant generations, it has simply become impossible to speak of distinct immigrant or minority 
groups. For some groups the second generation, who never really migrated in the purse sense of the 
word, are now larger than the first generation that actually migrated; also in some places in the 
Netherlands, including Rotterdam and Amsterdam to be examined in this research, the percentage 
of the population with a migration background approximates the 50%, making it hardly realistic to 
speak of minorities.  
 20 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
We can conclude that there is a paradox in this development. The deconstruction of integration 
policies into generic policies can be seen as a signal of awareness of the deep transformative effect 
of immigration and diversity at society at large, affecting almost all policy areas rather than being a 
separate policy area in itself. However, as has been observed in this chapter, questions can be raised 
(and are addressed in subsequent chapters of this report) about the extent to which this 
mainstreaming is effectively coordinated and managed in terms of awareness of migration related 
issues, or whether mainstreaming in reality comes down to policy dilution and government 
retrenchment.   
One key issue in this respect relates to the second dimension of the typology of mainstreaming that 
has been discussed in the literature review of the previous work package of this research project 
(Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014) the extent to which mainstreaming actively involves a ‘whole 
society’ approach at the interculturalisation of society at large (rather than the integration of specific 
migrant groups). The budgetary developments over the past couple of years as well as the lack of a 
‘horizontal’ policy coordination structure being installed after the deconstruction of the ‘vertical’ 
coordination structure of the past integration policies, cast doubt about whether this whole society 
approach has actually been effectuated. There are in the Dutch case no traits of a ‘community 
cohesion’ approach such as has been established in the United Kingdom over the past decade.  
Also, mainstreaming in the Dutch settings appears strongly correlated to decentralization of 
integration policies to the local level. Just like the trend towards generic policies, this 
decentralization development is a much older trend, starting already in the early 1990s and 
intensifying after the connection with Urban Policies at the end of the 1990s and the Neighborhood 
Policies of the late 2000s. Although decentralization may be a part of a trend toward poly-centric 
governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, p. 31), it is unclear to what extent in the Dutch 
setting multi-level governance structures have been put in place to coordinate policy measures at 
different levels and to prevent policy divergence or conflict. In fact, as research on policies in 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam shows, the Dutch case may be an example of ‘decoupling’ of policies at 
different levels rather than ‘poly-centric governance.’ This too casts doubt about whether the Dutch 
approach can effectively be understood in terms of ‘mainstreaming’ or rather in terms of 
‘retrenchment.’ In order to examine these questions we will look at policy developments in the fields 
of education and social cohesion of the past ten years in more detail in the following chapters. 
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3 – Education  
In the previous chapter we concluded that mainstreaming, or at least the trend from target group 
specific to generic policies, has been a long and incremental process over the past decades. The 
recent dilution of integration policy as an institutional policy domain can be considered the closing 
piece of this much older trend. Therefore, it is methodologically impossible to study the 
mainstreaming of immigrants integration in the Netherlands by looking only at explicit migrant 
integration policies. Consequently, two policy domains have been selected in the context of the 
broader international UPSTREAM project, one in the socio-cultural sphere (social cohesion policies) 
and one in the socio-economic sphere (education). This chapter focuses on the latter; education 
policies. It involves an analysis of mainstreaming both in national as well as in local education 
policies in Rotterdam and Amsterdam.  
Education covers a very broad policy area. An ordinary educational career in the Netherlands starts 
at an age of 4 or 5 years, as children start to attend primary school. After eight years, they will 
receive a recommendation by their school (-teachers) about the most appropriate level of secondary 
education. This recommendation is often complemented by the result on the CITO-exam27. Many 
policies distinguish between VMBO (preparatory vocational education28) and Havo, VWO and 
Gymnasium (levels qualifying for application at a university or a university of applied sciences). A 
diploma obtained in one of the last three levels is regarded as a ‘basic qualification’ to enter the 
labour market, whereas VMBO pupils will subsequently have to attend vocational education to 
obtain this qualification. Quitting school before obtaining a basic qualification is considered early 
leaving. In addition to the ‘standard’ educational career, there are institutions like preschool (for 
toddlers between 2.5 and 4 years old), head/feed and bridging classes (for those children who have 
a language disadvantage during or at the end of primary school), and education for adults, for 
example focused on language or participation. It is the combination of preschool with the first two 
years of primary education that is called ‘Early Childhood Education’ [ECE]. The policy domain of 
education therefore offers many possible moments and venues for implementing immigrant 
integration measures, both specific and generic ones.  
In this chapter we will discuss the three cases introduced before: the national government, 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam. For each case we will first focus on the problem-context of immigrant-
integration in education. What kind of problems are identified and how big are these problems 
perceived to be trough time? Subsequently, we analyse the policy-context: for example, how is the 
department organized, to what extent are retrenchment measures apparent and how are 
jurisdictions distributed among the different levels and departments? Thirdly, we will discuss the 
political context: to what extent is the discussion about immigrant integration in education 
influenced by (coalitions of) political parties, political and non-political actors? Finally, we will discuss 
the content of the policy documents written between 2003 and 2014, discussing issues related to 
                                                          
27 The CITO-exam is not yet obligatory for primary schools. If used, the exam exists of three elements (Language, 
Calculation, Study-skills) and one optional element (covering geography, history, natural sciences). The latter element will 
never be included in the score achieved. The score can vary from 501 until 550. There are several connecting scales 
between scores and secondary educational levels. Roughly, scores between 501 and 533 will qualify for VMBO 
(preparatory vocational education) and scores between 537 and 550 will qualify for Havo, VWO or Gymnasium.  
28 VMBO is subdivided in four levels, from a practice-oriented to a ‘theoretical’ level. 
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immigrant integration in education. To what extent can the described measures be labelled as 
mainstreamed as recognizable by the shift from specific policies to generic policies? In addition, we 
will pay attention to (shifts in) the mode of governance (state-centric vs. poly-centric) and the (shifts 
in) the monist or pluralist vision on society.  
3.1   National level 
First, we will look at national education policies.  We will first look at the context in which these 
policies have taken shape (political/problem/policy context), then at the content of these policies 
and will then analyse the developments from the perspective of the mainstreaming typology 
developed in WP2.  
3.1.1 Policy background 
Problem context 
Immigrant children on average experience several disadvantages throughout their educational 
career. Persistent language problems are perceived as a root cause of many of these disadvantages 
(Minister Onderwijs, Cultuur & Wetenschap [OCW], 2004). Research shows that first-generation 
immigrants who did not learn the Dutch language or second generation immigrants who married a 
partner from their home-country often raise their children in their mother-tongue (Minister Wonen, 
Wijken en Integratie [WWI], 2007). Consequently, many immigrant children arrive at school with 
language problems. During primary school, these children can at best partially catch up with the 
level of native children. Immigrant children on average have a language delay of two years at the 
end of primary school (Minister VI, 2003; Minister OCW & Minister VI, 2004), although this language 
delay is already diminished by 40% between 1995 and 2011 (Minister OCW, 2004b; Mulder, 2013).  
The first moment of disadvantage that has triggered much attention is the transition from primary to 
secondary school. Immigrant children are at this point more likely to be recommended to attend 
VMBO. In addition, the average CITO-score amongst immigrant children is lower than the average 
CITO-score of native children (Minister OCW, 2004). This results in underrepresentation of 
immigrant children at Havo/VWO/Gymnasium and overrepresentation at VMBO classes (Minister 
OCW, 2004, Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Throughout the years, a positive trend is 
noticeable in representation of immigrant children at higher levels of secondary school (Minister 
OCW, 2004b; Tweede Kamer, 2005; Ministerie BZK, 2011). In 2006, 30% of non-western immigrants 
attend a higher level of secondary education. This is not yet comparable to the 47% of natives, but it 
does represent a significant improvement (Tweede Kamer, 2006). In following years, numerical 
information about immigrant CITO-scores or secondary school-level advice is not given anymore. 
However, some comments are made about the increasing flow of immigrant children to Havo/VWO 
(Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.4) and the increased average CITO-score because immigrants are catching 
up on their disadvantages (Tweede Kamer, 2012, p.3).  
Early leaving is a persistent problem in the final years of VMBO and at schools for vocational 
education, especially amongst ethnic minorities (Minister VI, 2003; Ministerie OCW, 2004; Tweede 
Kamer, 2005; Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Again, there is a positive trend 
noticeable: the amount of non-western immigrants with a basic qualification has risen from 39% in 
2001 to 53% in 2005. Amongst youngsters, 36% immigrants obtained their basic qualification, versus 
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49% amongst the native population (Tweede Kamer, 2006). From 2008 onwards, information about 
early leaving is given in generic terms no longer differentiating between immigrant and native 
students but still showing a rapid downward trend in the total amount of drop-out (Tweede Kamer, 
2008; 2009; Minister OCW, Staatssecretaris OCW & Minister Economische Zaken, Landbouw en 
Innovatie [EZLI], 2011). Influenced by the WRR (the Scientific Council for Government Policy), early 
leaving was re-emphasized as a problem of ‘overloaded’ students: multi-problem and low socio-
economic-status replaced the ‘ethnic’ character of the problem (Minister Jeugd en Gezin [JG] & 
Staatssecretaris OCW, 2009).  
The final issue described here are the so called ‘black schools’29. In what is described in Dutch policy 
discourse as ‘black schools’, the percentage of immigrant children attending is at least 20% higher 
than the amount of immigrant children living in the surrounding area. In the same way, white 
schools can exist when replacing percentage of immigrant children with percentage of native 
children. (Alleged) Causes of this problem are overrepresentation of immigrants at certain 
educational levels, residential segregation and parental preferences. Black schools are conceived as 
a problem in general because they would hinder spontaneous contact between immigrant and 
native children (Minister VI, 2003; Tweede Kamer, 2005). Moreover, the problem was perceived 
even bigger for immigrants, because (language) deprivation of immigrant children would be 
reinforced by attending a black school. However, the SCP (The Netherlands Institute for Social 
Research) concluded in their Minority Report 2003 that there were signs that ‘black schools’ were 
more capable of reducing the language delay of immigrant children than other schools (Minister 
OCW, 2004). This insight was strengthened in the following years, after which the discussion 
replaced itself to the undesirability of separate schools because of the poor preparation to the 
modern multicultural society (Tweede Kamer, 2005).   
Policy context 
At the beginning of the new millennium the Ministry regarding education was undergoing many 
changes. It is in this time that the ministry changed its name into the current “Ministry of 
Education”, Culture and Science’ (Dutch abbreviation: OCW). As part of a large deregulation project, 
the amount of laws, general administrative orders and ministerial regulations a school had to take 
into account decreased with 33% from fifteen hundred to a thousand between 2004 and 200630 
(Minister OCW, 2004c). After 2006, no similar substantive reorganization or deregulation took place 
at the Ministry anymore. Also, the main decentralization of jurisdiction on the educational 
disadvantages policy took place in 2005, when the responsibility was shifted from the municipalities 
to the schools. It is in this period that the vertical shift in governance took place the most and the 
trend of a state-centric mode of governance to a poly-centric mode of governance was furthered.  
However, poly-centric governance does not only refer to vertical shifts in responsibilities, but also at 
horizontal shifts of cooperation, for example interdepartmental coordination. In the National Policy 
Framework “Municipal Educational Disadvantages Policy” 2002-2006 (Staatsblad, 2001), it is stated 
that effective educational disadvantages policy is dependent of a variety of other policy fields, such 
                                                          
29 In the Netherlands, educational segregation discussions are approached from a ‘black schools’, ‘white schools’ and 
‘mixed schools’ perspective. This terminology is not (completely) associated with the real skin-color of the individual 
attendees. Rather, ‘black’ is used as a synonym for students of an immigrant background, whereas ‘white’ refers to native 
students.   
30 Only 25% of these rules and regulations come from the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. Other main 
contributors are municipalities (11%) and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (13%) (Minister OCW, 2004c). 
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as the labour market, housing and safety. For some goals (such as reducing early leaving), there is 
interdepartmental cooperation (for instance between the ministry of Justice and the ministry of 
Education). In addition, documents handling the issue of school-segregation refer to neighborhood 
policies as an important and “real” solution to the problem (Minister Jeugd en Gezin & 
Staatssecretaris OCW, 2009). Clearly, immigrant integration in education depends on other policy-
areas as well. Strikingly, cooperation between Education and Integration seems minimal. 
Publications about Integration in general are not co-signed by the ministry of Education, although 
these policies often contain elements that are to be implemented by the ministry of Education. 
Equally, the publication of letters and reports about integration and education are signed by the 
minister of Education only, implying that is not a coproduction. Examples are the letter ‘Education, 
Integration and Citizenship’ in 2003, the letter “OCW and Integration” in 2006 and responses to the 
advice of the Education Council concerning the countering of segregation in 2005. Therefore, it 
seems like the vertical strand of poly-centric governance is better developed than the horizontal 
strand, at the national level.  
Another policy-context influence can be recognized in the influence of the 2008 economic crisis on 
the overall Dutch finances, including the budgets of the Ministry of Education. From 2001 until 2006, 
the OCW budget increased more than the growth of the Dutch GDP, but this trend reversed from 
2007 onwards31. In absolute numbers, the spending on education rose between 2008 and 2012 
(Ministerie OCW, 2013), however, the actual costs for schools increased more than their additional 
funding. Therefore, educational financing becomes more and more vulnerable (Algemene 
rekenkamer, 2013). The budgetary cuts are therefore distributed over all primary, secondary and 
some tertiary schools. There is no direct relation evident from the policy documents between 
austerity measures and mainstreaming or the abandoning of specific policies.  
Political context 
Education is an important political topic for several political parties, for different reasons. For two 
groups of parties, education is particularly important. At first we can recognize the working class 
parties such as the social democrats (PvdA) and the socialist party (SP) that emphasize qualitative 
and good education for every child and student at an affordable price (or preferably for free). 
Secondly, education is important for the Christian parties, such as CDA, CU and SGP, that are 
historically bound to faith schools32. Throughout the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth 
century, the so-called ‘school battle’ took place. During this battle, the secular and confessional 
parties ‘fought’ over the (financial) equality of ‘normal schools’ and ‘special schools’. Whereas 
regular schools are organized by the government, special schools are governed by a foundation or 
association. In addition, special schools are often founded with a particular ideological, eg religious, 
social or educational, vision, whereas normal schools are generally free of a specific vision, more 
open to all religions and applying a ‘conventional’ way of teaching. From 1917 on, article 23 of the 
Constitution regulates the right for public schools to have a specific denominational or religious 
character with equal (financial) status to non-specific public schools. Many of the Christian parties 
                                                          
31 The years 2008 and 2009 form an exception to the reversed trend because the Netherlands registered a negative GDP in 
those years. 
32 Faith schools are not known in the Netherlands as such. However, since we also have a system of real ‘special education’, 
for students with special needs such as disabilities or behavioural problems, choosing this translation would be confusing. 
In the rest of this report we will therefore refer to these schools as faith schools even though special schools may also refer 
to specific social or pedagogical visions.  
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are hesitant to apply any measure that might constrain the rights of faith schools or the rights of free 
school choice that parents have. Between 1981 and 2014, there is only one period (’98-’02) in which 
a liberal (VVD) minister hosted the Ministry of Education, remaining years are more or less equally 
divided between the largest Christian party (CDA) and the social democrats (PvdA). This division 
reflects the importance that these parties attach to the theme.   
Populist parties can influence the mainstreaming process in two ways: either they will push for more 
mainstreaming in order to not spend more money or recourses on the immigrants or their 
stigmatizing of the immigrant groups will trigger more specific policies. The arrival of the PVV in 2006 
has influenced the educational policies primarily through the questions asked in the House of 
Representatives, their input in debates and their input through the media. Although the PVV always 
maintains a vision of specifically framing and naming immigrants as problem-makers and –deliverers, 
it is also opposed to invest (more) money or resources to these groups. A good example of this 
stance is the debate that followed on the official request of the PVV of the expenditure made by the 
Ministry of Education for ‘non-western allochthons’, officially called ‘the debate on the financial 
consequences of immigration’. In this debate, PVV-member Fritsma emphasizes the immigration-
records and mass-immigration, consequently, according to him “the citizens have the right to know 
what the costs are of continuing mass immigration” (Tweede Kamer, 2009, p.57). Many of the other 
participants in the debate are primarily concerned that the PVV would like to use the information in 
a negative way, for example without approaching some costs as investment rather than sunken 
costs (Tweede Kamer, 2009; 2009b). Although the debate has had no striking policy-outcomes, it is 
exemplary for the negative sentiment resulting from many of their contributions.  
3.1.2 Policy content 
As indicated in the introduction, education covers a very broad policy area, including pre-school, 
primary school, secondary school, vocational and higher education and adult (language) education. 
Throughout time we can observe a trend of generic policies replacing previous additional specific 
policies. However, this process did not go steady nor comprehensive: contrary to some of the claims 
made, trough time several specific measures are still included in the policies.  
2003-2005: Mainstreaming as decentralization and deregulation 
Overall, 2003-2004 marked the beginning of the decentralization and deregulation of many 
educational arrangements. From this moment on, budgets are merged into the ‘broad subsidy’ 
municipalities are receiving, and other budgets are decentralized from the national government and 
the municipalities to the schools. To achieve not only decentralization, but also deregulation, 
output-indicators are used for supervision instead of process-indicators (Kabinet, 2003). Both 
primary and secondary schools became responsible for combatting educational disadvantages, 
without interference of the municipality. The municipality was still responsible for preschool, 
bridging classes and general school facilities (Minister OCW, 2004). In the multiannual plan 
“Direction Primary Education” (Tweede Kamer, 2004d), it was stated that the “policy to give schools 
more capacity by increasing autonomy and deregulation will be pursued with vigour”. The 
multiannual plan for secondary education supported the same message (Tweede Kamer, 2004e). 
Interestingly, the municipalities thus stayed responsible for elements that play a big role in 
immigrant integration in education and which are more prone to specific policies than the general 
educational process.   
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Simultaneously, a quite rigorous break with specific policies occurred when it was decided to abolish 
OALT in 2004. OALT refers to “education in immigrant living languages” and was established in 1998 
as a replacement of education in own language and culture (OETC). At first, OETC was established 
because of the expectation of guest workers returning ‘home’. Later, knowledge of the own cultural 
background was supposed to raise confidence and a positive development of the mother tongue 
would positively influence education in Dutch. In the 2003 document “integration policy, new style” 
the cabinet distances itself from the earlier frames regarding the added value of OALT: 
“In the opinion of the Cabinet, approaching minorities in their own language sends the wrong 
signal. It is not reconcilable with the Cabinet’s concept of shared citizenship. That is why the 
Cabinet wants to discourage all forms of institutions that directly or indirectly hinder 
integration by cultivating minorities own identity. The abolishment of OALT is a direct 
consequence of this principle.”  (Minister VI, 2003 p.11-12) 
Bold words are used throughout the whole document. For example, immigrant parents should take 
their responsibilities in raising their children and those of them who did not yet obtain their 
integration requirements (such as a language diploma) will be obliged to do so under sanctions of 
social benefit penalties. Consequently, the document is characterized by contrary announcements: 
on the one hand explicitly opposes specific targeting policies, preferring generic policies instead, and 
on the other hand (the more negative hand) it frames specific target groups with specific policies 
again while quite assimilationist imposing them with more self-responsibilities for their integration.  
Needs-based and area-based replacement strategies in school funding 
An important generic turn took place by altering the Dutch educational funding system in 200633. At 
the beginning of the 21st century, schools hosting children with “disadvantages” are compensated in 
their funds by the application of ‘weighing’ in the calculation of the size of the schools’ target group 
and thus their adjusted total school population34. Weighing indicators are parental educational level 
(complemented only in case of native children with parental work-level) and country of origin of 
parents, the latter results in a higher weighing than just low educated parents.  
Over 1.5 million children attended primary school in 2004 and 400.000 of them formed the ‘target 
group’ as determined by the weighing system. Immigrant children constituted half of the target 
group (Minister OCW, 2004b). Following the observations of the Commission Blok, more and more 
attention was asked for the situation of native disadvantaged children (Minister OCW, 2004b). In 
society, the low educated and low income electorate maintained the sentiment of being 
subordinated35, especially since the overall attitude towards migrants became more unwelcome. For 
the government, the development of the super-diverse society posed them with an increasingly 
difficult administrative task when parental ethnicity would stay a condition for weighing. These 
developments resulted in the alteration of the weighing guidelines, without much opposition, from 
2006 onwards36. Country of origin was formally removed as condition for a weight and thereby the 
                                                          
33 In the Netherlands, the educational funding system of primary schools is intertwined with the educational disadvantages 
policy. 
34 For example, a weight of 1.9 was assigned to children with immigrant (low educated) parents. This weight implied that 
when calculating the adjusted school population on which the funding is based, the child was perceived as 1.9 children. A 
school would consequently receive almost double funding for these students.  
35 Interview with Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
The Hague, 26th of June 2014. 
36 The new system was incrementally implemented between the school years 2006-2007 and 2010-2011.  
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funding system was clearly mainstreamed. This development counteracted the recommendations of 
the Education Council37, which concluded that ethnicity is still an important condition that should be 
taken into account (Mulder, 2013). Even in 2013, the Education Council maintains this position, once 
again recommending reintroducing ethnicity as a criterion for educational disadvantage subsidies 
(Onderwijsraad, 2013). 
In practice, schools in rural areas (with more native disadvantaged children) received more funding 
under the new guidelines. On the contrary, ‘black schools’ (mostly in large cities) saw their budgets 
shrinking since many (immigrant) children’s parents are too highly educated for the new weights. In 
the first years of the new system the schools with overrepresentations of immigrant children 
received compensation by the ministry. Subsequently, it was followed up by the area-based 
‘guideline impulse-areas’ in 2011. This guideline assigns extra money to schools in postal code areas 
with on average a low education level and high unemployment as registered by the poverty-monitor 
of the SCP (Mulder, 2013). These areas most often contain the schools that profited of the prior 
compensation rules.  
The weighing-(funding)-system is generally used as an indicator to determine the target-population 
of several policies. Consequently, all children who were assigned a weight were considered the 
target population. This implied that immigrant children automatically were part of the target 
population, whereas native children also had a chance of being part of the target population. After 
the change of the system in 2006, this distinction was not suddenly absent, but it was less explicit 
and less officially targeted. This observation implies that many actions that may seem to be 
formulated generically by aiming at ‘the target population’, are in fact quite specific, at least until 
2006. After 2006, the new (official) generic funding policy was complemented by an area-based 
guideline, which indicates a replacement strategy as described by De Zwart (2005).  
Citizenship education as a ‘whole society’ approach? 
Faith schools, Islamic schools in particular, are an exceptional case in the Dutch education and 
integration debate. Article 23 of the constitution enables the inhibition of Islamic schools. In 
addition, faith schools are important to several Christian parties, who are thus left without 
possibilities to oppose Islamic schools. Subsequently, Islamic schools are hardly mentioned in policy 
documents regarding immigrant integration in education. However, Islamic schools were subject of 
debate and of five studies throughout the period 2003-200838. Debates around these reports 
resulted in strengthened supervision (in case of fraud or bad performances, which both occurred 
more than average on Islamic schools) and influenced the incorporation of “promoting active 
citizenship and social inclusion” as official objective of primary and secondary education by law in 
2006. The additional official objective was the result of a bill submitted by the PvdA. With the 
acceptance of this bill, all schools, both non-specific public schools and faith schools, were bound to 
the following article: 
  
                                                          
37 Advisory board for the Dutch Government regarding Education. Both for requested and unrequested advise.  
38 Three of these studies focused on the extent of integration provided by the schools, each concluding that Islamic schools 
are no risk for social cohesion (Onderwijsinspectie, 2002, 2003; WRR, 2006). Another study focused on foreign interference 
with Dutch Islamic schools (BVD, 2002) and the last study focused on administrative malpractice and fraud 
(Onderwijsinspectie, 2008). 
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“Education:  
a) Assumes that scholars grow up in a plural society,  
b) Also aims at the promotion of active citizenship and social inclusion, and 
c) Is also focused on scholars having knowledge of and getting acquainted with different 
backgrounds and cultures of their peers.”  
(Article 8, primary education act and Article 17, secondary education act) 
Partly to support schools in the implementation of this act, a ‘canon of our national history’ was 
written and published in 2007. The canon is meant to be a guideline for history classes in primary 
and secondary education, which became more mandatory by declaring it an official objective in 2010 
(Staatssecretaris OCW, 2010). The canon exists of 50 ‘windows’, from the stone ages until the 
founding of Europe. Regarding immigrants, there are windows about the relations with Suriname, 
Antillean Islands and Indonesia and there is a window about ‘multi-coloured Netherlands’, focusing 
on the increased diversity of society and its influences e.g. on schools, mosques and integration39. 
Just as in other countries, the Dutch canon was not received enthusiastically by everyone 
(Commissie Ontwikkeling Nederlandse Canon [CONC], 2006). The motivation to write the canon 
came from the discussion about integration, identity and social cohesion in a multicultural society. 
However, the frontmen of the committee responsible for the canon dissociated himself explicitly 
from this discussion as a goal of the canon. Consequently, political discussions focused on the official 
objectives of the canon and the feasibility of the introduction of the canon as obligatory element of 
education rather than the actual content of the canon. The content was mainly perceived as a 
matter for experts (Tweede Kamer, 2008b). It are the experts, amongst which the Education Council, 
that are divided regarding the content of the canon and its perceived “too Dutch-ness” 
(Onderwijsraad, 2007). According to the Education Council, more attention should be paid to the 
influence of immigrants and their histories on the common history. However, the Minister explicitly 
did included that into the purpose of the canon when installing the canon-committee: “It is 
important that attention is paid to the way in which the Dutch culture is influenced by non-Dutch 
cultures and vice versa” (Minister OCW, 2005, p.4). Other parties, like the PVV, embrace the Dutch 
character of the content of the canon (Tweede Kamer, 2008b). The content of the canon is up for 
revision every five years (CONC, 2006) and is therefore perceived ‘alive’ and able to adapt to new 
(historic) insights in the importance of modern-day elements.  
The content of the canon is the distinctive element deciding whether the canon will fit into a more 
assimilationist perspective or an interculturalist perspective. With the current critics on the lack of 
incorporation of other (immigrant) cultures in the canon it is primarily seen as a mean of imposing 
the ‘Dutch’ history and values. Therefore, the canon seems to be serving an assimilationist goal, 
despite the request of the Minister who seemed to aim at a more interculturalist goal of the canon. 
The law on ‘promoting active citizenship and social inclusion’ can in practice be regarded as 
interculturalist. Besides knowledge of the governmental system (both Dutch and EU system), most 
attention is given to ‘generally accepted norms and values’, different religions influencing the Dutch 
multicultural society, and “similarities, differences and changes in culture and ideologies in the 
                                                          
39 Based on information of the official canon web-page, retrieved from, www.entoen.nu (translated: www.andthen.now) 
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Netherlands (…) and the meaning for society of showing respect for each other’s lifestyle and 
beliefs40.”    
The approach to school segregation  
In 2008 mixing school populations was seen as important because it would “increase the language 
skills of immigrants” and “contribute significantly to the strengthening of social cohesion in society” 
(Rijksoverheid, 2008). Reducing segregation was included as an explicit intention in the coalition 
agreement of Balkenende IV. Several pilots were introduced by State Secretary of Education, 
Dijksma (PvdA), in order to achieve more mixed schools, while sometimes including compelling 
measures that limit parents’ free choice of schools. Near the end of the pilots in 2011, quickly after 
the government turnover, the new Minister of Education, Bijsterveldt (CDA), announced the 
abolishment of anti-segregation policies. The ‘fact’ of the existence of ‘black and white schools’ and 
the importance of the parental right of free school choice has led the coalition parties (CDA, VVD, 
partly PVV) to abolish ministerial specific policies on anti-segregation in schools. Many actors, 
amongst which the Association of Dutch Municipalities, were surprised by the statements of the 
minister. The PvdA even called for an urgent debate. In this debate (Tweede Kamer, 2011), we can 
recognize roughly three ‘groups’ of parties with accompanying argumentations: the Left parties 
(large part of the opposition), the Right parties (the governing coalition, including CDA) and the 
religious parties. The inaugural speech and complementary report of Prof. dr. Dronkers on ethnic 
schools (Dronkers, 2010, p.6) took central stage throughout the debate. Especially because he 
concludes that: 
“A larger ethnic diversity of schools in secondary education hampers the educational 
achievement of both pupils with a migrant background and native pupils.” 
“A higher share of pupils with a migrant background at a school hampers educational 
achievement, but if these pupils have the same origin region (Islam countries; non-Islam 
Asian countries), a higher share of pupils with a migrant background at that school improves 
the educational achievement” 
Several leftist parties (PvdA, GL, SP, D66) emphasized the integration function of schools in addition 
to the educational achievements. The importance of one above the other is a political decision 
which, according to them, should be decided in favour of integration. Finally, the Christian parties 
(CGP, CU) put most emphasis on the parental right of free school choice and above all: the 
importance of the existence of faith schools41, defending the thesis that faith schools are not 
responsible for segregation. According to them, anti-segregation is not the responsibility of the 
ministry, since it quickly interferences with these rights (Tweede Kamer, 2011). One day after the 
debate, a parliamentary motion was filed by the SP to emphasize the ongoing importance of the 
conclusion of the Blok Commission, that measures should be taken to oppose (educational) 
segregation. This resolution was accepted by all parties, except the PVV (Tweede Kamer, 2011b). In 
2014, the current State Secretary of Education, Dekker (VVD), re-emphasized that anti-segregation is 
still not a policy subject for the ministry, municipalities on the other hand are still obliged to have 
yearly consultation about this subject with the schools. Above all, the subject has been decentralized 
rather than completely removed of the agenda.   
                                                          
40 Primary education, official objectives 36-37-38 and secondary education, official objectives 43-44-45.  
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2007-2014: The continuation of the move towards generic policies 
During the following period, the move towards generic policies is continued by reinforcing the frame 
of undesirability of specific policies and the discontinuation of the final ‘left-over’ specific policies. 
For example, the 2006 memorandum ‘OCW and Integration’ continues to stress the desirability of 
generic policies in education: “starting point of immigrant integration in education and science is the 
inclusive character of the policies. It does not aim at improvements of a certain target group but aims 
at the improvement of all students” (Minister OCW & Staatssecretaris OCW, 2006). Also, in the 2007-
2011 Integration Memorandum it is stated that, according to the Cabinet, specific policies for ethnic 
groups are undesirable and only justifiable in exceptional situations (Ministerie WWI, 2007). 
Interestingly, this memorandum devotes quite some attention to the justification of this turn, by 
emphasizing in what way general measures are proportionally more beneficial to immigrants. This 
way, they are hinting on a replacement-strategy as described by De Zwart (2005). From 2008 on, 
specific measures are virtually absent in the documents regarding immigrant integration in 
education, or education in general. The generic turn is reinforced in the 2011 ‘Integration 
memorandum’ (Ministerie BZK, 2011, p.11), by stating that “specific problems should be addressed 
by regular institutions and regular measurements” and “current specific measurements aimed at the 
problems which occur mostly in some groups will be embedded in regular policies”. Problems such as 
early leaving, formerly heavily formulated as an immigrant problem, are formulated as general 
problems, with general solutions. The same holds for language delays and ‘black schools’. Other, 
more specific, problems are often not mentioned anymore, like the lower CITO-scores, or certain 
forms of over- and under-representation. Subsequently, in the 2013 ‘Integration Agenda’ (Minister 
SZW, 2013), some specific problems are recognized, but not acted on specifically. To what extent the 
problems do not exist anymore is not clarified by the policy documents.  
Other monitors or reports might be able to clarify the existence of the problems. The annual 
education reports of the Education Inspectorate written between 2003 and 2013 form the basis of 
the yearly ‘policy responses’ given by the Minister of Education. In these annual reports we can 
recognize roughly the same trend as in politics: although the collected statistics are not made 
completely generic, the amount of specific data reported has diminished sharply between 2010 and 
2011. Previously, ‘allochtoon’ was used in almost every respect to point at possible discrepancies 
between natives and immigrants. In addition, whole sections were aimed at specific topics regarding 
immigrants (i.e. discrimination, inter-ethnic ‘incidents’, lagging participation in higher education). 
From 2011 on, the statistics and their description not only declined, but also changed. Being an 
immigrant (descendant) is now treated as one of many optional influential characteristics, alongside 
gender, prior received grades, etc.  
3.1.3. Conclusion 
This analysis of education policies at the national level clearly confirms the trend from target group 
specific to generic policies that was observed in chapter 2. Very symbolic developments in this 
respect are the abandoning of Immigrant Minority Language Instruction, the withdrawal of special 
measures against ethnic segregation at schools (especially those with relatively high representations 
of migrants, so-called ‘black schools’) and the abandoning of an ethnicity-based funding scheme for 
primary schools during the 2000s. At the same time, some form of ‘whole society’ approach was 
developed in the second half of the 2000s, especially with the state standardized programs for civic 
education. This includes a standardized canon on Dutch history, which should be considered as a 
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very concrete implication of the Dutch government’s desire to revaluate the importance of national 
norms and values in relation to migrant integration. Finally, clearly matching the mainstreaming 
typology of WP2, the educational field also clearly witnessed a trend of decentralization; more and 
more policy decisions, such as how to respond to schools with overrepresentations of migrants, have 
been delegated to the local level.  
At the same time, we observed that the mainstreaming of education policies did not imply a full 
fading of attention to migrant-related issues in the sphere of education. As we saw in our discussion 
of the problem context, there is much research in the Netherlands that show that educational 
deprivation amongst people with a migration background remains very significant. The strong 
presence of ‘ethnic statistics’ that help making these issues manifest, also plays a role in keeping this 
issue on the agenda and creating a sense of urgency in terms of educational policies. As such, we can 
observe that Dutch educational policies have been caught between (amongst others political and 
budgetary) pressure to mainstreaming and ‘generalize’ education policies on the one hand, and 
problem pressure generated amongst others by clear ethnic statistics that point at rather significant 
migration-related educational issues on the other hand. The recent effort from the Dutch 
Educational Advisory Board to make the argument for re-installing an ethnicity-based funding 
scheme for primary education should be interpreted in this perspective.  
In order to cope with this dilemma of generalizing policies versus persistent migration-related issues, 
we observed that national policies resorted to specific replacement strategies. For instance, in terms 
of funding this involved a combination of needs- and area-based measures. A needs-based funding 
scheme for primary schools was installed by measuring parent’s educational level as a proxy for 
education deprivation amongst children, which would address natives as well as migrants. In 
practice still many migrants were targeted this way, but evaluations show that funding to several 
‘black schools’ did decrease because of this system. This was combined with an area-based funding 
scheme, where financial impulses were given to specific neighbourhoods that would be known for 
educational deprivation, in practice often involving many ‘black schools.’   
3.2 Rotterdam  
3.2.1 Policy background 
Problem context 
Rotterdam sees itself as a city of entrepreneurs with a hands-on-mentality, an image they are very 
happy to convey. Apart from the specific mentality, the composition of Rotterdam’s inhabitants 
differs from the general composition of Dutch society as a whole and from other large cities, such as 
Amsterdam and Utrecht. Highly educated workers tend to concentrate in urban areas. In Amsterdam 
and Utrecht, more than half of the inhabitants is highly educated (53,5% and 58,4%), Rotterdam on 
the other hand houses only 33,7% highly educated workers and is thus characterized by a relatively 
low-educated population (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). Language disadvantages are also common 
among native low-educated ‘Rotterdammers’: in total, there are more than 100.000 people with 
literacy problems, both immigrants and natives (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). According to a policy 
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officer “illiteracy is also common among natives, even more than among immigrants” 42. In addition, 
immigrants form thirty-five percent of the population and non-western immigrant children 
constitute more than half of the children under fifteen. The educational system in Rotterdam is thus 
confronted with more immigrant children, than native children, and more disadvantaged children 
than other large cities. Two-thirds of the 90.000 scholars (in 2005) run the risk of developing 
educational disadvantages (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). Although the population of Rotterdam is thus 
clearly different from other cities, the main problems are not. (Language) disadvantages, early 
leaving, lagging participation by immigrant students in higher education and school segregation are 
the most notable problems to which policies are focused.  
In 2006 it became clear that preschools, designed to eliminate disadvantages before children start 
attending primary school, actually have a segregating effect as long as it is only accessible for 
children of the target population43 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006). Consequently, preschool was 
opened up for non-target group children as well. Subsequently, this and other interventions proved 
successful as the trend of increasing segregation was interrupted (Wethouder Jeugd, Gezin en 
Onderwijs [JGO], 2007). At least three main other issues are recognizable in the policy documents. 
Information given about early leaving and participation in higher education (by immigrants) is 
formulated generically from 2010/2011 onwards. Prior to 2010, information about early leaving is 
disaggregated by ethnicity. For example when stating in 2009 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c) that 
non-western immigrant students are more likely to drop-out, to switch studies and their diploma 
efficiency is lower. The emergence and existence of black schools (and later also white schools) is 
seen as a problem from the beginning and remains high on the agenda until 2010. According to the 
Aldermen, segregation undermines the social cohesion of the city and hinders the improvement of 
the language skills of immigrant scholars (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003; B&W Rotterdam, 2005).  
Most statistics regarding education published by the municipality of Rotterdam can be found in two 
series of documents: “the status of education in Rotterdam” and the general document “the status 
of Rotterdam”. The first document is published since 2011 by the Education department and is 
formulated very generic, only in 2013 one table differentiating between immigrant and native 
children is present. Prior, the 2009 Early leaving-monitor was packed with statistics specifically 
differentiating. The general document is published by the data-department and shows a similar 
trend as the education department. Between 2005 and 2013, the document sharply diminishes its 
references to differences between natives and immigrants. Eventually, the only ethnicity-specific 
information given is about the amount of early leaving and the participation rate of Havo/VWO 
education by immigrants.  
Policy context 
In general we can observe several influences of the national policies on the policy context of 
Rotterdam. Most influential in this respect is the transfer of the responsibilities (and accompanying 
budgets) for the educational disadvantages policy from the municipality to the school boards in 
2005. From that moment on, the schools are responsible for learning outcomes and development, 
whereas the municipalities are responsible for the relation between schools and their social 
environment, preschool, school facilities (housing, school transport in some cases) and youth 
                                                          
42 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, 
Rotterdam, interviewed  4th of June 2014. 
43 Target population refers to the group as defined by the national weighing system of the educational disadvantages policy.  
 33 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
policies in general (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). Especially for continual learning pathways, the transition 
from preschool to primary school demanded a good coordination after the change in 
responsibilities. The municipality is no longer the local ‘director’ but rather a partner of several 
youth institutions. Following these changes, several consultative organizations and structures were 
changed, established or regained importance. For example, The Rotterdam Education Forum used to 
be obligatory until this change, after which it changed into an optional cooperation between the 
municipality and schools44 (Kunst, 2004).  
Political context 
In two cases, Rotterdam played a clear role in national politics. Firstly, the use of double waiting lists 
at a primary school in Rotterdam hit the headlines in 2002. The double waiting list implied that 
immigrant or native children were favoured, depending on the aim of the school: increasing the 
‘white’ or the ‘black’ population. Alderman of Education, Leonard Geluk (CDA, since 2004), was very 
enthusiastic about the model and presented the plan for wider implementation of double waiting 
lists in whole Rotterdam to the ministers in 2004 (Meerhof, 2004, November 23; Trouw, 2004, 
November 23; Tweede Kamer, 2005b). Both Minister Verhoeven (Education) and Minister Verdonk 
(Integration) welcomed the initiative. However, questions were asked regarding the legal feasibility 
of the plan. Therefore, the Ministers requested the Education Council to study the plan and if it was 
considered not legally feasible, what alternatives could be formulated (Onderwijsraad, 2005). The 
Education Council concluded that distributing on origin or ethnicity is legally untenable. However, 
the council considered it necessary to have contact between different populations: “Learning about 
others will be difficult without others” (Onderwijsraad, 2005, p.9). Suggestions to achieve integration 
are amongst others: incorporating social integration as an official educational objective for schools, a 
consultation-obligation between the municipality and schools about integration and anti-segregation 
measures on a local level and possibly waiting lists based on language problems (as determined by 
the weighing-system) (Onderwijsraad, 2005). The first two suggestions are followed up by the 
Minister of Education (as described in 3.1.1/3.1.2) and the last suggestion had primarily local 
impacts. Amongst others, the specific primary school in Rotterdam changed its waiting list policy 
towards distinctions based on disadvantages in 2006. Following the predominantly positive advice 
about the Rotterdam approach, Alderman Geluk started a new plan against school segregation (see 
3.2.2).  
Secondly, the G445 presented together the ‘G4 youth manifest’ in 2006 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 
Gemeente Amsterdam, Gemeente Den Haag & Gemeente Utrecht, 2006). With this document, the 
cities wanted to clarify to the Cabinet that they advocate a new approach to youth policies. Main 
components of the desired approach are more administrative responsibilities to use accountable 
targets for schools and youth institutions (even when these institutions are financed by other 
governmental levels), decompartmentalization of budgets in order to apply local customization, and 
extra investments in elements crucial to youth development, such as preschool, community schools 
and wellbeing assistance (Gemeente Rotterdam et al., 2006, p.2). In 2008 and 2009, the 
municipalities indeed received more budgets for preschool and early leaving. In addition, the State 
Secretary agreed to give the municipalities more control (Staatssecretaris OCW et al., 2008; Tweede 
                                                          
44 The Rotterdam Educational Forum (Rotterdam Onderwijs Forum) started as the obligatory “consultation focused on 
agreement” as determined in the primary education act.  
45 The four large Randstad cities: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. 
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Kamer, 2009c). The manifest may be considered a response to the ongoing erosion of municipal 
powers regarding educational matters.  
3.2.2  Policy content 
As can be derived from the sketch of the Rotterdam population, the city is becoming increasingly 
diverse for many years. This is also recognized by policy makers. In 1999, the Mayor and Aldermen 
drafted a ‘Vision 2010’. In this document, they sketch a population in 2010 in which “the distinction 
between immigrant and native citizen has lost its meaning.” The population changes will occur 
without policy interference and therefore diversity is considered “a fact, not an issue” (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 1999, p.7). Many policy documents endorse this increasing pluralism by using 
descriptions as: “The classrooms of primary and secondary education in Rotterdam accommodate 
nearly 90.000 students, covering more than 150 nationalities. There are major differences in religious 
and cultural orientation, language development and social skills” (B&W Rotterdam, 2005, p.2-3). This 
development, and the acknowledgement of it, played an important role in the (development of the) 
policies as described in this section.  
Overall: a trend towards more generic policies 
Immigrant-integration in education has increasingly been mainstreamed in Rotterdam. 2006 can be 
considered as the starting point of this shift as specific attention was asked for ‘avoiding the use of 
expressions that work stigmatizing’ in policy documents by the municipality and school boards 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006b). The program of the Mayor and Aldermen in 2006 (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2006c) was framed generically as well, always speaking about ‘Rotterdammers’ 
(inhabitants of Rotterdam). Eventually, progress made regarding educational topics such as 
increased average CITO-scores, Havo/VWO attendance and higher education attendance should be 
continued by the community schools, the ‘Rotterdam attack of VMBO/MBO’ and collaboration with 
higher education: all generic measures equally accessible to all scholars or students in Rotterdam 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2009c). According to a former policy officer this trend is seen as inevitable. 
For instance, with regard to ‘black schools’, he states: “The inhabitants are ‘black’, what kind of 
policies do you want to implement on that? There are plenty of problems in education, but they are 
not really ethnic problems” 46. Three subtopics will illustrate this trend more specifically.     
Combatting language problems 
A preventive measure to combat language problems at an early age is early childhood education 
(ECE), which is composed of two elements: preschool and ‘early school’. Preschool is arranged as a 
sort of day-care and/or playgroups connected to primary schools with a coherent pedagogical 
program, co-aimed at language improvements of toddlers between 2.5 and 4 years. Early school is 
the program that devotes extra attention to language-development in the first two classes of 
primary school. Early childhood education policies started in 2000 when the ministry provided 
subsidies to start at combinations of preschools and schools with at least 70% disadvantaged 
children. From 2002 on, ECE was converted in a structural element of the educational disadvantages 
policy. As part of the change of the funding system (as described in 3.1.2), both the funding and 
jurisdiction on ECE changed. This became known as the ‘cut’, since from this moment municipalities 
were responsible and only received money for preschools, whereas schools became responsible and 
receive funds for early education. The question regarding the target group of ECE was left to the 
                                                          
46 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, 
Rotterdam, interviewed  4th of June 2014. 
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municipalities. Oftentimes, municipalities just stuck to the target groups as they would be 
formulated by the weighing-system a year later when starting primary school. However, since the 
goals for ECE expanded, implying that in the long run ECE should be available for every toddler, 
many municipalities opened up ECE to non-disadvantaged schools and areas as well. In addition, this 
development would counter the emergence of black and white schools through preschools.  
After the so-called ‘cut’ in ECE-policies and change of the funding system, Rotterdam decided to 
maintain the old definition of the target group as ‘children with an actual change of disadvantages, 
as determined by the weighing-system’ (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006b). In later documents, the 
target group is defined as children with at least one parent born in a non-western country or with at 
least one low-educated parent (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011c). In addition, parent counsellors are 
used to visit the families in order to bring toddlers to the ECE-facilities (which is not mandatory and 
therefore the municipality has no coercive measures available) and to lead parents to inburgerings-, 
language- or participation trajectories (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007). From 2007 on, the municipality 
experiments with ‘flexible ECE’ available at schools with less than 50% disadvantaged children. It 
would be more effective in reaching disadvantaged children in areas that are predominantly not-
disadvantaged and would counter segregation trough ECE (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007). Currently, 
ECE in Rotterdam can still be considered a specific measure, since having a parent born in a non-
western country immediately qualifies the child for ECE.  
Other language policies are framed in a generic way. A first example for pupils is the bridging class, 
which is meant for “native and immigrant students in primary education who have such a 
disadvantage in the Dutch language that they cannot participate at their own level successfully in 
mainstream education” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007, p.19). For these classes, language 
disadvantages are determined by test scores. The same trend of increasing generic formulations can 
be recognized by adult-focused language policies. The 2007-2010 policies regarding inburgering and 
illiteracy, called ‘participating trough language’ (inburgering) and ‘Rotterdam reads, Rotterdam 
writes” (illiteracy), are much intertwined. Target groups are formulated as ‘educators’, ‘women’, 
‘jobseekers’ and those who are eligible for social benefits. In the document regarding inburgering, 
the municipality states that “Trajectories in Rotterdam are not limited to graduating for the 
inburgeringscourse by newcomers, or achieving better language-levels for participants in educational 
trajectories. The Mayor and Aldermen chose active participation in society as final goal” (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2007b, p.9). Thus, goals are set at the same standards for native and immigrant 
inhabitants and part of a formerly very specific immigrant-integration policy is mainstreamed into 
language policies. Subsequent language policies (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011d) are focused on 
similar generic target groups as mentioned above. According to an integration policy officer we 
spoke to “It varies greatly to what extent education takes up collaboration with integration. 
Education has a limited mandate itself, since a lot is arranged by the schools themselves. Parental 
involvement and language policies amongst parents are pushed by the integration department to be 
addressed by education”47. The abovementioned intertwinement of integration and language may 
thus well be partly attributable to interdepartmental cooperation.  
                                                          
47 Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014. 
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Anti-segregation  
The enthusiastic attitude towards the double waiting list system as described in 3.2.1 is recognizable 
in the large-scale “Action plan integration at school” which was launched by Alderman Geluk in 
2005. The plan aimed at achieving a balanced school population that would reflect the 
neighborhood population. However, this was sometimes framed more specifically as “concentration 
of immigrant students at certain schools should be combatted” (B&W Rotterdam, 2005). The 
approach consisted of five measures: an integral approach to restructuring areas, support for parent 
initiatives, support for ‘friendships’ between white and black schools, monitoring (dis)colorization of 
schools and enabling double waiting lists. The program is in principle area-based, focusing on four 
deprived areas at first and at six additional areas in stage two. It appeared that it took quite some 
time for the school boards to be able to and to be willing to take part in the program. Therefore, the 
Department of Youth, Education and Society (YES), had to work closely with schools, school boards, 
sub-municipalities and other municipal services to make the plan work (Wethouder Onderwijs en 
Integratie Rotterdam, 2005). In 2009, the last specific progress report about the anti-segregation 
measures was published, from that moment on the topic is said to be covered in the general 
education reports (Wethouder Jeugd, Gezin, Onderwijs en Sport Rotterdam, 2009).  
From 2010 on, there is a change noticeable in the Rotterdam approach to anti-segregation. The new 
Mayor and Aldermen ended the active policies and emphasized educational quality rather than anti-
segregation (just like the Ministry would do 2011). In a meeting of GIA about anti-segregation in 
2010, Aldermen De Jonge endorsed the importance of the topic, but also stated the following: “A 
neighborhood school? Excellent, albeit one that delivers good educational quality. Then is doesn’t 
matter whether it is a black school or a white school (…) The most important is to prevent black 
schools from becoming weak schools” (Forum, 2010, p.4). Although double waiting lists are still 
possible, parents and schools are responsible themselves for mixing school populations’ trough 
parental initiatives and school information carrousels. Partly due to austerity measures, subsidies to 
parental initiatives and ‘friendship-schools’ are ended (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013). Although 
quality is seen as the new focal point, the program “performing better” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 
2011c) is not linked explicitly to anti-segregation. In addition, the consultation between municipality 
and schools about the topic has ended (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013).  
Early leaving  
Early leaving is predominantly apparent at VMBO and Vocational Education, in which immigrants are 
still overrepresented. Although we noticed already that problems are disaggregated by ethnicity till 
2010, the approach to early leaving is not. Early leaving is pre-eminently a topic that is dealt with in a 
generic poly-centric way. In 2003, a covenant was signed by the state, the municipality, the schools 
for vocational education and the secondary schools to combine efforts to reduce early leaving. In 
2007 (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008) this covenant proved successful having reduced early leaving 
with 10 percent. A new covenant was concluded upon for four years and again renewed for three 
years (Staatssecretaris OCW et al., 2007; Staatscourant, 2012). In 2011, the poly-centric approach 
was continued when a cooperation was founded in which the five biggest school boards have not 
only united administratively, but also executively. In close cooperation with the municipality, the 
new policy document was established (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2011e). The ‘joint attack’ is composed 
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of measures aimed at keeping scholars in school and guiding back those who did drop-out48. None of 
these measures include ethnic target groups.   
3.2.3. Conclusion 
This analysis of education policies in Rotterdam reveals several patterns that are of importance to 
this research. First of all, that the trend toward generic policies is also manifest at the local level. This 
does not so much involve a process that is imposed top-down upon the local level by the national 
level, although budget cuts at the national level were an important factor, but also a process led and 
driven by the local level in itself. The fact that Rotterdam has a long history in combatting various 
sorts of socio-economic deprivation amongst its city population plays an important role in this 
context as well; in many ways Rotterdam continued its educational efforts but then framed as 
targeting anyone with language problems rather than only immigrants. Rotterdam’s policies are  
phrased as policies for all ‘Rotterdammers.’ This clearly reflects the super-diverse character of the 
Rotterdam population, where it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between migrants and natives 
as well. Remarkably, this is also manifest in a declining emphasis on and even availability of data on 
the position of specific ethnic groups in Rotterdam. Also, the traditional emphasis of Rotterdam on 
combating segregation in the education sphere has shifted to the background over previous years.  
Secondly, the trend to poly-centric governance is clearly manifest in the Rotterdam case in various 
ways. National government decentralized many competencies in this policy area to the local level 
over the past decade, leading to specific changes in the coordination of a.o. early childhood 
education. This has led the city of Rotterdam to increasingly act as a coordinator in complex 
networks of actors, including primary and secondary schools, pre-schools, the national government 
and various other stakeholders. Here the city has clearly taken the role of a facilitator that fits the 
model of poly-centric governance. Also, Rotterdam has at various occasions, alone or via the G4, has 
attempted and partly managed to influence national policies; a clear illustration of vertical venue 
shopping.  
3.3 Amsterdam 
3.3.1 Policy background 
Problem context 
The population of Amsterdam is on average higher educated than the population of Rotterdam. 
However, although Amsterdam has many highly educated (native) inhabitants (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2009c) it also has a large population of (low educated) immigrants. Subsequently, 
Amsterdam is characterized by a large division along combined ethnic-socio-economic lines. As one 
of our interviewees formulates it: “When analysing Amsterdam (...) consistently a strong dichotomy 
becomes apparent. That dichotomy is simply coloured, and increasingly geographically as well”49. In 
2004, already 70% of the VMBO students have an immigrant background and the overall ratio of 
immigrant and native children is 60/40 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003; 2004). Just as in Rotterdam, 
                                                          
48 Specifically the measures to keep youngsters in school are aiming at the stimulation of appropriate career choices, a 
rigorous approach to absenteeism and several measures at improving tailored education, for example in working-learning 
arrangements. Monitoring early leaving, flexible entry moments in vocational education, neighborhood schools and ‘A New 
Chance’ (a special disciplinary school) are measures to guide youngsters back to school. 
49 Interview with a former program director of the 'Wij Amsterdammers'-program, Haarlem, 20th of May 2014. 
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the immigrant children form a majority in schools. However, due to the ‘dichotomy’, the immigrant 
(disadvantaged) children are distributed around the city very unequally. As an example: the 
boroughs “Center” and “Zuideramstel” have on average 14 and 20 percent of scholars with the 
heaviest weight (according to the weighing system described in 3.1.2), indicating very ‘white’ areas, 
while the boroughs “Bos and Lommer” and “De Baarsjes” accommodate 89 and 78 percent of those 
pupils (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003).   
As in the national case and in Rotterdam, Amsterdam largely recognizes the same educational 
problems. However, due to the specific population composition of Amsterdam, different problems 
are emphasised sometimes. Two problems that receive more (and longer) attention in Amsterdam 
are differences in educational careers of native and immigrant children, and segregation in schools, 
which is taken together with intercultural relations. Differences in educational careers start with the 
CITO-scores and advices given at the end of primary school. On average, the CITO scores of the 
‘white’ areas are 7 to 8 points higher than the scores in the ‘black’ areas. The focus of preschool is 
therefore directed to black schools (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). In 2004, 7900 children attended 
preschool, of which 84% belonged to the target population that existed for 80% of immigrant 
children (Gemeente Amsterdam et al., 2004).  
A study, conducted in Amsterdam schools in 2006, concluded that the mutual intercultural 
relationships are reasonable or good. Only 4 out of 25 primary schools and 4 out of 25 secondary 
schools recorded cultural tensions. However, overall, Moroccan and Turkish scholars felt less 
accepted and their identification with ‘the Netherlands’ decreased. Their Muslim identity was 
perceived as a binding factor (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2006b). In addition, an increase in 
conflicts between groups with different cultural backgrounds was observed in 2008. Many teachers 
were not equipped to act against this trend (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008). Contributing to this 
increasing division of scholars is the strong diversification of very good schools vs. very weak schools 
and the above average participation of western scholars at Havo/VWO and under average 
participation by non-western youth (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009). Even after taking the 
geographical divisions into account, many schools are considered either ‘too black’ or ‘too white’ 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011).  
Interestingly, the trend in collection and reporting of educational statistics in Amsterdam runs 
contrary to the trends as noticeable at the national level and in Rotterdam. The other cases are 
characterized by declining information on differences between natives and immigrants. However, in 
the same period Amsterdam increased the amount of information presented in an ethnic group-
specific way, both in general as well as education-only documents.  
Policy context 
Interestingly, governmental retrenchment and austerity measures seemed to be received more 
negatively (or at least to have been more openly contested) by Amsterdam than by Rotterdam. Little 
or no comments are made about the topic in Rotterdam policy documents. Contrastingly, at several 
occasions, remarks are made concerning expired or shrunken budgets and accompanying local policy 
consequences in Amsterdam. A first example is the claimed impossibility of intensifying the 
‘inburgering’ policies due to national austerity measures that limit the integration-budgets in 2003 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). Subsequently, in 2004, the abolishment of OALT and budgetary cuts 
in the municipal educational disadvantages budget influenced the ending of several specific policies, 
 39 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
whereas more money was made available for the generic goals of attaining more teachers and 
investing in knowledge and innovation (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004b). In 2005, budgets for 
inburgering were merged in the overall ‘large cities budget’, followed by the budgets for educational 
disadvantages in 2006 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004; 2005; 2006c). The large cities budget 
decreased again in 2005, making the goals that are set dependent on the new budgets (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2005). Several small projects (regarding computers at school, community schools and 
certain elements of preschool) were discontinued to be able to continue the overall process of 
education. The last stroke was hit in 2006, with the disappearance of municipal educational 
disadvantages policies and budgets. Some of the budget, intended for preschools and bridging 
classes, were added to the large city budget and other budgets are given directly to the school 
boards (after additional budgetary cuts) (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008b). This change in financing 
also implied a shift in policy- and financing responsibilities. The role of the school boards increased 
significantly. The subsequent education policy plans called ‘YOUNG Amsterdam’ (2006-2010) and 
‘YOUNG Amsterdam II’ (2010-2014) are consequently a coproduction of the municipality, boroughs 
and school boards (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2011).  
Political context 
With regard to the changing responsibilities of municipalities, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam were 
initiators of the G4 Youth Manifest described in paragraph 3.2.1. Therefore, the manifest is just as 
much a part of Amsterdam’s political context as it is for Rotterdam.  
Two Aldermen have been remarkably present in local and national media and politics during our 
period of study. The first is the Alderman of the PvdA, Rob Oudkerk, who was responsible for 
employment and incomes, education, youth, diversity and the ‘large city policy’ from March 2002 
until January 2004. Within this time frame, two incidents are recognizable. At first, in the evening of 
the local elections of 2002, Oudkerk was caught on tape in a private conversation with Mayor Cohen. 
Unaware of the fact that one of the microphones was still on, he spoke about ‘kutmarokkanen’ (a 
difficult to translate negative depiction of Moroccans) as ‘a bunch of annoying guys of Moroccan-
Amsterdam origin that create such a mess, that the whole group of people is associated with it’ 
(NOS, 2002, april 9). Although he apologized for the choice of words, he emphasized that the issue 
he was addressing is still important. In national politics it is named as a very bad political example 
several times when discussing diversity, radicalization or polarization, even up to 2009 (Moors, 
Balogh, Donselaar & De Graaff, 2009). However, on local level it caused little stir in the council.  
Subsequently, at the beginning of December 2003 a report about the alleged hindering of 
integration by an Islamic primary school in Amsterdam was published. A report requested by 
Oudkerk himself, after comments made by the Educational Inspection Body about that specific 
school. However, in the research report, the commission concluded that there are no signs of the 
school hindering integration. On top of that, “the commission believes that local authorities play an 
important role regarding the acceptance and thus development of Islamic education” (Bellari, Groen, 
Rentenaar & Spalburg, 2003). Although the commission concluded positively, Oudkerk followed a 
week later with a proclamation that all faith schools should be closed. According to him, parents 
should choose a school based on its didactic-pedagogical program rather than religion or 
denomination. In addition, the pillarized schools in Amsterdam allegedly have merely created 
segregation instead of integration (Valk, 2003, December 15). Although the statement created quite 
a stir in schools, local and national media, the topic never made it to the meetings of the council or 
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the Mayor and Aldermen and therefore it remained a political statement without direct policy 
implications.  
In 2009, Alderman Asscher was confronted with problems with the same Islamic primary school 
board that was discredited before. Meanwhile, the promotion of social integration and active 
citizenship had become an obligatory part of Dutch education (see 3.1.2). After renewed 
investigations, it was concluded that the school lacked efforts to embed this part in their regular 
education and the overall educational quality of the school was considered ‘very weak’.  After a 
letter of a former school-teacher of the school about the hampering of integration, Asscher and 
State Secretary Dijksma accelerated financial measures: reducing national subsidies and shutting 
down local subsidies. In addition, even closing down was considered an option. From 2010 on, the 
school receives all subsidies again. Partly because they have improved their programs and partly 
because the State Council declared that such financial measures are only eligible if a school does 
nothing on a certain subject (Raad van State, 2011).  
3.3.2 Policy content  
In terms of the content of education policies, Amsterdam seems to keep a specific focus on migrant 
related issues for a longer period when compared to other cases. Part of this difference is due to the 
recognizable dichotomy in the city that was observed above and the subsequent policy implications 
thereof. As we will see in this section, besides preschool and early leaving, anti-segregation and 
especially anti-radicalization are important policy subfields in the education policies of Amsterdam. 
For anti-radicalization, the socio-economic integration of immigrants is deemed important. The 
quality of schools is therefore a priority within this approach: “Every child is entitled to good 
education. Every child deserves to be able to develop optimally and to fully development its talents. 
In Amsterdam, it is your future that counts, not your origin. Therefore, all schools in Amsterdam need 
to be of good quality (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2010, p.10).  
Early childhood education 
To be able to meet the intention of ‘optimal development of each child’, preschool is an important 
first link. In 2003 and 2004, preschool was a specific measure, although formally formulated in 
generic terms and goals of the weighing ‘target population’. The method was twofold: for the 
children, preschool signalled disadvantages and provided extra support in normal classes at ‘black 
schools’ i.e. schools with at least 80% children with 1.9 weights. Simultaneously, contact parents 
with an immigrant background were deployed to lead the parents to language courses. This would 
subsequently improve the living- and learning-environment of the children (Gemeente Amsterdam, 
2003; Gemeente Amsterdam et al., 2004). Starting in 2006, the preschool changed from being 
exclusively focused on children with disadvantages (implicitly, immigrant children) to being (semi-) 
open to all children. This change was motivated by anti-segregation intentions and complemented 
by the expectation that disadvantaged children could benefit from the success of other children50 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d; 2010b). Subsequently, the new act “Developing Opportunities 
through Quality and Education” entered into force in 201051: making municipalities and boroughs 
legally responsible to organize early childhood education for every child of the target group. The 
                                                          
50 It was called the 80-20 rule: ideally, preschools are occupied by 80% disadvantaged children and 20% regular children 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006).  
51 Officially the act was implemented in 2011, however, the G4 started in advance in august 2010 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 
2011). 
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municipality of Amsterdam left the organization and execution of the act to the boroughs 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011). The boroughs are consequently responsible for the accessibility of 
preschools.   
The target group formulation of Amsterdam is determined by a flowchart in which ethnicity or 
country of origin formally plays no role. The most resembling indicator is the question whether the 
parents speak Dutch or a non-Dutch language with the child. If they do not speak Dutch, the child is 
considered part of the target group. Other indicators for inclusion in the target group are the 
educational level, pedagogical inabilities and the degree of stimulating learning environment at 
home (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2010c). 
Early leaving  
Early leaving is a problem that is often tackled from a generic perspective. Making sure that students 
make good career-choices, effective transitions and practical and appealing education are main 
points of interest. In 2003 and 2004, effective transitions are emphasised: the transition of VMBO to 
vocational education should be improved (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005b). However, rarely this 
statement is complemented by more specific measures of how they intend to achieve these 
transitions.  
Between 2004 and 2010, targeting specific immigrant groups takes place incidentally and mostly 
project-based. The 2005 action plan anti-discrimination discussed the difficulties immigrant students 
face when applying for internships and the measures the municipality would take to improve the 
availability of internships for migrants both within its own organization and local businesses 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008). In 2006, the municipality signed, together with two large schools for 
vocational education, the covenant “Amsterdam Attack of drop-out” (Minister OCW et al., 2006). 
Part of this approach is ‘special pathways for youth at risk’; a listing of several projects. Its main 
focus group was formulated generically as “adolescents in the age of 15-23 years, who did not obtain 
a basic qualification and who risk losing or already lost bonding with education or employment” 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006e, p.20). Of all projects, only one is explicitly focused on youngsters 
with an immigrant background. All projects required intensive cooperation and responsibility-
sharing by municipal and non-governmental actors (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006e). The 2009 quality 
agenda secondary education promotes the smoothening of transitions to make sure immigrant 
students will more often attend higher levels of education (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009). Finally, 
the 2010-2014 document “YOUNG Amsterdam II” is formulated in generic terms, following the 
framing of the WRR (discussed in 3.1.1) as ‘overloaded’ students instead of ethnic categorization 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011).  
Anti-radicalization  
Diversity is central to the policies regarding anti-radicalization, which have in practice been strongly 
connected to educational policies in Amsterdam. Propagating diversity and tolerance by increasing 
knowledge on different cultures is a common approach. Exception to this is the 2003 document 
“belonging and participating” (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). According to this document, which is meant 
to be a conceptual framework on integration: “citizenship starts with knowledge of our history, 
culture, basic values of our democracy and state of law and what expectations citizen may have of 
each other. More attention should be given to this matter in education” (B&W Amsterdam, 2003, 
p.10-11, underlines added). Only four months later, a follow-up document called “Integration in 
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Amsterdam: Work in Progress” was published which entails the real policies. In this document they 
state with a more pluralist mind-set that a “lack of knowledge and respect for each other and each 
other’s cultural background can lead to intolerance and tension at an early age” (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2003, underlines added). Recent developments52 would have led youth to become less 
tolerant and in order to counter that the municipality developed, in cooperation with several 
secondary schools, a curriculum on diversity aiming at increasing tolerance and diversity-awareness 
among scholars of Amsterdam53 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003).  
After the diversity-emphasis, the emphasis shifts to a connection between integration and 
radicalization in 2006 (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b). Providing perspective to education and work 
is important for everyone, “but reality is that, at the moment, it counts especially for inhabitants of 
Amsterdam with a migrant background”. Therefore, several measures are suggested to improve the 
perspectives of Islamic/immigrant students or recent graduates such as a motivational summer 
school, managerial coaches and continuation of the project ‘historical awareness’ that aims to make 
scholars and students part of the history of Amsterdam (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b). One of our 
interviewees highlights the difficulties that came with searching rapprochement to the schools in 
context of ‘Wij Amsterdammers II’: “It was hard to connect to the schools. (…). Schools have to gain 
new scholars next year; therefore they do not want to be known as breeding ground for 
radicalization. That is why we could not succeed in getting a foothold”54.  
Subsequently, another shift is recognizable in 2007: schools themselves are the new focus of anti-
radicalization in education by teaching teachers to cope with discrimination and radicalization. 
Budgets are available for courses, projects and workshops aimed at learning about radicalization, 
discrimination and ethnic tensions. In addition, intercultural advice and mediation in case of school 
incidents is made available. School initiatives focused on letting the children experience the city’s 
diversity in a positive way are given (budgetary) support between 2008 and 2010 via the, by the 
municipality subsidized, project organization ‘VIOS’: ‘Safety In and Around Schools’, that consisted 
(among others) of almost all secondary schools, safety coordinators and the police (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2007; 2008; 2008b; 2009b; 2010d; Wethouder Burgerschap en Diversiteit Amsterdam, 
2011). 
Anti-segregation 
Already in 1986, the Mayor and Aldermen of Amsterdam formulated the intention to reduce the 
amount of, what in the Dutch context are commonly referred to as, black and white schools55 
(Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). Because of the distribution of responsibilities over the municipality 
and school(s/boards), explicit measures are sometimes difficult or impossible to take. This is also 
acknowledged in 2003, when the Mayor and Aldermen emphasize the undesirability of segregation. 
Besides measures aimed at improved information provision about schools (to parents), the 
municipality would increase efforts to reach mixed neighbourhoods and invest more in ‘black 
                                                          
52 Examples are the publication of “the multicultural drama” by Paul Scheffer, the terrorist attacks of 11/9/2001, the 
election outcomes of 2002 and the Iraq-war (B&W Amsterdam, 2003, p.1) 
53 A second complementary project called “the second world war in perspective” started in 2004, after immigrant 
youngsters disrupted the official 4 May Memorial at several places in the city. Part of the project were history classes given 
by Moroccan students, trips to the Anne Frank house and an exhibition on the contribution of Moroccan allies in Europe 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004). 
54  Interview with a former program director of the 'Wij Amsterdammers'-program, Haarlem, 20th of May 2014. 
55 The first memorandum by the Ministry of Education that refers to the topic originates from 2000, thus 14 years later 
than the first memorandum in Amsterdam (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014).  
 43 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
schools’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003). In the following years, the connection between quality-
improvement of black schools and anti-segregation was not made explicitly anymore. The 
connection with neighbourhood-segregation on the other hand is re-emphasised at several 
occasions (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005, p.127): “Studies show that segregation in Education is 
primarily a derivative of the living situation in Amsterdam. Measures within Education can 
compensate this effect only partially”. Between 2001 and 2007, one can recognize many of the same 
kind of measures and pilots, often also aimed at the establishment of pre-arranged priority areas for 
application and admission (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006; 2006b; Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). 
However, as the research of the Kohnmann Institute (Ledoux, Felix & Elshof, 2013) indicates, the 
(visions on) policies on anti-segregation can vary substantively between boroughs; a condition that 
hampers poly-centric governance (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014).  
The covenant “Colourful Schools’, signed in 2007 by the municipalities, boroughs and primary 
schools of Amsterdam represented a change in two ways: the covenant illustrates a new and more 
accountable way of recording agreements between the different actors and the covenant was not 
merely focused on ethnic segregation, but also on socio-economic segregation (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2007b). Nevertheless, not many of the concrete actions were really ‘new’. In 2008, 
Alderman Asscher declared the covenant a failure: there was little alignment between schools, 
coordination was absent, and the allocation of children was non-transparent and even (legally) 
unequal. The problems were too complex and too different per area to be addressed municipality-
wide. Area-based pilots came back and extra attention was asked for weak schools (instead of black 
schools as done in 2003) (Rekenkamer Amsterdam, 2014). The pilots are considered a failure again 
(this time by the school boards) and subsequently Asscher requested advice from ADI. However, in 
the meantime, the school boards took the matter into their own hands and drafted a starting 
memorandum of anti-segregation in Education (Breed Bestuurlijk Overleg [BBO] PO Amsterdam, 
2010). Finally, in 2014, an “Urban Admission Policy” was issued as a coproduction of the schools and 
municipality. The role of the municipality is supportive by facilitating and providing information. The 
new admission policy is considered to guarantee legal equality and transparency and to ensure that 
every child can go to school in their own living environment. Anti-segregation is suddenly framed 
merely as a possible ‘side effect’, as it is emphasized that the policy is not intended as a dispersion 
tool (BBO PO Amsterdam, 2014).  
3.3.3. Conclusions 
The case of education policies in Amsterdam also shows a shift from specific to generic policies, but 
differs from Rotterdam and from the national level in specific ways. First of all, the shift appears to 
be less pronounced than in the other cases; Amsterdam seems to have held on to specific measures 
a bit longer than Rotterdam, such as in the connection to anti-radicalisation policies. Also, a marked 
difference with the other cases is the continued availability of ‘ethnic statistics’. Secondly, the shift 
toward generic policies in Amsterdam seems to have been fed less by an explicit policy and political 
agenda to get rid of target group specific measures. It was less a conscious masterplan to develop 
generic policies, but more a gradual retrenchment because of a variety of reasons such as budget 
constraints, as well as a gradual fragmentation of policies throughout different parts of the city. For 
instance, as the anti-segregation policies show, differences between boroughs were very 
pronounced. Also in the approach to early school leaving and anti-segregation, Amsterdam is a clear 
case of poly-centric governance, where local administration constantly engaged in cooperation with 
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societal stakeholders. Finally, more than the other cases, Amsterdam does combine its shift toward 
generic policies with a focus on diversity and interculturalisation. This is manifest very clearly in the 
emphasis on positive recognition of diversity in educational programs, also as part of anti-
radicalisation policies.  
3.4  Policy explanations 
In line with the typology, which is introduced in chapter two, this section will first discuss three 
elements: the extent to which the society is perceived monist or pluralist, the extent to which the 
policies are targeting specific groups or the general population and the use and design of poly-
centric modes of governance.  Thereafter, attention will be given to the overall questions: what is 
mainstreamed and why?  
3.4.1  Connection with the typology 
In terms of perceptions of monism or pluralism, it is clear that in the national as well as the local 
cases the diverse character of the school population is realistically recognized. On the local level, the 
educational departments of Rotterdam and Amsterdam recognize pluralism mostly as a ‘fact’ or 
‘reality’: there are many nationalities in primary education (over 150 or 170) and more than half of 
the school population has an immigrant background. At a national level, pluralism is experienced as 
a fact, but sometimes also as something that ‘should be experienced’ by children, or as an 
increasingly negative characteristic.  
Over the last decade we can very clearly recognize a shift from specific to generic policy targeting at 
a national level. Examples of current generic approaches are the programs aimed at early childhood 
education and reducing early leaving. Abandoning OALT can be considered a clear step away from 
specific policies, as OALT was one of the last educational elements that accomodated immigrants in 
explicitly maintaining their own culture and using it to emancipate and integrate in the Dutch 
society. A second clear step away from specific policies was the changing of the school-funding 
system. Whereas immigrant children used to receive more budget for combatting disadvantages, a 
‘needs-based replacement’-strategy came into place when replacing ethnicity with parents’ level of 
education. Following the argumentation of the government, this change entailed a focus on the 
“real” problems and ensured that “money goes to were its needed” (Minister OCW, 2004b). Likewise, 
adding obligatory ‘social integration and active citizenship’-courses in school can be considered an 
interculturalist approach, since “encouragement of interaction, understanding and respect between 
different cultures and ethnic groups” is considered a central element of the interculturalist approach 
(Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014).  
Amsterdam started in 2003 with a document with almost an assimilationist notion: immigrants and 
immigrant children had to learn “our” norms, values and rule of law (B&W Amsterdam, 2003). 
However, this approach was replaced very quickly by a more interculturalist notion, which remained 
in place since then. Diversity-awareness, tolerance, and projects focused on the “common 
Amsterdam history” try to create a more common sense of belonging. Measures against educational 
segregation are mainly generic in nature and aimed at furthering integration. Amsterdam pursued 
these measures longer than Rotterdam and the national government did and also signalled to the 
national level that the topic was still high on the local agenda. Overall, Amsterdam has an approach 
that involves both specific and generic elements. Immigrants are perceived to need additional 
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support on several matters in order to emancipate and integrate fully. However, this specific 
targeting has declined in all areas. For example, early childhood education was disconnected from 
black schools in 2006, the anti-radicalization measures based on provide immigrant youth with 
‘perspective’ were replaced by the school-based measures in 2006 and the early leaving approach 
stopped targeting immigrants in 2009. Therefore, we would say that Amsterdam changed gradually 
from a predominantly specific approach to an interculturalist approach.   
Contrary to the other cases, Rotterdam seems to be using mainly generic policies throughout the 
whole period of observation. Sometimes, it is recognized that immigrants are overrepresented in a 
certain problem. Sometimes, goals are formulated in terms of immigrants as target groups, but only 
next to the goals for the whole population. Eventually, even after naming specific problems, or 
specific measures, little or none measures are mentioned to address that specific issue in a way for 
that specific group. Consequently, integration is often taken together with the reduction of 
educational disadvantages, which is a problem among the local low educated population as well. 
Exception to this trend is the use of ethnicity as one of the two most important indicators for the 
formulation of preschool target groups. Overall, the approach of Rotterdam can be described as a 
‘needs-based replacement’-strategy, thus focusing its policies on problems rather than groups: “It 
remains an ongoing quest. First, the immigrants came from former colonies, then guest workers, 
refugees, migrants from eastern and central Europe. What’s next? You have to react on it constantly. 
New problems lead to new groups. But you should always start with the social problem”56 
Another element of the typology is the expectation that the process of mainstreaming is 
accompanied by increasing use of poly-centric governance modes. Both decentralization (vertical) 
and deconcentration (horizontal) would occur. Following the paragraphs above, Rotterdam should 
be the frontrunner in poly-centric governance, followed by the national government and finally, 
Amsterdam. However, decentralization is heavily influenced by the national government that 
replaced responsibilities from itself, to municipalities, to the schools. As a Rotterdam policy officer 
mentioned: “a lot is arranged by the schools themselves. Therefore, education only has a limited 
mandate in that area”57. At a local level we can recognize an increasing use of covenants and policy 
co-production. These methods allow municipalities to contribute to, and coordinate educational 
policies, even though they are formally not their authority. Therefore, on this topic, both the 
national government and municipalities are increasingly considered as directors, facilitators and 
information-providers, rather than actual policy makers. Regarding deconcentration, having other 
departments or ministries, such as education, taking upon themselves responsibility for elements of 
integration is crucial to avoid the topic of integration sliding completely of the agenda. According to 
the same Rotterdam policy officer, that is a challenging component of mainstreaming58. Overall, 
cooperation between departments (such as integration and education) is in none of the three cases 
institutionalized. 
  
                                                          
56 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, 
Rotterdam, interviewed  4th of June 2014. 
57 Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014. 
58 Idem. 
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3.4.2 What is mainstreamed and why? 
The policy field of education is broad, but many elements are mainstreamed by nature due to 
constitutional rights. Examples of these rights are education for every child, freedom of school-
choice and the freedom to found schools with a specific religious, social or educational vision. 
However, as demonstrated throughout the chapter, there are certain policy-topics that are more 
likely to be involved in the integration of immigrants; such as ECE, early-leaving, anti-segregation at 
school, language policies, anti-radicalization and above all, the funding system. Many of these topics 
have not been approached entirely specific, however, it was noticeable that immigrants were 
overrepresented in the overall target population of (for example) ECE and early leaving. Throughout 
the last ten years, specific policies in all these topics are increasingly mainstreamed into generic 
policies. 
The next question to answer is why these educational policies are mainstreamed. The most evident 
explanation can be found in the development of the problem setting in the Dutch case: increasing 
diversity coupled with the long migration history of the Netherlands. The Dutch population of 
schoolchildren is increasingly diverse in country of origin and generations of immigrants. In the large 
cities, more than half of the children are of immigrant origin, partly due to the higher fertility rate of 
ethnic minorities. The increasing diversity caused the local governments to see mainstreaming as 
‘inevitable’; policy implementation became more difficult when more and more ethnicities had to be 
taken into account. Examples on a national level are OALT, which was continuously extended with 
new languages, and the funding system, in which especially the multi-generational factor became a 
statistical burden. Although the population became increasingly diverse, many policy documents 
mentioned specific progress of certain ethnic immigrants (such as: Already 4% of second generation 
Moroccans attend higher education, compared to first generation Moroccans). Through time, 
attention for specific problems of immigrants decreased. However, when assessing the impact of 
this trend on the increased mainstreaming of immigrant-integration in education we may end up in a 
circular argument. At this stage it is impossible to conclude whether problems decreased first, are 
subsequently not mentioned anymore and can consequently be mainstreamed or whether the 
political decision to mainstream is the root cause of the decrease of attention for specific problems. 
Therefore, we can state that there is probably a correlation between the degree of perceived 
integration problems in integration and the tendency to mainstream policies, however, the causal 
relationship is questionable. 
A second explanation of mainstreaming immigrant-integration in education policies can be found in 
the increasing influence of the crisis and especially governmental retrenchment. At a national level, 
the large decentralizations and waves of mainstreaming seem to be unconnected. The municipalities 
were already made responsible for several (specific) education policy implementations (such as 
OALT and the implementation of the educational disadvantages policy). However, the change of the 
funding system in 2006 did coincide with a shift of responsibilities from the municipalities to the 
schools. After this shift, we can notice more policies resulting from coproduction between the 
municipality, schools and other actors. Examples of these co-productions are the youth policies of 
Amsterdam (YOUNG Amsterdam I and II; Gemeente Amsterdam 2006; 2011), the recent document 
on Amsterdam’s Admission Policy (BBO Amsterdam, 2014) and several covenants of both 
municipalities as well as the ministry (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007b; Staatscourant 2012). These co-
productions are more likely to be mainstreamed than their municipal predecessors. After 
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decentralizations, the ministry and the municipalities are left with generic policies to provide the 
knowledge infrastructure, more often referred to as the (new) director’s role of the government59. 
Governmental retrenchment in austerity measures seems to be less influential with regard to 
mainstreaming immigrant integration in education. Amsterdam is the only case that emphasizes 
austerity measures. However, the consequences are mostly connected to inburgering rather than 
educational topics.  
Finally, immigrant-integration in education is not one of the most mediagenic topics of the Ministry 
of Education. Search on a topic such as the financing system of higher education students and you 
will find much more than when searching on topics regarding immigrant integration. If it is explicitly 
mentioned in the media, oftentimes it are negative examples such as Islamic schools hampering 
integration or for example big claims made by politicians (such as the abolishment of anti-
segregation measures in 2011). Populist parties, such as PVV, use the media more often to bring 
forth their anti-immigration statements. Its rise in 2006 and its parliamentary support connection to 
the Cabinet in 2011 coincide with two waves of mainstreaming of immigrant-integration in 
education. However, it is not possible to explicitly link the influence of the PVV to these waves of 
mainstreaming. Especially in 2006, since many of the changes that were implemented from then on 
were initiated before the founding of the PVV. However, the overall change in Dutch sentiment, 
following the rise of the LPF in the early 2000’s, may have contributed to the increase in 
mainstreaming educational policies.  
  
                                                          
59 Interview with Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
The Hague, 26th of June 2014. 
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4 - Social cohesion 
The second policy domain on which our analysis focuses is social cohesion policy. This policy domain 
was selected because it constitutes one of the most important socio-cultural policy domains that 
may be affected by the mainstreaming of migrant integration policies. In the Netherlands social 
cohesion came to the fore in the shift from the integration policies focused on social-economic 
participation to an awareness of the social-cultural dimension of immigrant integration since the 
assimilationist turn of the 2000s. This shift was initiated by a series of incidents, nationally and 
internationally "that strengthened the consciousness that cultural diversity has its drawbacks too" 
(Tweede Kamer, 2004b), such as the politically motivated assassination of writer and director Theo 
van Gogh. The consternation caused by the assassination resulted in widespread debate on the 
social distance and segregation between immigrants and the native population of the Netherlands 
and the effects of immigrant integration for so far. This marks a more normative development in 
immigrant integration policies, emphasizing debates on common or Dutch norms and values and 
identification.  
Moving away from specifically targeted immigrant integration policies, integration became a 
concern of the society as a whole, approached from a perspective of social cohesion rather than 
emancipation. Throughout the years this crystalized in a number of topics such as ‘livability’ on a 
neighborhood level and citizenship projects. These topics are primarily (co-) coordinated by the 
respective Minister or Alderman of Integration, and typically involve different levels (mostly local 
and national) of governance. While increasingly a primary aim of immigrant integration policies 
itself, social cohesion also touches upon topics such as segregation and housing policies, 
radicalization, interethnic contact and discrimination. Below, the policies will be discussed in more 
detail in their distinctive national and local context, illustrating different degrees of mainstreaming. 
However the chapter will start with a few remarks to contextualize the issue of immigrant 
integration in its contemporary problem, policy and political-context. 
4.1  National case 
4.1.1 Policy background 
Problem framing: a socio-cultural gap 
In terms of problem framing, especially since the early 2000's a social and cultural gap between 
immigrants and the native population was defined as the main problem trend beyond immigrant 
integration issues. It is stated that "a too large part of ethnic minorities are distanced from the Dutch 
society" (Tweede Kamer, 2004c). Although supposedly not as influential as the educational 
disadvantages or unemployment, high ‘segregation indices’ and concentration-areas'60 in general are 
a said to hinder orientation towards the Dutch society and citizen-participation (Tweede Kamer, 
2004b; 2005; Van der Laan 2005). Later on the lack of social integration is explicitly linked to 
criminality and nuisance (Minister WWI, 2007). Specifically in the Coalition period of 2007-2010 
                                                          
60 Large-city areas with a high concentration of minority groups. See: Tweede Kamer, 2004c. 
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(Balkenende III) this is high on the Agenda, coordinated by the Minister of Living, Neighborhoods and 
Integration.  
Incidents such as the murder of writer and director Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in 2004, and the 
arrest of the Hofstadgroep, a group of young radical Islamists "have put the social cohesion of the 
society to the test" (Tweede Kamer, 2006) leading to “doubt with regard to the feasibility of the 
immigrant-integration project” as written in the Annual Immigrant Integration Memorandum of 
2005 (Tweede Kamer, 2005). In a safety monitor conducted between 2003 and 2005 it turned out 
that two-third of the population think immigrants integrate badly, and almost half of the population 
indicates that they think there are too many immigrants (Tweede Kamer, 2005), though the latter 
dropped to 40% in 2006. These incidents put the supposed lack of social cohesion on the agenda, 
addressing citizenship, bonding and interethnic contact as central themes in immigrant integration 
policies, intended to restore the social cohesion of society.  
In subsequent years this feeling gets a religious connotation, as  “the opinions on immigrants are 
increasingly affected by the Islam, terroristic attacks in the name of Islam, nationally and 
internationally, left its traces” as indicated by decreasing levels of support for the immigrant 
integration project and the belief that Muslims can contribute to Dutch culture61 (Minister WWI, 
2007). Vice versa the negative opinions on Islam affected Turkish and Moroccan Muslims, of whom 
an increasing number thinks judgment on Islam in the Netherlands is too harsh. Approximately a 
quarter of the Turkish and Moroccan respondents would consider a Western and Islamic lifestyle to 
be incompatible (Minister WWI, 2007), indicating the polarization and increasing religious/Islamic 
framing that characterizes the debate. 
Policy context: policy retrenchment 
As in many other fields, immigrant integration policies throughout the last 10 years are 
characterized by shrinking budgets, resulting from the retreating government, far-reaching 
retrenchment and decentralization measures. With regard to social cohesion this is best visible in a 
strong decentralization development, as illustrated in housing- and neighborhood-policies where 
local parties and inhabitants are considered the primary actors: “The national government should 
not be a directing or determining player in this field” (Ministerie BZK, 2011). 
As a ministry without portfolio, the policy responsibility for immigrant integration has shifted 
between departments under different ministries.  An influence with regard to the topics addressed 
and the cooperation with the respective ministries or political constellation is notable throughout 
these years, with a respective emphasis on the link to immigration (2002-2007), housing policies 
(2007-2010), strong decentralizations (2010-2012) and a focus on employment (currently).  Through 
time these topics have been coupled together under the co-coordination of the Ministry responsible 
for Immigrant Integration. However, driven by a strong move away from specific policies and 
developments of decentralization and deregulation in general, around 2011 housing policies in the 
context of anti-segregation measures have been separated from the immigrant integration agenda. 
In fact, the link between concentration, segregation and integration on the one hand, and the 
(un)desirability of this (ethnic) concentration in deprived areas on the other hand, are a continues 
                                                          
61 Survey-results show that the number of people supporting the statement that Muslims can contribute to Dutch culture 
dropped from 45% to 34% (Minister van Wonen, Wijken en Integratie, 2007).  
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topic of debate where spatial planning and immigrant-integration policies meet, as illustrated by the 
policy developments below. 
Political context: politicization of social cohesion 
Lastly the field of immigrant integration is, as illustrated by incidents named above, a highly 
politicized field. The, politically driven, dissatisfaction with effectiveness of previous immigrant 
integration policy from the ‘90s has since then dominated the discussions in this field. Policy 
measures from the 2000’s on are repeatedly framed as a ‘break’ with, and ‘alteration’ of these 
policies – placed in a general backlash against what was perceived as multiculturalism. This period 
also saw the rise of new populist parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (founded in 2002) and the Partij 
voor de Vrijheid (founded in 2006). The parties have immigration and integration high on the agenda 
and do not eschew controversial statements to highlight these. Both parties briefly took part in the 
Coalition (respectively between 2002-2003 for LPF and the PVV in 2010 as part of a parliamentary 
support agreement), but have been very influential on the immigrant-integration debates outside 
these periods too (Scholten, 2013).  
Important in the context of this section is that this politicization at the national level in the 
Netherlands clearly evolved much more around the topic of social cohesion than education. A 
paradox can be observed in that precisely in a period where the involvement of national government 
in social cohesion is characterized by retrenchment, social cohesion figures increasingly prominently 
in national political debate. This politicization of social cohesion was fed by a number of focus 
events, some of which were mentioned above, as well as by the rise of populist parties. This paradox 
can be clearly illustrated by the political controversy that emerged around the parliamentary 
investigative committee on integration policy, also named the ‘Blok- committee.’ In 2004 this 
committee observed that immigrant integration had been relatively successful, especially because of 
progress made in the educational sphere that was considered a key-sector for integration.  
Subsequently, this committee became itself object of fierce political controversy, as various political 
parties framed the integration process a success regardless of these educational successes but 
precisely because of the perceived problems in the area of social cohesion. This clearly shows that 
political judgment about integration, at the national level at least, was fed primarily by concerns 
about social cohesion.  
4.1.2 Policy content 
As mentioned above social cohesion increasingly forms one of the core aims of immigrant 
integration policies in general, marking a shift to socio-cultural integration. In the period under 
research here this relates more specifically to anti-segregation measures in housing policies and 
interethnic contact, focusing around terms such as 'livability' and living together primarily on a 
neighborhood level. 
From specific to generic housing policies 
Housing policies and spatial segregation programs have always been primarily a responsibility of the 
Ministry for Housing, but have through time often been addressed in an immigrant integration 
context too.62 This involves in particular ethnic concentration in certain deprived areas and its 
(alleged) influence on integration outcomes. Since the end of the 1980s, the policy area of housing is 
                                                          
62 In the Coalition period of 2007-2010 this coincided with the Housing portfolio of Minister Vogelaar of Housing, Living and 
Integration under the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment. 
 51 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
characterized by major decentralizations and deregulations of government responsibilities to the 
open market (mid- and high range rental and owned-property) and housing co-operations (social-
housing).63 This shift also indicated the end of specifically targeted housing policies for ethnic 
minorities, which before counted as a criterion for financial compensation for rent, or as a criterion 
for the assignment of social housing (see Tweede Kamer, 1983). Already from the 1990's on housing 
policies are addressed primarily in generic, non-ethnic terms only, instead targeting by 'objective' 
labels such as income and family size (Tweede Kamer, 2004). Though no longer targeting by 
ethnicity, housing policies in the nineties were intended to promote a differentiation of city- and 
neighborhood demographics in a broader sense, which would remain the central objective of these 
policies in the coming decade64 (Tweede Kamer, 2004).  
From 2002 on the 'livability' in concentration areas has been high on the agenda again, 
problematizing the influence of ethnic segregation on immigrant integration and the quality of life in 
deprived neighborhoods in general. The Coalition Government of Balkenende I phrased the intention 
to reduce the concentration of socially-economically deprived immigrants. Although the political 
discourse in this period put strong emphasis on the problematization of ethnic concentrations in 
specific urban zones, the policy measures were (carefully) formulated in generic ways. In particular, 
needs- or area-based replacement strategies were formulated that enabled the targeting of 
neighborhoods with ethnic concentrations, without explicitly problematizing ethnic concentrations. 
Following the advice of the Commission Blok as published in 2004 (see chapter 2), the coalition 
intended to improve the quality of life in the concentration-neighborhoods by a two-fold approach: 
a differentiation of the housing-stock in the cities and by opening up opportunities for 
housing/relocating vulnerable groups in suburban areas. On top of that, the ‘Wet Bijzondere 
Maatregelen Grootstedelijke Problematiek’, also known as the Rotterdam-Act as it was initiated 
from this city, was introduced on a national level in 200565. This Act can be applied under extra-
ordinary circumstances of deprivation in certain city-areas, to take far-reaching provisions in order 
to improve the livability in these areas. The Act consists of a wide range of measures to improve 
livability and safety, but its most controversial measure intends to regulate the influx of the number 
of people with a low income in certain city-areas66. This requirement makes the law so controversial 
since it threatens equal access to services as grounded in the constitution. Although a national law, 
this act has only been implemented in the city of Rotterdam, laying justice to the name ‘Rotterdam 
act’.  
While The Rotterdam Act was originally raised as a measure to reduce the number of disadvantaged 
immigrants in these neighborhoods by the local party Liveable Rotterdam, there was no wider local 
or national support for these criteria and the policy was instead targeted in terms of income and 
employment, as the other housing policies from that time. The Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning 
and Environment briefly put the housing-situation of immigrants-specifically back on the agenda in a 
                                                          
63 See Nota Volkshuisvesting in de jaren negentig (1989) in Commission Blok report 
64 Between 2000-2002 there was a remarkable shift in this regard where the government stated that ethnic or income 
concentration was not a problem as long as the social or cultural structure of a neighbourhood is not against one’s will or 
due to a lack of choice “Housing policies that automatically accommodate by type, or the opposite, stimulating 
differentiation is undesirable” (Mensen, Wensen, Wonen, 2000, p.18). 
65 More on how the Act was drafted can be read in 4.2 Rotterdam 
66 When 45% of the inhabitants can be qualified as low-income and 25% are regarded non-active the law is enforced. 
Newcomers to the region (e.g. a residence of less than six years) will be subject to income-requirements before they can 
settle in the respective neighbourhood. 
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publication (Ministerie van Volkshuisvestiging, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 2005), claiming 
this had ‘gone silent’ with the move towards generic policies. Equally the State-Secretary refers to a 
report on the topic published by the Sociaal Cultureel Planbueau (Gijsberts and Dagevos 2005) when 
stating that "while not as influential as individual characteristics, the effect of housing-policies on 
immigrant-integration is meaningful. Therefore I am happy to apply housing policies to pay a 
contribution here" (Ministerie van Volkshuisvestiging, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer 2005b), 
though stressing the wider, generic context of these housing and neighborhood policies. 
While the Commission Blok in its report linked spatial anti-segregation measures explicitly to 
integration, the Council for Social Development (Raad voor Maatschappelijke Ontwikkeling, RMO) a 
year later published two reports in which they state that instead of ineffective spatial-measures in 
concentration-areas, the government should focus on bonding to create unity and overcome 
segregation in society (RMO, 2005; 2005b). While the government decided to continue the housing 
projects nonetheless, the government additionally opened a program for financial support to 
stimulate ‘local initiatives that stimulate interethnic interaction and contact’ (Tweede Kamer, 2006). 
This resonates with an earlier, though more generically targeted program, the ‘Broad Initiative 
Societal Bonding’ (Tweede Kamer, 2005c). This program was introduced as a response to the 
deregulation as announced by the central government, mobilizing new coalitions of citizens, the 
government and civil society in order to encourage bonding and cohesion. While phrased in more 
generic terms the program partly focused on the lack of contact between native and immigrant 
citizens. Other examples that intended to stimulate interethnic contact are the ‘Integration-
Campaign’ (Tweede Kamer, 2005), ‘&-Campaign’ intended to demonstrate good examples of 
intercultural interaction and several sport initiatives (Tweede Kamer, 2006). 2005 marks an 
incremental transition to broader anti-segregation measures in neighborhoods, moving beyond 
spatial-planning with the campaign and programs aiming to stimulate contact and dialogue targeting 
social cohesion in a wider sense. While clearly moving away from specifically targeted policies since 
the nineties, around 2005 the government slowly moves towards the promotion of the plurality of 
society, stimulating interethnic contact and interaction. Policies can be observed to move towards 
interculturalism and mainstreaming. 
Social and spatial policy measures from 2005 on 
In a revision of the Housing Act in 2007 (Directoraat-Generaal Wonen, Wijken en Integratie [DG 
WWI], 2007) the Minister lists livability as a condition for interference in the spatial planning of 
neighborhoods. In an accompanying letter the Minister emphasizes that local governments should 
have some discretion in the allocation of housing on a neighborhood-level due the differences in 
livability and the housing-market in different areas and cities. However the Minister also notes that 
this selection should never be based on ethnicity (DG WWI, 2007). Social cohesion is increasingly 
phrased in local and neighborhood terms rather than ethnic terms, placing the work- and living-
environment of people central in the policy design. "People should be addressed and challenged to 
work on integration in their direct work- and living-environment, participating in maintaining the 
liability of their neighborhood" (Tweede Kamer, 2006).  
The well-known 'Krachtwijken aanpak' or ‘power-boroughs approach’ (Ministerie van 
Volkshuisvestiging, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer [VROM], 2007) of Minister Vogelaar forms 
a good example of this development. This large polycentric collaboration between the central 
government, housing co-operations and local governments, aims to improve the livability of a 
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selection of 40 deprived neighborhoods67 throughout the country by a combination of ‘spatial’ and 
‘social’ policy measures in the neighborhoods, extending the mandate of spatial planning to the 
social dimension addressed in the RMO advise (2005). The program raises the fact that a large 
portion of the deprived areas is characterized by a ‘disproportionate number of non-Western 
allochthons’ (Ministerie VROM, 2007). Integration forms one of the five themes around which the 
policies are centered. Due to or despite the program's wide -spatial and social- scope, heritage is not 
applied as a criterion for selecting the neighborhoods for the program, which is left open to a wider, 
generic, public.68 Apart from a few specifically targeted measures (e.g. focusing on civic-integration, 
sports activities for immigrant youth and microcredit for immigrant women) the policy-measures 
under integration are framed primarily in generic terms, aiming to improve shared interests and 
contact for example through sports and generic social cohesion activities. This discrepancy between 
raising policy issues specifically and addressing them generically illustrates the 'dilemma of 
recognition' (De Zwart, 2005, p.139), balancing the stigmatizing effects of specific and generic 
policies.  
The ‘Power-Boroughs’ program was eventually ended early 2012, after a change of government and 
controversy around the financing of the program69. From 2011 onwards, housing policies and spatial 
planning have no longer been addressed explicitly in the immigrant integration context. Instead the 
Minister of Internal Affairs states that “focus-areas will be covered under generic policies in the fields 
of learning, working and safety” (Ministerie BZK, 2011), emphasizing that local parties and 
inhabitants are the primary actors here (Tweede Kamer, 2012b). This should be understood in the 
context of major decentralizations in the social domain. 
One issue that is mentioned in this context is the housing situation of migrants from the European 
Union, or EU labour migrants, or mobile- citzens. They are said to put a heavy burden on certain old 
city neighborhoods in Rotterdam and The Hague, due to poor housing-conditions and unfamiliarity 
with the language (Ministerie BZK, 2011; Minister van SZW, 2013). The government is skating on thin 
ice here as their legal status prohibits drafting discriminating measures or requirements for these 
EU-citizens. Nevertheless the housing- and situation of EU-migrants in general, remained a focus 
area.  
Except from this new group, the strong narrowing down of the immigrant integration agenda since 
2011 (see chapter 2) not only means an absence of housing and anti-segregation policies, but 
translates into an absence of interethnic contact all together. While formerly based on an exchange 
of norms and values, coping with diversity is now addressed in terms of the responsibility of the 
newcomer him- or herself, stressing the importance of the Dutch basic-values as a corner stone of 
civic integration courses and integration in general through citizenship-projects in schools (see 
chapter 3) and the so-called ‘participation declaration’ (Minister SZW, 2013c).  While the 
individualization approach was previously applied to react to a diversification of the target groups 
                                                          
67 Of which five neighborhoods are located in Amsterdam and nine in Rotterdam. 
68After some controversy Minister Vogelaar was forced by the lower court to publish the list of criteria for the selection of 
the neighborhoods for the program. Neighborhoods were selected by social-economic deprivation (income, work and level 
of education); physical deprivation (small, old and cheap housing); social problems (residents opinion on dilapidation, 
demolishing of public services, nuisances of (direct) neighbours and fear of harassment or robbing); physical problems 
(residents opinion on housing situation, propensity to move, nuisance by noise, smell, dust, trash or traffic or unsafety due 
to traffic-situation). 
69 Though 38 out of 40 neighborhoods were listed for continued partnership with the national government (Ministerie van 
Volkhuisvestiging, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer, 2013).  
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with a strong focus on its plurality (see chapter 2), this is now applied to an assimilationist frame 
focused on adaption. A new pilot of the 'participation declaration' illustrates its symbolic value. A 
selection of 16 municipalities sends immigrants who come to live in their city a 'participation 
declaration', addressing the rights and obligations of both third-country nationals and EU-migrants in 
the Netherlands. Since EU-citizens can not officially be targeted for integration courses the 
declaration is of symbolic value, enshrining that "immigrants are welcome but they should also 
realize in what a great country they have arrived. They should realize what the norms and values are 
we live with here. They should know them, respect them and be able to enforce them. They don't live 
here with the norms of the country of origin. The declaration of participation is an expression of that" 
in the words of the Asscher, Minister of Social Affairs (Volkskrant, 2013, December 20). 
4.1.3. Conclusion 
This analysis of social cohesion policies reveals several trends, some of which fit in very well with the 
conceptualization of mainstreaming as developed in the context of this research project. Particularly 
the trend towards more generic policies and towards more decentralization fit the definition 
particularly well. Social cohesion policies, even those formulated at the national level, are primarily 
oriented at social cohesion at the neighborhood level, such as illustrated by the ‘power-boroughs 
approach.’ Also, they are framed generically, in terms of targeting livability, differentiation (also in 
terms of groups with different socio-economic status) and increasingly also safety.  
However, we also observed that these social cohesion policies often involved distinct needs- as well 
as area-based replacement strategies. This should be seen as a response to the broader policy and 
political setting (described in 4.2.1) where ethnic concentration does continue to be problematized 
explicitly. By targeting issues of ‘livability’ or ‘safety’ and by targeting those areas with an 
overrepresentation of socio-economically deprived groups (such as in the Rotterdam act), policies 
often indirectly still target areas with ethnic concentrations as well.  
What is manifest only very limitedly in the Dutch national setting is an explicit orientation on the 
plural character of society to promote interculturalisation, which is another dimension of 
mainstreaming.  Although there were some measures to promote interethnic contact, this was 
clearly not a policy priority, in spite of the calls from the Dutch Council for Social Development to 
focus more on social bonding. In contrast, the recent initiative of a ‘participation declaration’ signal 
an emphasis on adaptation to certain values and norms rather than interculturalisation and 
recognition of diversity.  
  




Rotterdam is a highly diverse city, with a large cohort of young, second and third generation 
immigrants. This ‘fact of diversity’ forms the basic principle of the immigrant integration policies 
throughout time. A collective project of the Aldermen of Rotterdam and Amsterdam to compare and 
analyse the ‘state of integration’ reveals a high degree of segregation (though declining throughout 
the years) and low levels of connection of citizens to their city and their neighborhood in Rotterdam 
(Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012, p.20). These developments have triggered several policy measures such 
as citizenship-projects and far-reaching housing policies. Before looking into these developments 
further we start with a few lines on the problem, policy and political context of social cohesion 
policies in Rotterdam. 
 
4.2.1 Policy background 
Problems: concerns about livability 
First of all, in terms of problem framing, the threat of declining social cohesion and advancing 
segregation is addressed as a high political priority in the Coalition Period of 2002-2006 
(LeefbaarRotterdam, CDA and VVD). The Coalition Agreement reads: 
"In the run up to the 2002 local elections the feeling amongst many citizens and counsellors 
had rose that the city had permitted to much change and variety in the preceding years, 
leading to social tension and distance between people. People felt as if Rotterdam was no 
longer their city, not feeling at home in their streets. ... This translated in the election 
turnout, which can be summarized in one sentence: things have to change, the cohesion has 
to be restored" (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002). 
The comparative ‘State of Integration’-study (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012) of the cities of Rotterdam 
and Amsterdam shows that for the four biggest immigrant groups70 Amsterdam has significantly 
higher segregation indices71 than Rotterdam, while Rotterdam scores a little higher on ‘other 
categories’ of non-western immigrants, but scores remarkably higher for the segregation indices of 
the native population (Scheffer & Entzinger, 2012, p.119). In a follow-up letter, Aboutaleb, the 
mayor of Rotterdam, stresses that both Amsterdam and Rotterdam have become cities of migration. 
The native population of Rotterdam has declined stronger since 2000 than that of Amsterdam (B&W 
Rotterdam, 2012). Additionally the native population of both cities score poorly when it comes to 
contact with people outside their own group; only 62% of the native Rotterdam citizens ever has 
contact with people outside their own group against 76% for Amsterdam (B&W Rotterdam, 2012), 
indicating the lack of contact and cohesion amongst its citizens.  
                                                          
70 Surinamese, Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans 
71 Divided along postal-code regions the segregation index (varying between 0 and 100) indicates the percentage of non-
Western immigrants that has to move to a different neighbourhood in order to create a ‘proportional division ‘of 
immigrants between the different areas. Proportional here means a division that is in line with the segment of immigrants 
in the city in total. A segregation index of 0 thus means that all non-Western immigrants are divided between 
neighbourhoods equally, while an index of 100 would mean all non-Western immigrants are concentrated in areas with no 
other inhabitants. The index is also applied to differentiate between different ethnic groups as in the example mentioned 
above. Retrieved august 1, 2014, from http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/_unique/_concept/default.htm? 
Languageswitch=on&Concept=Segregatie-index+&PostingGuid={0DB772EF-68C5-4850-9399-458B135F8A23}  
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Rotterdam is known as a working class city, and its housing policies were directed at the fast growing 
working class, amongst whom many migrants. Since this decade policies have been directed at 
creating mixed neighborhoods (Engbersen, 2014, p.8). Since 2008 Rotterdam publishes an annual72 
Social Index. Based on registrations and surveys the Index is intended to give insight in the quality of 
life in neighborhoods throughout Rotterdam. Remarkable is that overall the index climbed from 5,8 
(‘vulnerable’) to 6,0 (just reaching the level of ‘socially sufficient’) between 2008 and 2009, but falls 
back down to 5,8 in 2010 and 5,5 in 2012. Notably the capacities (language, income, health) and 
social bonding (perceived bonding) drop down to level of vulnerability; and with regard to living-
environment suitable housing and facilities dropping to barely sufficient (Social Index 2008; 2009; 
2010; 2012); qualifying Rotterdam overall as socially vulnerable. The significant drop in quality of life 
between 2010 and 2012 is linked to the economic crisis, due to the fact that people can hardly make 
the ends meet and the falling levels of health. The number of so-called problem-neighborhoods73 
has doubled in that same period from 6 to 13, on a total of 65 neighborhoods. The ‘problem-
neighborhoods’ are located in the sub-districts of Charlois, Delfshaven and Feijenoord (Sociale Index, 
2012, p.6-7). 
Policies: linking housing and integration 
The City Executive Coalition of 2002-2006 (Leefbaar Rotterdam, CDA and VVD) and the current 
coalition (LeefbaarRotterdam, D66 and CDA) both have a separate portfolio putting immigrant 
integration high on the political agenda: respectively ‘Social Integration’ (Alderman Tak, CDA), and 
‘Urban Development and Integration’ (Alderman Schneider, Leefbaar Rotterdam). Notable in this 
first period is the influence of Alderman of Infrastructure Pastors (LeefbaarRotterdam) on the 
Integration debate, as illustrated by a few incidents below (see politics).  
In the intermediary period this policy area was rephrased in generic terms, replacing immigrant 
integration as a policy-field by city-citizenship under the respective portfolios of ‘Public Health, Well-
being and Social Care’ (Alderman Kriens, PvdA, 2006-2010) and ‘Labour market, Higher Education, 
Innovation and Participation’ (Alderman Louwes, Lib-Dems/D66, 2010-2014). 
While housing policies, like on the national level, are typically phrased in generic terms, between 
2002-2006 the general situation of spatial and social segregation and deprivation is explicitly linked 
to immigrants. A local administrative memorandum states: “the influx of immigrants concerns people 
that in social-economic development, language, culture and religion are on a far distance from the 
Rotterdam-average .. this coincides with the high concentration of these groups in certain districts; 
e.g. segregation” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003: p.11), linking housing policies explicitly to immigrant 
integration policies in the Coalition period of 2002-2006. These two areas were decoupled in the 
subsequent coalition periods. 
Politics: politicization of integration 
Arguing against the former years of ‘casual and informal immigrant integration policies’ was “one of 
the strongest concerns of both Fortuyn and his party … the councilors of Leefbaar Rotterdam 
deliberately chose to make controversial arguments in order to ‘stimulate discussion’” (Uitermark &  
Duyvendak, 2008, p.1492-1493). This was evident from e.g. media controversies of Leefbaar 
Rotterdam councilors around the Islam-debates and controversies around the framing of the 
                                                          
72 Published only biennial since 2010. 
73 The social index distinguishing between respectively strong/sufficient/vulnerable/problem/very weak neighbourhoods. 
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Rotterdam-Act. Repeatedly making “..the ethnic composition of the city [..] the starting-point for 
policy debates on its economic, cultural and social life” (Uitermark &  Duyvendak, 2008, p.1493).  
While segregation at a neighborhood-level became a policy-priority all over the country, an annual 
prognoses-publication of the Rotterdam Bureau of Statistics of future city-demographics, drove the 
debate in Rotterdam to the edge. In the publication it was estimated that in 2017 ethnic minorities 
would make up over 50% of the entire city-population, with numbers up to 85% in the sub-district of 
Charlois. In response to this ‘alarming’ report Alderman Pastors for infrastructure and housing of 
LeefbaarRotterdam argued for an ‘immigrant-stop’ (‘allochtonenstop’) or a ‘fence around 
Rotterdam’ preventing underprivileged immigrants to move into the city (NRC Handelsblad, 2003, 
September 12; Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003b). While outside his party Pastor’s proposal could not 
count on much political support, it did lead to the notion that the influx of ‘disadvantaged 
households’ had to be regulated (framing these in terms of income and employment rather than 
ethnicity) eventually leading to a proposal for the Wet Bijzondere Grootstedelijke Problematiek, or 
the Rotterdam-Act at the national level (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003; see also chapter  4.1.2).  
In 2005 a series of controversial public debates on the Islam and Integration were organized in 
Rotterdam. Initiated by the municipality the debates were intended to discuss the growth of Islam in 
the city amongst the inhabitants of Rotterdam. The debates were initially framed as an opportunity 
“to finally speak out and express out doubts and obligations” (NRC Handelsblad, 2005, January 12; 
2005b, April 7). In an essay Alderman Pastors caused controversy by stating that “Western society 
and Islamic society differ fundamentally from each other” (Pastors in: Uitermark & Duyvendak, 2008, 
p.1492). Eventually however it were the parties that initially opposed the very idea of the debates 
that supported its outcomes most strongly, stressing the importance of tolerance and mutual 
interest, as well as plans to follow the debates up on a neighborhood-level. Later controversy arose 
again around the ‘Citizenship-Charter’ that was drafted as a result of the Islam and Integration-
debates. While initially adopted without much controversy, the Charter became a hot-topic when 
Minister Verdonk of Migration and Integration praised the Charter, highlighting the second condition 
of the code that stated “We Rotterdammers, use Dutch as our shared language” (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2002). Picked up by the media the code was placed in an assimilationist frame, while, 
according to the responsible Alderman Geluk (CDA) quite on the contrary respect was the basis of 
the 'RotterdamCode' (Tops, 2007). 
 
4.2.2 Policy content 
Immigrant integration policies in Rotterdam over the past ten years are characterized by a mixture 
of specific and generic policies aimed at the social integration of immigrants. The policies are 
typically interwoven with different field of generic 'disadvantage-policies' (achterstandenbeleid), 
aiming at 'structural integration' through e.g. housing and labour-market policies (Gemeente 
Rotterdam 2003). Although throughout the years the emphasis on specifically targeted immigrant 
integration policies has shifted to a generic citizenship approach as will be elaborated below, 
specifically targeted subsidies and consultation-structures feature the policy context all along. 
Examples of these specifically targeted projects are the consulting of Turkish, Moroccan or Antillean 
organizations for language-classes and educational disadvantages (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002), 
specific monitoring of Antillean- and Moroccan-Rotterdam citizens (De Boom, Van San, Weltevrede 
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& Hermus 2009; De Boom, Weltevrede, Van Wensveen, & Hermus, 2011) and programs aimed at 
Moroccan and Antillean risk-groups (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2010b).  
Social cohesion on a neighborhood level 
While (social) housing is not specifically part of the immigrant integration policies, neighborhoods 
and 'the street' are important parameters for integration and social cohesion. ".. based on the 
thought: our neighborhood, our street is what binds us together. We are all citizens of Rotterdam" 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2005). In the Integration Memorandum of the Coalition it is stated that 
"many citizens of Rotterdam perceive housing as an indicator of the level of social integration" 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2003c). Between 2002-2006 the general situation of spatial- and social 
segregation, as well as depravation in Rotterdam is explicitly linked to immigrant-citizens, setting the 
stage for the local incentive that led to the Rotterdam Act.  
In addition, the ‘People make the City’-program (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002) focuses on social 
cohesion and active citizenship on a street-level, distinguishing between social and normative 
coherence. Meaning so much as contact and participation in the social network of the street and an 
emphasis on shared values, norms and behaviour (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002-2006). Building on 
previous initiatives the overarching ‘People make the city’-program aims to increase the number of 
Opzoomer-streets and link these to the Stadsetiquette74 as well as introducing the social-contract 
approach with an explicit generic approach. As a Rotterdam policy officers recalls75: 
“This initiated the transition to generic policies. The message was very clear, it is not about 
difference. We address everyone as a citizen of his or her street or neighborhood .. and that 
was absolutely not limited to migrant-neighborhoods”  
City-citizenship 
While the 2002-2006 period initially focused mainly on spatial policies (through income) to diversify 
and balance the population in certain areas, from 2006 on these social cohesion efforts focus more 
on 'bonding and participation' (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2006c): "It is not only about the physical 
encounter, but about creating actual connections and solidarity between the citizens of Rotterdam" 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008b). Dialogue and debates fulfill a central role in this period. Following an 
advise from the International Advisory Board of Rotterdam the Coalition strives to make Rotterdam 
'a leading Intercultural City': "The 160 different nationalities in Rotterdam are not a problem but 
should instead be seen as an opportunity that Rotterdam should make use of" (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2007c). While referred to in a number of policy documents, the term 'intercultural city' 
does not seem to resonate outside these documents let alone beyond this Coalition Period. 
However, one interpretation of the intercultural approach that is central to the Coalition Program 
the concept of 'City-Citizenship'. Focusing on the core values of taking pride in the city, reciprocity, 
identity, participation and ethics. City-Citizenship is intended to form a framework for all policies 
related to integration, participation, emancipation and citizenship. The program broadens the scope 
                                                          
74 ‘Opzoomeren’ originates from an initiative of the residents of the ‘Opzoomerstraat’ in the eighties when they joined 
together to renovate their street. Since 1994 an annual ‘Opzoomer’ campaign is organized to activate ‘Opzoomer‘-streets 
all around Rotterdam as to stimulate residents-initiatives to imprive the livability in the area. Currently the city counts 1800 
‘Opzoomer‘-streets. Retrieved October 20, 2014, from http://www.opzoomermee.nl/overons.html#.VETZu1cudEg. 
‘Stadsetiquette’  entails ‘citizen-initiated’ social encounters aiming to improve trust in the public space. Gemeente 
Rotterdam (2001). Projectplan Stadsetiquette Rotterdam. Rotterdam: Gemeente Rotterdam.  
75 Interview with policy officer and program-manager department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 26th of June 
2014.  
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of immigrant-integration policies to City-Citizenship as an important goal for all citizens of 
Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2007c).  
While previously more specifically and centrally driven, the citizenship-frame as typical of the 
policies between 2006-2014 has an explicit generic and inclusive approach, targeting both immigrant 
and native-citizens: “bounded by the fact that they are all citizens of Rotterdam” (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2008b). While a first step towards generic policies and its framing was set here, several 
policy officers we spoke to claimed this shift only really took shape under the budgetary cuts of the 
new Coalition in 2010 when cutting all subsidies for mono-cultural organizations and projects. This 
suggests a correlation between budget cuts, retrenchment and mainstreaming. 
A financial push for mainstreaming? 
As part of retrenchment measures all social policies were revised, “there were too many things going 
on. There was an overlap between several programs and things were done simultaneously”76.  The 
programs were replaced by more result-oriented approach in those neighborhoods that where 
behind in health, poverty, integration, participation, living, public space and nuisance (Gemeente 
Rotterdam, 2010c) and partly replaced by a focus on the areas of emancipation, discrimination and 
diversity (Burgemeester en Wethouders Rotterdam, 2011). While these organizations and initiatives 
were previously subsidized to overcome segregation (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2002b) it was now 
instead argued that equality, approached through generic policies, is the motor towards the 
solidarity and cohesion.    
A former policy officer summarizes the transition as follows: “It was a next step towards the 
citizenship policies. The incentive was given in 2006, the budgetary cuts formed the next step in this 
direction”.77 In another interview a NGO-officer stresses the importance of the financial reforms: 
“while the frame and discussion are not necessarily much sharper than in 2002, the actual reforms 
are now driven by the financial cuts, these are of a decisive importance here”.78  Initially the reform 
was very much focused on what was no longer done, rigidly discarding all targeted measures: 
“When looking back I can conclude there was no effort to mainstream at that time. The efforts were 
very much focused on letting go of immigrant-integration policies but the responsibility for this field 
was not picked up on by other departments. ... It is not self-evident that for example the educational 
department takes this up”. 79 
The officer points out that the ‘State of Integration’ report, published on the cities of Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam, had put the issue of immigrant integration back on the agenda in the midst of the 
                                                          
76 Interview with policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, Rotterdam, 9th of June 2014. 
77 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, 
Rotterdam, interviewed  4th of June 2014. 
Effectively this meant that the wide range of (mono)cultural organizations mainly active in ‘frontline social work’ were cut 
back the budget by 70% for the 38 civil organizations supported by the municipality before. While cutting back the front-
line work, the main principle was to preserve the knowledge that many organizations had developed throughout the years. 
This eventually led to four knowledge- and expertise centers based around women emancipation, gay-emancipation, anti-
discrimination  and diversity as empowerment [brede aanpak diversiteit], meant to inform and raise awareness on these 
topics in generic, governmental policies. This fits a shift in governance towards a smaller and more efficient government 
who takes the role of a facilitator, outsourcing or abolishing the first-line work (Burgemeester en Wethouders Rotterdam  
2011; 2013).  
78 Interview with NGO-staffmember knowledge-center diversity, Rotterdam, 16th of June 2014.  
79 Interview with policy officer at the department of education, and former policy officer at department of Integration, 
Rotterdam, interviewed  4th of June 2014. 
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generic citizenship development. The report led to a contrary development, such as the ‘Mee(r) 
doen’ program; an 'integration method' directed at the citizens of Rotterdam (Gemeente Rotterdam, 
2011f). While generic in principle the program additionally addresses (partly specifically targeted) 
immigrant integration projects. Policy officers we spoke to claim that this step internally led to a 
more active coordination between the departments on issues of immigrant integration.  
4.2.3 Conclusion 
This analysis of social cohesion policies in Rotterdam illustrates the shifting policies and its framing, 
from explicit and specific targeting of immigrants to a generic rephrasing in terms of inclusive city-
citizenship. However, this rephrasing was so strongly focused on moving away from specific policies 
that the issue of integration was not touched upon at all anymore, completely disappearing of side 
in all policy-departments: illustrating the risk of decoupling (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014, 
p.27). It is only recently that the theme of immigrant integration is back on the agenda with the 
awareness that this requires active coordination between departments. However how this will 
develop under the new Coalition is yet unclear. While former Alderman Louwes previously wrote 
that "contrary to what Leefbaar Rotterdam frontman claims, immigrant integration in its classic 
sense has long passed in Rotterdam.. Integration is not something to talk about, you just do it" 
(Louwes, 2014, January 28), in line with the generic citizenship-frame. On his turn her political 
opponent Eerdmans writes that Louwes claim that integration is over, is all wrong "if it is up to 
Leefbaar [Rotterdam] we get on with the integration policies that have been neglected by Louwes as 
soon as possible. It is of crucial importance to give 'New Dutch'[citizens] a solid basis in the Dutch 
culture and society, so that they can participate in our society the sooner" (Eerdmans, 2014, February 
5). In the new Coalition Agreement, with Leefbaar Rotterdam as one of the Coalition parties, it is 
indeed stated that “To solve specific problems we chose target group policies and accustomed policy 
measures when these prove to be effective” (Gemeente Rotterdam, 2014, p.14). Whether this marks 
a new policy shift, moving away from the generic, and mainstreamed, citizenship policies remains to 
be seen.  
The case analysis of Rotterdam reveals a similar trend from specific to generic policies as Amsterdam 
and the national level. Also, as in the other cases, clear replacement strategies were put in place. 
This involves both needs-based strategies, reflecting the more traditional Rotterdam focus on socio-
economic deprivation such as in the sphere of housing, as area-based strategies, such as manifested 
in the Rotterdam act that was adopted in response to lobbying of the city of Rotterdam.  
As far as an intercultural orientation is manifest in the Rotterdam approach, this is rather faint. The 
citizenship frame does seem to provide an anchor for bonding within the super-diverse population 
of Rotterdam, and the recent establishment of an expertise-center on diversity do suggest a positive 
recognition of diversity and its importance to the city. At the same time, our context analysis clearly 
shows that diversity remains a fiercely contested political issue in the Rotterdam political arena, in 
contradiction to Amsterdam.  
At the same time, what stands out clearly from our fieldwork on Rotterdam is the role of budgetary 
constraints on the shift toward generic policies. Mainstreaming is in this sense often framed as a 
consequence of retrenchment of the more active (and sometimes group-specific) integration 
policies. 
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4.3  Amsterdam 
Amsterdam was the first so called ‘majority-minority’ city of the Netherlands, when in 2011 the 
migrant population outnumbered the native population, with 51% against 49% (Crul, 2013, p.1). Like 
in Rotterdam, the ‘fact of diversity’ has for a long time formed the basic principle of the immigrant 
integration policies. While generally characterized as politically stable with less populist influences 
than Rotterdam or the national level, the Amsterdam case is strongly influenced by the assassination 
of filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh, as will be elaborated amongst other developments in 
the policy background sketched below.  
4.3.1 Policy background 
Problem context: incidents and polarization 
The debate on social cohesion in Amsterdam has been strongly influenced by the assassination of 
filmmaker and columnist Theo van Gogh on the streets of Amsterdam in November 2004 by a 
second-generation Moroccan-Dutch radicalized Muslim (see also Penninx, 2006). The religiously and 
politically motivated murder caused a ‘shockwave’, confronting the Netherlands with one of the first 
incidents of religion-related terrorism in a very long period. While not leading to direct violent 
polarization in Amsterdam80, the incident did raise levels of mutual mistrust and fear. This polarized 
tension in the city again comes to the fore when a seventeen-year old Moroccan-Dutch boy died in 
traffic after being chased by the police. This boy’s death caused tension in the city-district of 
Slotervaart where the incident took place when the residents ‘turned against’ the police. Similarly 
tension rose between residents around incidents in the Diamant city-district. Indicating the tensions 
on the street and an increased feeling of division between the native and immigrant population 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b). 
Divided social worlds are rising and the problem-accumulation in certain areas seems to coincide 
with a concentration of immigrants in certain areas, “contributing to the polarization between 
different ethnic groups” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.4).  This division translates spatially as 
well, the Amsterdam municipality warns for a ‘potential split’ of the Amsterdam population 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c). Characterized by increasing differences in social-economic position 
Amsterdam seems to divide between areas ‘inside the A10 ringroad’ and the areas ‘outside’. In the 
districts of Nieuw-West and Zuidoost this social economic-disadvantage coincides with a 
concentration of non-Western-allochthons (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c, p.35). Though overall, in 
2011 all neighborhoods in Amsterdam scored moderate to positive on the national ‘livability-
measure’ (Ossel, 2013, p.2). 
Several studies indicate that social trust and social contacts between ethnic groups are declining. 
The political participation amongst immigrants is low, and has decreased since 1994 (Gemeente 
Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11). The municipality sees a big challenge in improving the connection, 
dedication to- and identification with the city of non-western allochthons and youngsters in general 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013). 45% percent of the population of Amsterdam thinks negatively of 
Moroccans, a fourfold in comparison to attitudes toward other ethnic groups. While native citizens 
are upset about nuisance and misbehaviour, in their opinion caused by allochthons, 50% of 
                                                          
80 The murder did lead to a series of violent repercussions throughout the rest of the country.  
 62 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
Morocans and Turks in Amsterdam on their turn say to have experienced discrimination based on 
their descent (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11).  
In a grand revision of the Amsterdam immigrant integration policies the municipality mentions an 
‘Islamization’ of issues of domestic violence, criminality and anti-Semitism, stating that "this 
wrongful analysis has no other result than polarization" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c). With regard 
to radicalization a survey study of the IMES (Slootman & Tillie, 2006), following the murder of van 
Gogh, reports that 2% of the Muslims in Amsterdam is sensitive or susceptible for radicalization, 
taken from the fact that they combine an orthodox interpretation of the Islam with the belief that 
the Islam is under threat and that something must be done about it (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). 
The annual report of the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands that year 
(Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst, 2006) observes an increase in Islamic radicalization, 
specifically under migrant-youth. Equally the Municipal Information-service on Radicalization (de 
Gemeentelijke Informatiehuishouding Radicalisering) noted a strong increase in reports of 
radicalization, mostly about Islamic radicalization and a few reports on right-wing radicalization too 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007). While not framed as such as strongly as in Rotterdam or at the 
national level, Amsterdam policymaking is strongly informed and influenced by these incidents, 
indicating an ‘Islamization’ of issues of integration and radicalization, and its policy-responses. 
 
Policies and Politics 
In contrast to the strong political shifts that characterized Rotterdam politics, Amsterdam has known 
a fairly stable succession of PvdA-led Coalitions (Social Democrats), up to the recent local elections 
(2014). which were won by D66. Throughout the last ten years Amsterdam has always held a 
separate portfolio on immigrant integration, coinciding with portfolios such as social affairs, housing 
policies and diversity.  
In a grand revision of its immigrant integration policies in 2005 the Coalition stated that "there are 
simply too many projects and programs going on. .. numerous projects have been started up, ideas 
pitched and debates initiated" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.11). The Revision remarks a mix of 
tolerance and political correctness on the one hand and as an antithesis an overcompensation of 
strong language and a harshening of the political debate and policies on the other. This has led to a 
harshening of the so-called problem-group par excellence; the Moroccan Youth, of whom a part 
explicitly does not (wish to) identify themselves with the Dutch society anymore, instead seeking 
resort in the radical Islam. “A sequence of incidents increasingly determines the relations. … 
Amsterdam has continuously tried to pacify these hardened relations and prevent escalation” 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.6). It is this role and a "facet-approach” that does justice to the 
complexity of the immigrant integration process and the diversity of the Amsterdam society 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c p.2+26) that defines Amsterdam Immigrant Integration policies. 
Apart from some small adjustments on this regard, the reorientation does not lead to major changes 
in Amsterdam immigrant integration policies.  
The local immigrant integration policies of Amsterdam are subject to government retrenchment 
measures at the national level (see Vervolgnota 'Werk in Uitvoering' 2003) and a reduction of the 
GSB-means for integration, ‘old-comers’ and educational disadvantages policy (Jaarplan en 
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Begroting 2005). However in Amsterdam this did not lead to such comprehensive reorganization of 
the immigrant-integration (funding) system as in Rotterdam. 
 
4.3.2 Policy content 
As a ‘multicultural city’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004d; 2008) Amsterdam is, and always has been 
characterized by diversity, this has formed a central and equally self-evident theme in Amsterdam 
policymaking. While still treating diversity as a separate topic in the Immigrant Integration 
Memorandum of 2003 and the revision thereof in 2005 (B&W, 2003; Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003; 
2005c) this period marks the beginning of a transition towards mainstreaming. From the following 
Coalition Period on (the year of 2006 and beyond) topics such as immigrant integration, social 
cohesion and citizenship are treated generically in the respective program plans and Memorandums 
of different departments. Policies move away from a separate set of immigrant integration policies, 
instead forming a ‘facet approach’ active on all fields and levels of community care and public 
facilities. "Whether we call it integration policies or not, it is about equal access to scarce resources in 
the fields of living and livability, work and income, knowledge and schooling and health" (2005c). In 
addition new programs on radicalization and discrimination are coming up, later continued under 
the citizenship programs (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004c; 2006b; 2007; 2008).  
Specifically targeted policies 
While increasingly generic in approach, throughout the years there are numerable specific policies 
recognizable too. Such as sport-stimulation programs ‘specially adjusted to ‘new’ Amsterdammers’ 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2003), the emancipation of female ‘oudkomers, or special civic-integration 
tracks for highly educated immigrants (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2004d). Special attention for 
immigrant women and their children (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c) or area-focused policies 
indirectly targeting certain income/ethnic groups (Ossel, 2013). However, as observed on a national 
level as well as in Rotterdam, in Amsterdam (political) support for specific policies is waning81.  
In this light and driven by austerity measures Amsterdam, like Rotterdam, restructured its financial 
support for migrant self-organizations. The former programs were reformed to more generic 
programs for integration and participation (Subsidieverordening Integratie, Participatie en Sociale 
Cohesie, SIP), with an emphasis on ethnic-mixing and women- and gay-emancipation in 2004. In 
2013 these were reformed again to a Citizenship and Diversity program, focusing additionally on 
discrimination and citizenship-initiatives. However, as one of the Amsterdam’ policy-officers remarks 
in an interview, Amsterdam is the only city that still hosts some financial-support for specific groups, 
to bridge the gap with other groups in society.  
‘We Amsterdammers’ 
The assassination of Theo van Gogh on the 2nd of November 2004 startled the city, putting 
radicalization on the map. In immediate response to the killing the ‘We Amsterdammers’ Action Plan 
was developed in 2005 to combat terrorism in cooperation with the policy and the judiciary; 
counteracting radicalization, by opposing discrimination and exclusion; avoiding polarization and 
mobilizing positive powers. Combining repressive policies with preventative social cohesion 
programs, such as developing tools for early-identification of radicalization, 'Day of the Dialogue'  
                                                          
81 Interview with head of the department citizenship and diversity and policy officer DMO, Amsterdam, 20th of June 2014. 
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and the 'Amsterdam intolerant for intolerance' campaign targeted at the hospitality industry, 
educational institutions, sports clubs, employers and parents (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005d). The 
program does not fall under the regular immigrant integration department but instead a separate 
‘Platform Amsterdam Together’ is developed under the direct responsibility of the mayor. While 
previously a self-evident theme, from this moment on diversity is increasingly considered as a 
‘potential source of conflict’ (Gemente Amsterdam, 2006d, p.3-4). While diversity remains to be 
considered the "force behind an open city" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2008), it is now linked explicitly 
to the (improvement of) social cohesion and participation.  
In the sequel Memorandum ‘We Amsterdammers II’ it is concluded that “the so-called ‘We-feeling’ 
that should indicate the inclusion of all Amsterdammers (...) still requires sufficient direction and 
effort” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.8). An evaluation of the first program-period learns that 
while the more concrete radicalization and polarization are working relatively well, the third more 
abstract polarization branch seem harder to affect. "Bonding and bridging social capital is not 
something that can be initiated from the city hall but should arise from initiatives by the citizens 
themselves" (p.9). Remarkable here is that the program explicitly choses to approach cohesion in a 
dialectical -multicultural- way, focusing on bonding within groups on the one hand, and bridging 
between the different groups on the other hand: "People should feel safe and familiar in their own 
circle before reaching out to participate in society and politics. Bonding within ethnic groups therefor 
is an important condition for bonding between ethnic groups" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006b, p.11). 
As a part of the We Amsterdammers program in 2007 a specific plan against radicalization was 
executed: the Amsterdam against radicalization program. After 2010 the citizenship and social 
cohesion theme were picked up in a new neighbourhood approach (Gemeente Amsterdam 2007) 
and in the policy on Citizenship and Diversity (the ‘citizenship campaign’) (Gemeente 2011b), 
although never explicitly linked as such.82 The Platform Amsterdam Together, that was developed 
specially for the ‘We Amsterdammers’ program, has merged with the Citizenship and Diversity 
department in 2010, who thereby becomes the primary responsible department on all diversity 
matters. 
Moving to the neighborhood level 
Housing policies and effective methods to deal with so-called 'problem-neighborhoods' were 
considered the most important binding theme on the local immigrant-integration-agenda (see a.o. 
Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c). Referring to the Rotterdam Act, the Amsterdam Coalition claimed 
that "radical solutions such as locking of neighborhoods for the less privileged are not on the agenda 
in Amsterdam, the municipality does strive for a social-economical mixing, but by building and 
restructuring only" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2005c, p.20). From 2007 on this spatial planning focus 
shifts to a 'neighborhoods approach', intended as a "catalyst to intensify the existing approach and 
create more unity and focus there, from now on centered around the implementation on a 
neighborhood level" (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c, p.20). In line with the Coalition’s central 
program-plan ‘People make Amsterdam’ (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d) 'citizenship-participation' 
becomes a central theme in the (partly mainstreamed) integration policies. Framed in terms of 
livability and safety, social cohesion policies are developed on a neighborhood level, in order to 
stimulate the integration and participation of “all who are left on the side-line, men and women, 
                                                          
82 Interview with policy officer at department of citizenship and diversity, Amsterdam 2nd of July 2014. 
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young and old, native and immigrant citizens, they should all be motivated to participate” 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2007c, p.18), phrasing the social cohesion goals in more generic terms on a 
neighborhood-level. 
In the following Coalition period (2010-2014) the Alderman of (e.g.) Diversity and Integration stated 
that “in Amsterdam we speak of citizenship”83 and explicitly ended immigrant integration policy as a 
separate policy domain. The goal is that citizens participate, respect each other and are open to 
diversity so we can live together in a pleasant way in Amsterdam. The municipality’s policies on 
women- and gay-emancipation, antidiscrimination, participation and courtesy are integral parts of 
citizenship (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2011b). The term ‘hyperdiversity’ pops up in this period too, 
addressing the fact that Amsterdam is a city of 183 nationalities, and that diversity should be 
understood in a wide sense, e.g. also including sexual diversity moving further away from the classic 
immigrant integration approach to diversity. In 2013 the citizenship-policy emphasis shifts more 
strongly to social- and policy- participation of citizens (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2013b).  Declining the 
potential division of the native and immigrant population - coinciding with social-economic 
disadvantages - remains the main driving force behind housing policies in the following years 
(Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c). The ‘Vision on Living’ as published in 2009 targets the (immigrant) 
middleclass to prevent them from leaving the city, broadening the policies measures from a 
differentiation of housing to a high quality of services (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2009c, p.45). The 
move to the neighborhood-level was also driven by developments of retrenchment and a 
decentralization of tasks from the national government to the municipalities. This led to new 
bottom-up approaches to work on the neighborhoods through neighborhood trusts and self-
management from 2015 on (Ossel, 2013).  
4.3.3 Conclusion 
Similar to the national level and Rotterdam, the integration or citizenship policies of Amsterdam 
have been moving towards mainstreaming in the past ten years. In 2006 policy-responsibilities were 
redistributed to a ‘facet-approach’, active on all fields and levels of community care and public 
facilities to do justice to the complexity of integration and diversity. A move to more generic framing 
of these issues followed later, by replacing immigrant integration with citizenship policies in 2010. 
This is also reflected in the decline of cooperation with (single-ethnicity) migrant organisations, in 
fact very similar to Rotterdam. 
However, there are several important differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam as well as 
with the national level. First of all, Amsterdam seems to have continued specific policies longer than 
the other cases (similar to what we saw in the educational domain in chapter 3).  For instance, the 
‘We Amsterdammers’ campaign clearly reflected at least a strong awareness of the importance of 
migrant groups and processes of bonding within and bridging between groups. Also, some forms of 
cooperation with migrant groups are said to be continued. Possibly, this more incremental and more 
modest turn toward generic policies are a reflection of the absence of a sharp politicization as had 
been the case in Rotterdam and on the national level. In Amsterdam, it was rather the 2004 killing of 
Van Gogh that speeded up policy developments, but not in all respects favored the trend toward 
generic policies.  
                                                          
83 Although initially introduced in 2004 (Gemeente Amsterdam 2004d).  
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Furthermore, Amsterdam appears to have developed a much more explicit orientation on diversity 
and culturalisation of the city, which has been much more modest in Rotterdam and on the national 
level. This reflects the fact that Amsterdam has become a super-diverse city, the first majority-
minority city in the Netherlands.  
4.4 Policy explanations 
This section connects the findings on mainstreaming integration in social cohesion policies to the 
conceptualization and typology of mainstreaming that has been developed in the previous work 
package of the UPSTREAM project (Van Breugel, Maan & Scholten, 2014). We will discuss to what 
extent mainstreaming involves a move to a ‘whole society’ approach in terms of diversity, to what 
extent policies are targeting specific groups or the general population and the use and design of 
poly-centric modes of governance. Subsequently, in the following paragraph the overall question 
‘what is mainstreamed and why’ will be addressed.  
4.4.1 Connection to mainstreaming typology 
With regard to policy targeting – one dimension of our typology- social cohesion policies are mainly 
phrased in generic terms. Rather than directly targeting ethnicity, for instance by focusing on inter-
ethnic contact or on ‘ethnic concentration neighborhoods’, replacement strategies are now firmly in 
place that involve primarily area- and needs-based strategies. Social cohesion policies are now 
primarily targeted at the neighborhood level and framed in terms of mixing high- and low-income 
groups or in terms of addressing all people on a city level as city-citizens. Although all three cases 
have several examples of specifically targeted policies throughout the last ten years, these were 
rather exceptions than the standard, at least in terms of framing. On a national level, the ethnicity-
targeted programs for housing policies have been abandoned, with policies now mainly framed in 
terms of income. Notable here however is the difference in defining problems, and the actual 
drafting of policies. Disadvantages in problem- or weak-neighborhoods are often, amongst other 
factors, raised in terms of ethnic concentration and integration. However subsequently there seems 
to be a reluctance to target the policies likewise, instead they are ‘kept open to a wider public’ such 
as in the ‘Power-Districts Approach’. Resonating the ‘dilemma of recognition’ typically linked to the 
assimilationist model of ‘denial’ “insist[ing] that, despite inequality between social or cultural groups, 
redistribution policies do not benefit any particular group” (De Zwart, 2005, p.139). 
In Rotterdam the move to generic policies intensified in particular after 2006, when a new coalition 
was installed without Livable Rotterdam. Since then integration policies have strongly moved away 
from separate immigrant-integration policies, instead speaking of city-citizenship and thereby 
reducing all specifically targeted programs. This specific dimension of mainstreaming, as a move to 
generic policies, proved to work poorly as the policy responsibility for the topic was not distributed 
to other departments; rather, the responsibility for integration and the awareness of integration-
related issues appeared to be fragmented and diluted. Later a comparative study on integration in 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam put immigrant integration back on the agenda here, eventually leading 
to more active coordination between departments on immigrant integration and the return of 
certain specific programs. At this local level we can thus recognize different levels and framings of 
mainstreaming. From a move towards generic framing of citizenship to the so-called ‘risk of 
decoupling’, where the issue of integration risked to disappear altogether. This illustrates the fact 
 67 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
that good coordination is required when mainstreaming immigrant integration policies across 
departments. 
In Amsterdam the move towards more generic, citizenship, projects was strongly driven by the anti-
radicalization program as developed in response to the murder of Theo van Gogh which put the 
emphasis on social cohesion, commonality and identification on the map. The role of the former 
mayor Job Cohen was decisive in the development of this program. “He was the figurehead of the 
program, capable of bringing people together”84, a good match with the strong emphasis on social 
cohesion, as actively disseminated by Job Cohen. While a facet-approach on integration was 
introduced in 2006 already, it was only in 2010 that a more generic citizenship-system was 
introduced. Notably a couple of years later than Rotterdam.  
Our analysis does reveal a slight paradox in that whereas the policies now mostly involve area- and 
needs-based replacement strategies, policy and political discourses often do involve a more explicitly 
problematisation of ethnicity. This related in particular to ethnic concentration in specific 
neighborhoods and to lack of inter-ethnic contact. Our analysis clearly shows that this 
problematisation of ethnicity and interethnic contact was a key driving factor behind the 
mainstreaming of social cohesion policies in the studied period, especially in Rotterdam and on the 
national level. Furthermore, we found that budgetary constraints played an important role, with 
vanishing budgets for the specifically targeted policies of the past as a more objective motor behind 
the formulation of generic policies.  
The second dimension of our mainstreaming typology involves the presence or absence of a whole 
society approach that is based on a recognition of cultural pluralism or monism. Overall diversity of 
neighborhoods and society is considered a fact. However, our analysis does show that this 
recognition of diversity is more apparent at the local level than at the national level, which can be 
seen as a reflection of the (super-)diversity of these cities, whereas this goes less for the national 
level. While previously considered rather self-evident, it was Leefbaar Rotterdam that put diversity 
in the context of social cohesion on the agenda in Rotterdam. In Amsterdam a shift in this thinking 
was initiated by the assassination of Theo van Gogh, putting segregation, polarization and 
radicalization on the map. As summarized in the following words of the Amsterdam Program 
Agreement of 2006: “Diversity is the force behind an open city. But diversity also forms a potential 
source of conflict. Discrimination, feelings of detachment and radicalization threaten social stability 
and can lead to a divided city” (Gemeente Amsterdam, 2006d). 
While the opinion on the desirability of mixed neighborhoods shifted briefly around 2000, since 
2002 policies have been directed at diversity (in its widest sense, e.g. ethnicity, age, level of 
education and income) rather than at ethnicity at a neighborhood-level through housing and social 
policies. On a local level the pluralist notion of society is most evident in the citizenship programs, as 
initiated in 2006 in Rotterdam and 2004 and since 2011 in Amsterdam. "It is not only about the 
physical encounter, but about creating actual connections and solidarity between Rotterdammers" 
(Gemeente Rotterdam, 2008b).  Dialogue and debates fulfill a central role in this period. In terms of 
mainstreaming the role of diversity and contact indicate the pluralist framing of generic policies. On 
the national level quite the contrary seems to happen, an increasing focus at the individual level and 
                                                          
84 Interview with a former program director of the 'Wij Amsterdammers'-program, Haarlem, 20th of May 2014. 
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the responsibility to adapt to the host society indicates a move towards monism in policy-measures 
and its framing. 
Thus it is clear that, similar to what we found in the educational domain, the shift towards generic 
policies in the Netherlands does not really correlate with an emerging ‘whole society’ approach in 
terms of diversity. Only the city of Amsterdam does seem to have an approach that is explicitly 
oriented at interculturalisation (although with a sometimes uneasy combination with ethnic 
problematisation in terms of anti-radicalisation). To a lesser extent Rotterdam addressed this under 
the generic citizenship frame of ‘we are all Rotterdammers.’ The national level and to some extent 
also Rotterdam (see the Rotterdam code) seem based on cultural monism rather than pluralism, 
involving to some extent a decision to ignore rather than recognize diversity.  
Finally, with regard to polycentric governance as the final dimension of mainstreaming (Van Breugel, 
Maan & Scholten, 2014), processes of deconcentration and decentralization can clearly be identified 
in the case of social cohesion policies. The first entails a differentiation of policy responsibilities 
between different departments and stakeholders, where the latter indicates a distribution of policy 
responsibilities between different levels of governance. Especially the latter case of decentralization, 
stands out in the area of social cohesion. Housing policies have been characterized by major 
deregulations and decentralizations already since the 1990s, which was also the period that 
integration policy was indirectly connected to this via urban policies. Throughout the years under 
study for this report we can observe that this trend has continued further, in what can perhaps be 
phrased the second large housing-decentralization of 2011 (twenty years after its first major reform) 
as part of deregulation -and austerity- reforms in the social domain. Social cohesion policies in 
relation to migrant integration now primarily involve neighborhood policies.  
This trend to decentralization of actual social cohesion policies in terms of housing and 
neighborhood policies, is somewhat at odds with the simultaneous politicization of social cohesion 
at the national level. There is a clear discrepancy between the emphasis on social cohesion in 
national political discourse and its role in actual national policies. In fact, with the exception of the 
‘Power Boroughs Approach’ that has now already come to an end, national social cohesion policies 
have had to cope with austerity measures almost constantly throughout the period of this study. It 
can be concluded that, when looking at actual policies and budgets, the Netherlands does not so 
much have a real national social cohesion strategy, but has rather delegated this to the local level, 
where superdiverse cities like Amsterdam and Rotterdam have taken up the challenge of promoting 
social cohesion in specific and somewhat city-specific ways.  
Poly-centric governance also involves deconcentration of policy responsibilities. This is also clearly 
present in the field of social cohesion, where on the national level as well as in Rotterdam in 
particular the responsibility for migrant integration in general and social cohesion in particular has 
been differentiated over various departments. To some extent this also applies to Amsterdam, 
although there migrant integration in relation to social cohesion resorts under a generic department 
of ‘diversity and citizenship’, rather than differentiating it across various departments. An important 
challenge in this respect, visible in particular in the Rotterdam case, is to preserve some form of 
policy coordination and problem awareness across departments. Without proper ‘horizontal’ 
coordination mechanisms between departments and stakeholders, the Rotterdam case shows that 
there can be a risk of policy dilution. 
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4.4.2 What is mainstreamed and why? 
Now we have analysed how social cohesion policies on immigrant integration were (or were not) 
mainstreamed, the question remains of what drove these developments of mainstreaming. Our 
assumption that mainstreaming can be explained by the extent of diversity (also super-diversity) 
cannot be fully justified after our analysis of social cohesion policies. On the one hand, the turn from 
specific to generic policies took place at the national as well as the local level, regardless of the much 
more (or super-)diverse setting of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Also, traces of more specifically 
targeted measures continued much longer in the first Dutch majority-minority city, Amsterdam, than 
in the others. On the other hand, it was clear that a more interculturalist ‘whole society’ approach 
emerged much more in Amsterdam and to some extent also in Rotterdam than at the national level. 
This would be fully in line with our expectation about policies in super-diverse local settings, though 
it does not help us understand the differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam.  
Our analysis does show that the political factor is important to mainstreaming in the field of social 
cohesion. In particular, we see that politicization at the national level and in Rotterdam was an 
important force behind the shift from specific to generic policies, abandoning group-specific 
measures. Particularly in Rotterdam we can see how the moves between specifically targeted 
immigrant integration policies and more generic citizen-approach are politically loaded and reactive. 
The political turn of Livable Rotterdam in 2002 can be considered a local ‘backlash against 
multiculturalism’ responding strongly to previous informal and multicultural policies. This was less so 
in Amsterdam where politicization was much more modest, even after the tragic killing of Van Gogh 
in 2004. At the same time, Amsterdam seems to have been able to develop an interculturalist ‘whole 
society’ approach much more easy and to keep integration policy coordination much more 
manifestly than the other cases, which also seems to be related to the lower degree of politicization. 
It should be observed in this context that politicization in these cases primarily involved the rise of 
populism, which has been clearly the case in national and Rotterdam politics, but not in 
Amsterdam’s politics. So we can conclude that whereas the rise of political populism contributed to 
abandoning of group-specific measures, it has hampered the replacement of such measures with an 
inclusive approach in terms of the scope and effectiveness of the policies. In fact at the national level 
the turn to generic policies is so strong that “in the current political climate there is no room for 
specific policies, even if it would be more efficient“85. Politicization here leads to a narrow 
interpretation of mainstreaming, leaving little to no room for questions of inclusivity.   
On a national level the recent turn to generic policies and decentralization has to be situated in the 
context of general retrenchments in the social sector and a move towards ‘participatory society’ that 
form part of the reason to narrow down immigrant integration policies.  Equally in Rotterdam 
retrenchment in the social sector proved to be a decisive step in the process of mainstreaming. 
However here, immigrant integration was already rephrased in generic citizenship-policies when 
retrenchment hit the field and thus proved to serve as a next step in the citizenship-frame. By some 
actors this was even believed to more decisive in applying the framework than the political framing 
that was initially set. Retrenchment and austerity measures as a consequence of the economic crisis 
do prove to be influential on mainstreaming, either as an initial push or next step in mainstreaming. 
                                                          
85 Interview with Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, The Hague, 26th of June 2014. 
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However, it was remarked that the move to generic policies in Rotterdam was strongly informed by 
what should no longer be done, mainly dismissing policies. 
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5 – Conclusions 
 
This report focused on the policy rationale behind (or ‘the politics of’) mainstreaming immigrant 
integration in the Netherlands. Mainstreaming is understood in this project as a shift toward generic 
policies oriented at a pluralist society and toward poly-centric forms of governance (Van Breugel, 
Maan & Scholten, 2014). This understanding of mainstreaming guides our study in search of 
situations that match this definition, rather than those cases where mainstreaming may be 
mentioned explicitly but defined in very different ways. The key questions in this study were: 
1. What forms of mainstreaming can be identified? To what extent are migrant integration 
policies mainstreamed, and to what extent are other policy strategies preferred?  
2. How have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors contributed or 
obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance? 
3. Why has (or has not) integration governance been mainstreamed? What explanations can 
be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance? How can differences between 
cases be explained? 
 
5.1 Types of mainstreaming in the Netherlands 
 
Our analysis shows that mainstreaming is not such a new phenomenon in Dutch integration policies 
as is sometimes suggested. In spite of Dutch policies being internationally renowned for their group-
specific ‘multiculturalist’ approach, the issue of mainstreaming has been part of Dutch immigrant 
integration debates from the very beginning. Already in the 1980s, even though Dutch government 
then pursued many target group specific policies, the defining policy slogan was to have specific 
policies wherever required and generic policies wherever possible. Even in this period, when looking 
at policy budgets, emphasis was more on socio-economic participation of immigrants than on their 
socio-cultural emancipation as groups. Especially in the 1990s, the balance between generic and 
specific policies already clearly shifted toward the former. In that period, most integration measures 
focused on socio-economic participation of individual migrants as new citizens of Dutch society.  
Besides the issue of how to target migrants, the other two dimensions of mainstreaming also apply 
more broadly to the development of Dutch policies over the past decades. On paper at least, the 
Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s already would have involved a ‘whole society’ approach 
oriented at ‘mutual adaptation’ between migrants and the host society in full recognition of the 
multi-ethnic character of society (see Scholten 2013). However, it must be recognized that in 
practice the Ethnic Minorities Policy indeed concentrated primarily on the minority groups involved 
rather than at society at large (with notable exceptions such as Intercultural Education of the 1980s). 
Also in the 1980s and early 2000s, integration policy never really addressed society at large in 
practice. 
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The dimension of poly-centric governance does apply especially to the 1990s as well. Whereas the 
Ethnic Minorities Policy was clearly a state-centric led policy, the integration policy of the 1990s was 
deconcentrated to sector departments and also to some extent decentralized to local governments. 
The latter trend has continued throughout the 2000s, in spite of some centralizing tendencies in the 
context of the assimilationist turn. In fact, one of the paradoxes that this project observed is that 
precisely in the period that the politicization of immigrant integration at the national level was 
fiercer than ever before (the mid-2000s), the actual role of national government in this policy 
domain had been dispersed between departments and over different levels of government more 
than ever before.  
What is new about recent developments in terms of ‘mainstreaming’ in Dutch integration 
governance is, according to our findings, especially the extent to which specific measures have made 
place for generic policies and the extent to which policy responsibilities have been differentiated or 
even ‘diluted.’ First of all, the analysis of both education policies and social cohesion policies, show a 
shift from specific measures to generic policy measures, resulting in a full abandoning of specific 
measures by the end of the 2000s. What is more, this applies to the national level as well as to 
Rotterdam and Amsterdam, albeit in somewhat different paces. In national education policies, 
specific measures such as special attention for so-called ‘black schools’, immigrant minority language 
instruction and target group specific funding regulations for primary schools were all discontinued. 
In national social cohesion policies, the shift to generic policies had already set in earlier during the 
1990s, continuing in the 2000s in particular in relation to increased emphasis on neighborhood 
policies.  
This shift to generic policies also applies to the cases of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In Rotterdam, 
this shift was even facilitated by its traditional focus on socio-economic participation and 
accelerated by political pressure to abandon group specific measures of any kind in both policy 
areas. The education policies of Rotterdam are characterized by tackling educational disadvantages 
predominantly with generic measures and aiming at ‘mixing’ black and white schools to increase 
inter-ethnic contact between pupils. Early childhood education and care is the biggest exception to 
the overall generic approach, since it is still targeting immigrants specifically. However, in Rotterdam 
the shift toward a generic approach was combined sometimes uneasily with a continued 
problematization of ethnicity in political discourse. This is perhaps illustrated most clearly by the 
Rotterdam Act, which was adopted upon direct request of this city, and originally intended to 
establish an ethnic threshold for specific neighborhoods, which was only later replaced by an 
income-related threshold. In Amsterdam the shift toward generic policies was more incremental and 
more modest. Amsterdam can be characterized by its dual approach to immigrant integration. 
Following the murder of Theo van Gogh, a move towards generic citizenship policies was initiated. 
However, like in the other cases, social cohesion and education policies in Amsterdam now are 
predominantly generic, with only very minor specific elements remaining in the context of a.o. the 
anti-radicalization policy and in collaborations with migrant organizations.  
However, our research shows that in both areas, generic measures were often framed as needs- and 
area- based ‘replacement strategies’. Especially in policy discourse it is phrased explicitly that many 
of these generic measures are still to target an ethnic factor in educational issues and in social 
cohesion, but without stating this explicitly so. Instead, education policies focus, for instance, on 
educational level of parents and the location of the school as needs-based and area-based proxys for 
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ethnicity. In social cohesion policies, a similar strategy can be discerned, but than based on income-
level and livability issues per neighborhood, very similar to the French Urban Priority Zones. For 
instance, the ‘power-boroughs approach’ or the special approach for the South of Rotterdam were 
explicitly legitimated within policy discourses with reference to ethnic relations.  
What remains much less evident in the Dutch case is a ‘whole society’ approach in terms of diversity, 
which constitutes the second dimension of mainstreaming. In fact, developments such as the 
‘participation declaration’ that has been launched at the national level and supported by Rotterdam 
in particular, suggests a continued focus on cultural monism rather than a recognition of pluralism. 
Only in Amsterdam did we find traces of an interculturalist orientation in education policies as well 
as social cohesion policies, although modest as well. In Rotterdam, besides the citizenship framing of 
‘we are all Rotterdammers’ in policy discourse, there is a hardly an explicit recognition of 
superdiversity as was found in Amsterdam. On the national level, the approach to citizenship 
education does contain elements that may lead to stronger focus on interculturalisation in the 
future. However, as discussed in this research, the focus on for instance the ‘historical canon’ of 
Dutch history suggests a focus on monism rather than pluralism.  
Furthermore, the Dutch case does first sight also clearly reveals the shift to poly-centric governance, 
as the third dimension of mainstreaming in the UPSTREAM project. Whereas minorities policy or 
integration policy had formed a clearly institutionalized policy domain in the 1980s and 1990s, 
during the 2000s it was incrementally de-institutionalized. Policy responsibilities were 
deconcentrated across different departments and to different stakeholders. Furthermore, in both 
areas, policy responsibilities have shifted to the local level in particular. Especially when it comes to 
the issue of migrant integration in relation to education and social cohesion, these policies have 
become primarily local policies, for instance in neighborhood policies in the efforts of local 
governments to coordinate collaborations between schools in terms of school transitions. At the 
national level there is no minister for integration anymore, and in Rotterdam responsibilities have 
been dispersed across departments as well. Only in Amsterdam did we see that integration 
remained a distinct responsibility of a department for diversity.  
However, our research also shows that this deconcentration and decentralization did not always 
lead to effective coordination mechanisms for coping with this policy complexity. At the national 
level, shrinking budgets in combination with differentiation of policies across various departments 
give the impression of government retrenchment rather than poly-centric governance. To some 
extent, this also applies to the local cases, such as Rotterdam where mainstreaming was sometimes 
understood by actors as simply the ending of specific measures for budgetary reasons and the 
dispersion of policy responsibilities across departments. However, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam 
have developed practices for cooperating with various stakeholder, especially in the context of 
education policies. Also the establishment of expertise centers in both cities could, if further 
developed, play a key role in policy-centric integration governance in accordance to the model of 
mainstreaming.  
What should be mentioned in the context of poly-centric integration governance in the Netherlands 
is the role of what can be described as ‘ethnic statistics.’ More than in most other countries that are 
included in this research project, the Netherlands can rely on an abundant availability of statistics on 
the socio-economic and to some extent even the socio-cultural position of migrants (measured as 
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‘minorities’ or as ‘allochthons’). Somewhat paradoxically, ethnic statistics clearly have played a role 
in the ‘targeting’ of mainstreamed policies; they provide a monitor of whether generic measures 
have disproportionate effects for specific groups, and whether generic policy changes are required 
to cope with specific problems. Furthermore, ethnic statistics (on the national level provided by the 
Social and Cultural Planning Office and the Central Planning Bureau) help create problem awareness 
and can be used as a poly-centric governance tool in order to mobilize responsible policy 
departments to take action if seen as needed. Our research shows that such ethnic statistics also 
play an important role at the local level, although especially in Rotterdam the availability of and use 
of ethnic statistics has declined rapidly over the last years. What may be surprising as well in an 
international context is that ethnic statistics in the Netherlands are relatively uncontested.  
 
5.2  The process of mainstreaming integration governance 
 
The analysis described in the previous section shows that when applying the UPSTREAM 
conceptualization to the Netherlands, we can conclude that mainstreaming is incomplete in the 
Netherlands. There is a shift to generic policies, but a whole society approach in terms of diversity 
has not been established yet and mechanisms for poly-centric governance are not yet in place. In 
this section we look at the factors that account for the process of how this (incomplete) 
mainstreaming of integration governance has come about in the Dutch case. Following the method 
of the UPSTREAM project, when determining what factors contributed or obstructed the 
mainstreaming of integration governance, the research focused on four main variables: actors, 
decision moments, frames and incidents.  
First of all, what stands out from the Dutch case is the key role of politicization in the turn toward 
mainstreaming. This applies in particular to the national level and to the case of Rotterdam, whereas 
the degree of politicization in Amsterdam was clearly less than in the two other cases. Especially the 
shift toward generic policies and the abandoning of specific measures can be linked to influence of 
populism in national and Rotterdam policies in the early and mid 2000s. This shift was not reverted 
after executive turnover in both cases at the end of 2000s, as in fact the trend toward 
deconcentration and decentralization was continued. Noticeable especially at the local level is the 
importance of individual politicians; examples from Rotterdam are Alderman Geluk, who actively 
tried to implement the use of double waiting lists in schools to prevent segregation, and Alderman 
Pastors, who tried to implement the Rotterdam-act with a specific ethnic focus. At the same time, 
the absence of such politicization and the role of several important actors in Amsterdam, such as 
Alderman Asscher and Mayor Cohen, allowed Amsterdam to steer a somewhat different course, 
maintaining some specific measures and mainstreaming much more incrementally and modestly.  
What appears very specific to the Dutch case is the role of ethnic statistics. Although contested in 
most other countries involved in UPSTREAM, in the Netherlands ethnic statistics are well 
institutionalized and frequently play an important role in the agenda setting of migrant-related 
issues (such as recently with regard to Polish workers). Somewhat paradoxically, it is the availability 
of ethnic data in the Netherlands that helps developing generic policies in such a manner that group 
specific issues are still targeted indirectly. However, especially the Rotterdam case shows that in the 
context of mainstreaming, attention for and availability of ethnic data is waning. This may lead to a 
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diminished awareness of migrant-related issues. Furthermore, we found in this research that the 
role of research and experts more in general on decision making related to mainstreaming appears 
rather limited; here, as mentioned above, the political context appears more decisive. For example, 
the advice of the Education Council to maintain ethnicity as indicator for the education funding 
system was rejected whereas the advice of the WRR to re-label Early Leavers as ‘overloaded’ 
students, instead of emphasizing other characteristics such as ethnicity, was adopted quickly. At the 
local level a general publication such as the citizen forecast of Rotterdam (2003) can result in the 
political claim for an immigrant stop. Whether (the results of) a research report fits within the 
current political frame on immigrant integration seems therefore an important question when 
assessing its influence on the mainstreaming of immigrant integration.  
Another factor that stands out very clearly form the Dutch case is the role of austerity measures in 
the process of mainstreaming integration governance. Austerity measures and mainstreaming seem 
to be mutually reinforcing processes. Especially a shift from specific to generic policies is as much a 
cause as a consequence of shrinking budgets for specific integration policies. At the same time, this 
relation to austerity measures strengthens the earlier observation that in the Dutch case 
mainstreaming integration governance did not involve a more active generic approach in the sphere 
of interculturalisation. The national government reinforced its strive for generic policies by declaring 
that the budget for immigrant integration policies will be reduced to zero in 2015 (Ministerie BZK, 
2011). Similarly, at the local level it was the abolishment of subsidies to mono-cultural organisations 
under pressure of diminishing municipal budgets that proved to be the decisive step in 
mainstreaming immigrant integration in Rotterdam. As such, it is very clear that in Dutch case 
mainstreaming is associated to government retrenchment from the area of integration, at the 
national as well as the local level.  
In terms of framing integration issues in a way that would promote or discourage mainstreaming, 
there are several broader trends in society that play a role in integration governance as well. At the 
national level, mainstreaming and government retrenchment are influenced by the current trend 
towards the ‘participatory society’. The participatory society, emphasizing individual responsibilities 
for participation in society, covers many policy fields, but is recognizable in the frames regarding 
immigrant integration as well. In the last ten years the national government increasingly created an 
assimilationist focus towards immigration and integration. While we can recognize a short period 
(’05-’11) with more interculturalist notions, this interculturalist frame was accompanied by the 
harshening tone towards the magnitude of total immigration as well as the efforts made by 
immigrants to integrate in their host society. Mainstreaming immigrant integration fits within these 
frames by introducing generic policies, conveying the message that all citizen are equal, and 
emphasizing individual responsibilities.  
At the local level we can recognize the emergence of the city-citizenship as an important frame 
conducive for the mainstreaming of immigrant integration. Contrary to immigrant integration 
policies, city-citizenship focuses on the main goal of participation by all citizen, both native and 
immigrant citizen, using generic and inclusive policies. Additionally, the policies aim at creating an 
open society with shared core values regarding diversity, reciprocity, identity and pride in the city. 
Eventually, all people should feel themselves connected to the city and their fellow citizens.  
  
 76 | U P S T R E A M  W P 3  M a i n s t r e a m i n g  i n  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
 
5.3  Explanations for mainstreaming integration governance 
 
Based on Kingdon’s ‘families of processes’ (2003), the UPSTREAM project distinguishes three types 
of hypotheses to explain the reasons for mainstreaming. The hypotheses are differentiated between 
influences in the sphere of ‘problem recognition’, ‘policy proposal formation and refining’ and the 
‘political stream’. In this section, we will address to what extent these hypotheses apply to the Dutch 
case.  
In the sphere of problem recognition we expect the history of immigration, the degree of diversity 
and perceived integration problems to be of influence on the process of mainstreaming. Especially 
because of its relatively long migration history and high degree of diversity, the Netherlands may be 
(theoretically) seen as a likely case for mainstreaming. The Netherlands has been a country of 
immigration ever since the Second World War, with several migrant groups now already in their 
second, third or even fourth generation. Furthermore, the total size of the migrant population in the 
Netherlands is relatively large when compared to the other countries in this study. Especially when 
taking into account these second and third generations. In Rotterdam and Amsterdam, this 
population makes up up to, or even over 50% of the total city population (Scheffer & Entzinger, 
2012; Crul 2013). Also, the number of different groups, in terms of ethnicity or country of origin, has 
broadened considerably.  
This changing problem situation, characterized increasingly by ‘superdiversity’, provides a most-
likely setting for mainstreaming, especially at the local level. In this super-diverse context, specific 
policies would be infeasible due to the large number of groups and the hyphenation over 
generations, and diversity would be so central to society that some form of ‘whole society’ policy 
aimed at interculturalisation would be required. At the national level we see this particularly in a 
move away from group-based targeting. In 2004 it was decided that the differentiation within 
minority-groups makes group based policies senseless. The frames emphasises, in the spirit of the 
multicultural backlash of the early 2000’s, that integration is an issue of everyone. Despite this 
frame, many national policies remain targeting separate groups. An ever present heritage of the 
multicultural years of the previous decades. It is only in 2011 that almost all of these specific policies 
are done away with, though this is then done in an individualised frame of cultural adaption. At the 
local level this developed slightly different as group-based policies soon proved to be impossible to 
implement on the increasingly diverse population. For example the increasing diversity of Dutch 
school population, with more than half of the children of immigrant origin in the bigger cities, 
complicates the implementation of group-based policies so much that mainstreaming was 
considered an ‘inevitable’ next step. The question of integration and group based policies almost 
automatically turns into a generic question of citizenship of the entire city or school population, as 
evident in the citizenship frames as developed in Rotterdam since 2006, and Amsterdam since 2010. 
However, the Dutch case only seems to fit this ‘problem hypotheses’ as explanation for 
mainstreaming, partially. First of all, mainstreaming applies just as much (or even more) to the 
national level as to the local level in the Netherlands, which would not fit the superdiversity 
hypothesis. Secondly, there is very little evidence of interculturalisation or the emergence of a 
‘whole society’ approach in the Netherlands, except from Amsterdam (to some extent). As such, the 
change in problem definition that would be associated with mainstreaming, from immigration as a 
temporary and ad-hoc phenomenon to a permanent phenomenon of such significance that it affects 
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societal institutions at large, is not (yet) completed in the Dutch case. Third, and this may also be an 
explanation for the ‘incomplete mainstreaming’ in the Netherlands, migration-related issues in the 
Netherlands still tend to be framed in group specific terms. 
Since the multi-cultural backlash in the early 2000's the national integration-debate is characterised 
by a strong problem framing focused on issues of social-cultural integration and adaptation, as 
group-specific problems. Thus while policies are increasingly framed in generic terms, it is still very 
common in the Netherlands to make a specific connection between groups and specific problems 
(see also Van Ostaijen & Scholten, 2014). 
Besides the problem setting, UPSTREAM hypothesizes that the policy and political context play an 
important role in accounting for mainstreaming integration governance. More experience with 
specific policies is expected to decrease the chance of mainstreaming because this would lead to a 
tradition and habit of specifically targeted policies. While specific policies themselves indeed 
obstruct mainstreaming, the tradition of specific policies in the Netherlands seems to have fuelled a 
move to mainstreaming, as a next step in integration policies. In fact, mainstreaming appears 
strongly motivated by the ‘multiculturalism backlash’ that has been particularly strong in the 
Netherlands, denouncing the group specific multiculturalist approach as undemocratic and 
counterproductive. At the local level we see that Amsterdam has a stronger tradition of specific 
policies than Rotterdam, this might indeed explain why Amsterdam started mainstreaming later 
than Rotterdam. In Rotterdam on the other hand we see mainstreaming strongly responding to a 
previous period of specific policies and political populism in the field of immigrant integration. While 
experience with specific policies shows to be of influence on mainstreaming, it does not explain the 
different outcomes of mainstreaming, with varying attention for diversity-policies. Other influences 
such politicization and retrenchment must be taken into account here too. Thus we can conclude 
that only when strongly departing from its experience with specific policies this might lead to 
mainstreaming, in terms of generic policies. On the other hand the Amsterdam transition proves to 
be more inclusive than the national policies, or early mainstreamed policies in Rotterdam.   
Besides the influence of experience with specific policies, we expect the economic crisis and 
government retrenchment to increase the chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies. 
In the Netherlands mainstreaming indeed seems to take place in the context of retrenchment. 
Combined with a politicized setting the declining budgets seem to stimulate a move towards generic 
policies. A justification of specific and 'beneficial' policies proves hard to maintain under these 
circumstances. Particularly in the case of Rotterdam the influence of retrenchment, leading to a 
revision of the budget and subsidiary-relations, proved to be of decisive influence on the process of 
mainstreaming. Under the influence of the budgetary revisions, the generic frame of city-citizenship 
was actually affected and taken to a next step, definitely departing from the last remainders of its 
specific policies. The Amsterdam case on the other hand illustrates how declining budgets make it 
more difficult to address civic-integration goals in the field of education, threating the inclusive 
character of this generic field.   
Conclusively, we (surprisingly) did not found any links between mainstreaming integration 
governance and experiences with mainstreaming in other policy fields. While in theory often linked 
to the concept of gender mainstreaming, this link to immigrant integration mainstreaming was not 
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recognisable in the policy documents and developments and thus proves to be of no influence on 
the process of mainstreaming in immigrant integration policies. 
Finally, the UPSTREAM project has drafted several hypotheses on the role of the broader (than 
integration) political context on mainstreaming integration governance. We have drafted three 
hypotheses on the influence of politicization, populism and individualisation on the process of 
mainstreaming. We expect that political and media attention for integration issues increases the 
chance of mainstreaming immigrant integration policies; when highly exposed to media attention 
and public scrutiny, it may be more difficult to sustain specific policies aimed specific target groups. 
While immigrant integration has always been a hotly debated topic, this reached its highest peak in 
the early 2000's.  This period was characterised by several national and international incidents that 
contested the perceived levels of integration and led to a heavy politicization of immigrant 
integration. The turnout of the new anti-immigration parties such as Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF), Leefbaar 
Rotterdam (LR) and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) are illustrative of this.  The politicization and 
mediatisation of the issue led to move away from specifically targeted measures, which were framed 
as 'beneficial' and 'ineffective'. Even when specific measures are deemed more efficient they will not 
stand a chance in this political climate, making it very difficult to adjust policies to the needs of a 
diverse society. This seems to be most influential at the national level. All cases show that a decrease 
of political and media attention allows for more room to target diversity, or respond to problems or 
groups specifically. Thus while politicization might lead to the first steps of mainstreaming, 
decreasing political and media attention subsequently can create room for more inclusive policies. 
As the 'second phase' of mainstreaming in Rotterdam around 2012 shows, when immigrant 
integration problems were once again addressed on the political agenda, albeit this time in a less 
politicized context.  
Building on this, populism around the immigrant-integration debate is expected to increase the 
chance of mainstreaming likewise. The populist turn at the national level and in Rotterdam 
effectively put immigrant integration and social cohesion on the agenda. While leading to a generic 
frame of social cohesion as an integration goal in itself, this was done by overtly targeting migrants 
to adapt culturally and socially. The opposite of mainstreaming. The Amsterdam case might shine a 
light on this. While immigrant integration policies in this city too were politicized, this did not lead to 
a turnout of populist parties. This might explain why Amsterdam held onto its specific policies 
longer, and at the same time explain its more inclusive education policies as a result of less populist 
influence than the other cases. While populism might put immigrant integration on the political 
agenda in the context of social cohesion, it is opposed to mainstreaming as it leads to specific 
policies aimed at a monist perception of cultural adaptation. 
Finally, increased individualisation increases the chance of mainstreaming. While moving away from 
specifically targeted policies for longer, since 2011 this is placed explicitly in an individualist frame 
under the header ‘future over descent’. While moving beyond group policies, the frame emphasizes 
the individual responsibility to integrate. The local level also moved beyond group policies, applying 
a frame of (city-) citizenship, emphasizing the collectivity of the city-identity and its (potential) 
inclusive character. While the move away from specific policies is essential in mainstreaming, the 
individualisation seems to be more influential for the assimilationist frame at the national level than 
at the local level were a citizenship-frame prevails.   
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Appendix I - interviews 
________________ 
National 
Head of the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 
interviewed 28th of May 2014. 
Policy-advisor at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, interviewed 26th of June 2014. 
Policy officers Forum (knowledge-center for multicultural affairs), interviewed 27th of June 2014 
Coordinator migrant organization, interviewed 30th of June 2014. 
Program-manager at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment, interviewed 30th of June 2014. 
Policy officer at the Integration and Society-department at the Ministry of Social Affairs, interviewed 
11th of July 2014. 
 
Amsterdam 
Former program director of the 'Wij Amsterdammers'-program, interviewed 20th of May 2014 
Head of the department citizenship and diversity, interviewed 20th of June 2014. 
Policy officer DMO, interviewed 20th of June 2014. 
Policy officer at department of citizenship and diversity, interviewed 2nd of July 2014. 
 
Rotterdam 
Policy officer at the department of education, and formerly policy officer at department of 
Integration, interviewed  4th of June 2014 
Policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 9th of June 2014 
Policy officer at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 11th of June 2014 
NGO-staff knowledge-center diversity, interviewed 16th of June 2014 
Policy officer and program-manager at the department of activation and well-being, interviewed 26th 
of June 2014 
Advisor EU-affairs, interviewed 1st of July 2014  
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Appendix II - Overview of ministries involved with immigrant 
integration, social cohesion and education 
 
Table 1:  Ministries responsible for immigrant integration and social cohesion policies  
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Table 2: Overview of Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 2002-present 
Cabinet Period Minister Coalition Partners 
kabinet-Rutte II 2012 - Present Jet Bussemaker (PvdA) VVD, PvdA 
kabinet-Rutte I 2010 - 2012 Marja van Bijsterveldt (CDA) VVD, CDA 




kabinet-Balkenende III 2006 - 2007 Maria van der Hoeven (CDA) CDA, VVD 
kabinet-Balkenende II 2003 - 2006 Maria van der Hoeven (CDA) CDA, VVD, D66 
kabinet-Balkenende I 2002 - 2003 Maria van der Hoeven (CDA) CDA, LPF, VVD 
 
 
